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ABSTRACT
A common European energy policy is emerging. That poses a puzzling instance of
European integration and policy‐making. Despite the origins of the European integration
project rooted in the coal and nuclear sectors, integration in the energy domain largely
failed until the 1990s. The last two decades, however, witnessed an increasing number
of energy policy initiatives at the European Union (EU) level and culminated in the
inclusion of the energy article in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.
The dissertation aims to explain under what conditions, and how, European
integration succeeds in the domain of energy policy, based on a novel fuzzy‐set
qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of the twelve key legislative proposals in the EU
energy policy field, and a comparative case study of the two EU renewable energy
directives. In the dissertation, I develop a configurational approach that sets ground for
a typological theory of European integration. The findings support the major claim of
the study that there are multiple paths to successful integration outcome. I find
alternative paths of integration in the EU’s energy policy domain. The dissertation
findings provide evidence that integration of EU energy policy proceeds under the
interplay of structure (rules), agency (member state preferences, or supranational
policy entrepreneurs) and contingency (external shocks).
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives and Significance of the Study
The emerging common European energy policy is a puzzling instance of
European integration and policy‐making. Despite the origins of the European integration
project rooted in the Coal and Steel and EURATOM Communities and the salience of
energy issues, integration in the energy domain up to the 1980s was regarded as a
spectacular failure. The energy field lacked a legal basis in the EU treaties and was
unaffected by common market legislation. However, the last two decades have seen an
increasing number of energy policy initiatives on the EU level that are gradually bringing
the nationally ‐ dominated energy field into the legal remit of the European Union.
This dissertation aims to explain under what conditions, and how, integration
succeeds, or fails, in the energy field. The present research reorients the study of
European integration from what and why to how question and takes a configurational
approach (see Ragin 2008) to examine equifinality in European integration process. The
major theoretical and methodological contribution of the dissertation is to set ground
for a typological theory of European integration that can accommodate multiple paths
to integration outcomes. To accomplish this objective, the dissertation examines
combination of causal factors/conditions, the so‐called causal recipes that are conducive
to European integration. In other words, the dissertation aims to reveal conjunctions of
jointly sufficient conditions that lead to integration in the EU’s energy domain.
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The dissertation evaluates causal paths to integration derived from contending
liberal intergovernmental and supranational approaches, and an alternative
“punctuated equilibrium path” that brings together agency, structure and external
contingency. The goal of this testing/evaluation exercise is theory improving rather than
disproving and is aimed at developing synergy between different theoretical
approaches.
The major claim of this dissertation, supported by the findings, is that there are
alternative paths to integration that occur under the interplay of agency, structure and
external contingency. In contrast to existing studies that offer either structure‐oriented
or agency‐centered explanations of integration process, this dissertation finds that
integration in the EU energy policy domain results when structural conditions (dense EU
rules) and external shocks pressing for common solutions are successfully exploited by
supranational policy entrepreneurs (the European Commission) and/or permitted by the
convergence of preferences among the key EU member states.
Instead of theorizing about the progression of the integration project as a whole,
extensively addressed in the European integration literature, this dissertation seeks to
explore how particular policy‐making instances resulted in successful integration
outcomes. To accomplish this purpose, the dissertation draws on European integration
theories as well as literature on the EU policy‐making. The research analyzes twelve
legislative pieces in the EU’s energy domain, including the three consecutive energy
packages for liberalization of gas and electricity sectors, directives dealing with
renewable energy, energy efficiency and security of gas supply, using fuzzy set
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qualitative comparative analysis, followed by a comparative case‐study of the two
renewable energy directives. The dissertation examines cases looking at five causal
conditions ‐ supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of member state preferences,
transnational interest consolidation, rule density and external shocks ‐ to reveal the
causal path(s) to integration.
The major theoretical and methodological contribution of this dissertation lies in
its configurational approach to the study of European integration not just as a process,
but also as a policymaking outcome that results from different conjunctions of causal
conditions. This lays the foundation for developing a typological theory of European
integration that could inform the European integration scholarship about structural,
contextual and agency‐related opportunities and constraints in the European
integration process. Theoretically, this project is expected to bring integrative
cumulation as it synthesizes existing theoretical approaches in order to understand the
dynamics of European integration. On the methodological front, employment of fuzzy
set qualitative comparative analysis (or fs/QCA, on twelve EU energy proposals) is a
pioneering attempt in the field of European integration and makes a valuable
contribution to the existing qualitative studies. I expect that this methodology can
successfully be applied to other EU policy domains in future scholarly endeavors,
providing a basis for cross‐sectoral comparative analysis.
In addition, the dissertation contributes to better understanding of EU energy
policy‐making. So far, very few studies have analyzed the drivers of the EU energy
policy‐making and factors that can lead to integration in the EU’s energy policy area.
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Despite the recognition of the need for EU energy policy and its increasing influence on
national energy policy processes, there is a significant knowledge gap on how common
EU energy policy develops. In this respect, the comparative in‐depth case‐study of two
renewable energy directives is particularly enlightening.
Finally, the research carries policy relevance. It is now widely acknowledged
among policymakers, stakeholders and experts that a common EU energy policy is
essential to achieve a competitive internal energy market and respond to challenges
brought by climate change and energy security concerns. In light of recent events
unfolding in the Ukraine, a key transit country for the Russian energy supplies to the EU,
a major question occupying minds of the policymakers in the EU is going to be how to
address future energy demand and how to speak with one voice on energy issues.
Therefore, this dissertation can be equally illuminating for scholars and practitioners
interested in EU energy policy.
1.2 The Outline of the Dissertation
Chapter two reviews existing literature on European integration, identifies gaps
and develops an analytical framework for understanding under what conditions and
how European integrations succeeds in the EU’s energy policy domain. The chapter
proposes causal paths to integration derived from contending liberal intergovernmental
and supranational approaches and puts forward an alternative “punctuated equilibrium
path” that brings together structure, agency and external contingency as necessary
components of the causal path to integration outcome.
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Chapter three presents the research design and discusses two methods of
analysis employed in the research. The chapter outlines advantages of the
configurational approach, in particular fsQCA, for the proposed study and also details
the added value of the comparative case‐study method. The chapter discusses the case
selection strategy and deals with the operationalization of five causal conditions and
causal outcomes. The important contribution of this chapter is that it conceptualizes
integration outcomes along two dimensions – vertical (degree of institutionalization)
and horizontal (harmonization level) integration.
In chapters four to six, I analyze key conditions, as well as different
configurations of these conditions, in EU energy policy integration. Before resorting to
analysis of twelve EU energy proposals, chapter four provides the reader with a
historical and institutional background on the emergence of EU energy policy and
presents data obtained from the questionnaire‐based elite survey and semi‐structured
interviews. The main goal of the chapter is to examine under what conditions European
integration succeeds in the domain of energy policy based on the fuzzy set qualitative
comparative analysis of twelve EU energy proposals. By analyzing different
configurations of five causal conditions – supranational entrepreneurship, convergence
of preferences, transnational interest consolidation, rule density, and external
contingency ‐ this chapter contributes to assessing propositions suggested in the
analytical chapter and provides a basis for the development of a typological theory of
European integration. The results support the major claim of this dissertation that there
are different paths to integration and that integration in the EU energy policy domain
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proceeds under the conjunction of structural conditions (such as pre‐existing domain‐
specific EU rules), external contingencies (such as focusing events outside the EU), and
skillful supranational policy entrepreneurs (such as the European Commission).
Alternatively, successful integration outcomes result when the causal path to
integration also includes convergence of preferences among the key EU member states.
In chapters five and six, I conduct a comparative‐case study of the two
contrasting cases. In chapter five, I process‐trace the development of the 2001 RES‐E
directive that did not result in a successful integration outcome. In chapter six, I process‐
traces the development of 2009 RES directive with successful vertical integration
outcome. Systematic comparison of the two contrasting cases within the same policy
field along all causal conditions contributes to assessing the validity of different causal
paths to integration outcomes found as a result of fuzzy set analysis. In contrast to fuzzy
set analysis, in which I rely on the elite survey data, in comparative case‐studies I utilize
multiple data sources. In the end, I draw a systematic comparison between the two
cases in the field of EU’s renewable energy, and analyze whether the two different
modes of analysis validate each other’s findings.
Lastly, chapter seven concludes the dissertation by summarizing my findings, and
the implications of my research to the study of European integration. Also, I
acknowledge the limitations in the study and make suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 How to study European Integration?
The principal problem in European integration studies is the lack of a generally
accepted definition of the concept of European integration. Some scholars define
integration as a process of political integration, the end result of which is a new political
community (Haas 1957: 16). For other writers, integration is much more a process of
becoming, a variable condition, however, without a clear outcome or a definitive
reference to a political end state (Groom and Heraclides 1985: 174; Lindberg 1963: 6).
Integration has often been defined as a process through which supranational
governance – the competence of the European Community to make binding rules in a
given policy domain – has developed (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998: 1). Conversely,
integration has been defined as a condition achieved when a group of people within a
territory have attained dependable expectations of peaceful change and ceased to
prepare for war against each other (Deutsch 1957: 16).
Conceptualizations of European integration as a condition have been criticized
on the grounds that they only permit a general discussion of the environmental factors
influencing integration and fail to provide us with the tools needed to make a clear
distinction between the situation prior to integration and the situation prevailing during
the process, thus obscuring the role of social change (Haas 1958: 627). On the other
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hand, conceptualizing integration as a process, a constantly changing moving target,
may well prevent scholars from catching any meaningful snapshot of integration and
pose a serious methodological problem for explaining social change.
The satisfactory conceptual approach to the meaning of integration is therefore
an inclusive one, which sees integration as a complex process of political, economic and
social relationships as well as a broadly comparable outcome across various issue spaces
at a given point in time.
This dissertation views European integration as a complex process, which results
in varying integration outcomes in terms of the degree of institutionalization (vertical
integration) or level of harmonization across national boundaries (horizontal
integration) at a specific time in history. The interplay of various causal conditions
defines varying patterns of vertical and horizontal integration. Changes in these
dimensions mark integration success or failure. Thus, integration can experience
retraction, extension or remain steady from ‘t’ to ‘t+1’ time.
How should we study European integration? It is true that the major episodes of
intergovernmental bargaining by decision‐makers representing member state
governments are often crucial for explaining certain kinds of integration outcomes.
However, a great deal occurs around and between these grand bargains. Treaty reforms
do not emerge from thin air; rather they are reflections of prior trends and complex
day‐to‐day machinery (Maurer et al. 2003: 58). EU policy‐making is a continuous process
of building on, refining, and extending existing policies (Stone Sweet et al. 2001: 78).
Therefore, a comprehensive account of European integration should include not only
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the study of the so‐called history‐making intergovernmental decisions that led to the
delegation of sovereignty, but also the in‐between dynamics that lead to non‐treaty
based changes reflected in the secondary legislation, which may later be formalized and
brought into subsequent treaty amendments. In other words, taking stock of particular
instances of policy‐making that results in successful, or not so successful, integration
outcomes is equally important.
2.2 Existing Literature and Theoretical Framework: Structure, Agency, Contingency
To date the scholarship on EU energy policy has been dominated by descriptive,
prescriptive or normative studies. Scholars have been trying to find answers to the
following questions: “Does the EU have a common energy policy? Should the EU have
one, and if so, what should it look like?” (Matlary 1997; Egenhofer and Behrens 2011).
There are numerous studies dealing with specific policy instruments in various sectors of
EU energy policy (see for instance Helm 2007; Johnston et al. 2008; Kulovesi et al. 2011;
Schöpe 2010). While these studies provide valuable analysis of the problems and
potential solutions, they generally ignore the underlying causes and policy processes
that prevent or lead to integration of EU energy policy. By contrast, very few studies
have analyzed drivers and barriers of EU energy policy and factors that can explain
integration in the EU’s energy domain (for such studies see Birchfiled and Duffield 2011;
Buchan 2009; Eberlein 2012; Boasson and Wettestad 2013). Buchan (2009) looked at
the development of European energy policy as a constant struggle in which member
states play their own games when trying to reach ambitious climate and energy goals
set by the European institutions. On the other hand, Birchfield and Duffield (2011)
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looked at the process of “communitarization” of European energy policies and factors
that facilitate or impede this process in general. Some scholars that have tried to
theorize the emergence of a common European energy policy, have hastily rushed to
the intergovernmental conclusion that the divergence of preferences of member states,
mainly derived from the differences in their energy mix and their external policies
towards suppliers, prohibits the EU from having a common energy policy (Kusku 2010).
Several issues deserve further discussion in response to such claims. First, preferences
are not necessarily fixed; they can change as a result of interaction among various
internal or external factors. Second, to claim the definitive failure of a common policy
one also has to specify the criteria for its success. This is a challenging task as European
integration is an ongoing process and the EU is a moving target. There are no predefined
criteria for the end result of integration. Ernst Haas acknowledged that it was obsolete
to define the final outcome of integration (Haas 1975). Therefore, in an empirical world
we need to operationalize integration properly in order to observe variation in
integration outcomes.
Overall, coherent theoretical explanations of the emergence of a common
European energy policy have been lacking. In this respect, the dissertation is expected
to provide a useful contribution. Besides the limited number of studies explaining the
dynamics of EU energy policy‐making, extensive scholarship on European integration
can offer useful insights for developing a typological theory of European integration
based on the analysis of EU energy policy.
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European integration, and its implications for member state sovereignty, has
confronted scholars with significant theoretical as well as conceptual challenges. States
have voluntarily (or involuntarily) given away and, it seems, continue to give away, some
of their sovereignty to supranational institutions. Major disagreement and debate
among scholars sprang from different conceptions of actors, conditions and processes
driving European integration as well as different visions of the final outcome of
integration. The historical origin of the debate was between neo‐functionalism (Haas
1958; Haas 1961; Lindberg 1963; Schmitter 2003) and intergovernmentalism (Hoffman
1966; Moravcsik 1993; Moravcsik 1998; Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). These two
approaches featured competing conceptions of the role of supranational institutions.
More specifically, scholars have been debating to what extent, and under what
conditions, institutions make a difference, and whether or not integration is a self‐
reinforcing and transformative process.
There are two more or less automatic processes in the neofunctionalist model.
First, economic integration automatically generates an increased level of transactions
between actors within the integrating region. Because of the essential group
characteristic of politics, there is a tendency for new interest organizations to form at
the regional level. Meanwhile, supranational institutions become key sponsors of
further integration. They develop strategies to accomplish the twin goals of deeper
integration in an expanding range of sectors and the increased institutionalization of
authority at the regional level. Integration is a two‐way process in which the central
institutions affect and are affected by the subject groups (Haas 1958). As Lindberg later
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suggests, lack of agreement between governments may lead to an expanded role for the
central institutions; in other words, member states may delegate difficult collective
action problems (Lindberg 1963). Secondly, integration in one area spills over into
another when groups perceive it in their interest. Integrative lessons learned in one
functional context will be applied in others. Haas referred to spillover as an expansive
logic of sector integration. Spillover creates a situation in which the original goal can be
assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create further conditions and a
need for more action (Haas 1958; 1961).
Neofunctionalism suffers from some deficiencies in light of its explanatory power
for the development of European energy policy. The major problem for neo‐
functionalists lies in the causal dynamics of spillover. Spillover has a limitation regarding
its explanation of the expansion from macro‐sector to macro‐sector. This requires
political leadership; and as the empirical world shows, leadership, initiative and
prerogative often remain with national governments. As we have seen, the spillover
from the European Coal and Steal sectors and EURATOM did not take place in other
energy sectors, namely, gas and electricity. Second, neo‐functionalism does not
systematically account for external shocks and their impact on integration. It has been
rightly argued that the European Community is a part of the world economy, and the
international system would deny the possibility of insulating Europe from its effects.
Some scholars contended that external factors can prove to be a disintegrative force.
External shocks and a changing international economic climate would tend to provoke
diverse responses from the member states, which in turn would create divisions and
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prove disintegrative (Hoffman 1966). Other writers have emphasized the integrative
impact of the world setting (Schmitter 2003). Haas considered neofunctionalism’s
neglect of the wider world context as a serious shortcoming (Haas 1975; 1976).
In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that European governments are
very much in charge of the integration process (Moravcsik 1993). Member states can
halt or reverse integration when it no longer meets their needs. Moravcsik’s key
assumption is that states are rational. He develops the idea that rational state behavior
emerges from political processes in the domestic policy arena, where the primary
interest of government is to maintain the support of what Bueno de Mesquita calls the
selectorate (Moravcsik 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). For Moravcsik, national
interests are best viewed as consequences of state‐society interactions. Once
formulated, interests are then the objects of intergovernmental bargaining (Rosamond
2000: 137). The process of intergovernmental bargaining at the European level also
strengthens states vis‐à‐vis their home politics and enhances the domestic autonomy of
governments (Moravcsik 1998). In Moravcsik’s view, the member states, far from
becoming peripheral to the supranational evolution of the institutions, place explicit
limits on the transfer of sovereignty to the EU (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001). As
Moravcsik explains, governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions
where potential joint gains are decentralized or domestic means are likely to be
ineffective (Moravcsik 1998: 9). According to Moravcsik, European integration since
1955 has reflected three factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative
bargaining power of key governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of
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interstate commitments. European integration has resulted from a series of historic
decisions ‐ rational choices made by national leaders ‐ in pursuit of national interests,
primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily
macro‐economic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions in response to structural
incentives in the global economy (Moravcsik 1998: 3). Where and when such interests
converged,

integration

advanced

(Moravcsik

1993;

1998;

Moravcsik

and

Schimmelfenning 2009). Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism explains integration based
on preference formation (why governments desire certain outcomes), preference
distribution (which governments have the most influence on decision‐making), and
preference configuration (which alignment of member state preferences can best
explain the policy and institutional outcome). Thus, liberal intergovernmentalism views
EU integration as the product of the interests of sovereign member state governments
and the majority coalitions of these governments within the EU Council. Member state
preferences are seen as issue‐specific, shaped through bargaining with main societal
interest groups, such as the dominant national energy producers and consumers. EU
policy outcomes are seen as the product of intergovernmental bargaining processes,
where a prime concern for governments is future compliance with the substantive deals
reached. As noted by Schimmelfennig and Rittberger (2006), the degree to which
governments favor the delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions depends
on the value they place on the issues and substantive outcomes. “The higher the gains
of a cooperative agreement for a government, and the higher the risk of non‐
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compliance by other governments, the higher its readiness to cede competencies to the
EU” (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006: 83).
Several issues are problematic for intergovermentalism in light of integration in
the energy policy domain. Some are empirical and others are theoretical. First, the
development of European energy policy cannot be described as a result of history‐
making decisions. Indeed, it has been developing without a formal legal community
competence in the treaties. Second, liberalization and the establishment of a common
market in energy were in line with the interests of neither dominant industry groups
(indeed big national champions were very reluctant) nor the key member states
(Germany and France were quite reluctant), but proceeded nevertheless. Third, liberal
intergovernmentalism does take transnational society into account, but only insofar as it
funnels the demands through the domestic political processes of the member states.
However, in the empirical world, agents of transnational society, in their attempts to
solve problems, may go directly to supranational institutions to push for the preferred
policy options. Fourth, intergovernmentalism downplays the role of supranational
actors – the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in shaping
integration outcomes. Moravcsik bases his argument on the lack of bargaining power of
supranational actors. However, he disregards the agenda setting powers of
supranational entrepreneurs (Moravcsik 1991). Although Moravcsik admits that
member states rely on supranational institutions to solve the second‐order problems of
control and sanctioning, he does not recognize they can independently exert power and
influence the outcome (through Commission infringements proceedings or ECJ Rulings,
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for instance). Moravcsik argues that by delegating tasks to supranational institutions,
governments effectively remove issues from the influence of domestic politics, which
might exert pressure for non‐compliance if costs for powerful domestic actors are high
(Moravcsik 1998). There is a flaw in this logic: if the dominant domestic groups
(commercial interests, i.e.) are reluctant to comply with the EU‐level rules, and if liberal
intergovernmentalism is right in arguing that negotiation outcomes reflect preferences
of dominant groups in key member states, how is it that decisions favored neither by
dominant groups, nor by key member states have been made? Why did outcomes not
favored by the key member states come into being in the first place?
On a more methodological note, the problem with liberal intergovernmentalism
is that it is always possible, ex post, to posit some set of government preferences that
reconcile the observed outcomes. Where policy outcomes do not conform to expected
preferences, they may be explained as a part of nested games or side payments
(Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Another problem with Moravcsik’s theory is that his
argument of preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice is
strictly sequential. First, preferences are not necessarily fixed throughout the policy
cycle. Second, institutional choices do not necessarily follow the substantive bargaining.
Analytical separation of substantive bargaining and institutional choice is questionable.
Member state governments do not first settle policy issues and then turn to selection of
institutional arrangements, but have institutional preferences in addition to policy
preferences and make linkages between the two (Schimmelfenning 2004: 82).
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Also, liberal intergovernmentalism does not explicitly discuss how external
shocks may affect the positions of member states, and to what extent preferences
reflect exogenous conditions. And even when it does, liberal intergovernmentalism only
takes into account long‐standing remote structural factors (i.e. international economic
competition) but does not discuss the effects of proximate external events or shocks.
Even if liberal intergovernmentalists are right to assume that preferences of member
states are heavily weighted toward preserving sovereignty, and delegation of
competencies is only acceptable insofar as it strengthens national executives, increasing
levels of sensitivity and vulnerability caused by external shocks, especially those that
have direct electoral implications, such as energy disruptions, can raise the willingness
of governments of the member states to delegate powers to the Community.
Governments care more about an efficient response due to short‐term decision
horizons determined by electoral constraints rather than sovereignty. Governments can
scapegoat the EU for unpopular measures and justify the costs of domestic adjustment.
Proponents

of

supranational

governance/institutionalism

differ

most

fundamentally from Moravcsik in their view of supranational institutions as sponsors of
integration. From neo‐functionalism they picked up the institutional expansion and from
Deutsch the importance of transnational transactions (Deutsch 1957). Supranationalism
offers a different view, portraying EU‐level institutions in more autonomous terms in
which they are able to utilize the significant gaps in member state control over the
process of European integration in day‐to‐day policy‐making.
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The logic of supranational institutionalization unfolds when the convergence of
transnational society, supranational organizations and rules gradually but inevitably
reduce the capacity of member states to control outcomes (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
1998). At first, the process that translates human behavior into structures and rules
takes place followed by the process of translating structures and rules into political
impacts. Supranational institutions become key sponsors of further integration.
Supranational agents develop strategies to accomplish the twin goals of deeper
integration and the increased institutionalization of authority at the European level.
Integration is a two‐way process in which the central institutions affect and are affected
by the subject interest groups. Nationally constituted groups have specific interests and
aims, and are willing and able to adjust their aspirations by turning to supranational
means when this course appears profitable and efficient. Governments, faced with
declining benefits and rising costs of maintaining national governance structures, react
by constructing supranational governance (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).
An important condition for expanding supranational authority is prior
institutional commitments. Institutional and policy change become ‘path‐dependent’ as
actors define their preferences within the context provided by supranational
institutions, based upon what has occurred in the past (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000;
Peters et al. 2005; Bulmer 2009). History creates context, which shapes choice. With
respect to prior commitments issue‐linkages are important as well. Because sectors are
so interconnected, previously integrated sectors can have future implications on
unintegrated ones as supranational institutions can seize the opportunity and exert
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independent influence on the process of integration by establishing linkages between
related issue areas. Independent influence by the supranational institutions favors
policy solutions that place the locus of interest mediation at the European level, and
involve binding EU rules rather than intergovernmental co‐ordination. Supranational
institutions have the capacity to shape preferences of actors, constrain them and in so
doing structure political situations and affect outcomes. Under these conditions,
member states have less ability to set priorities independent of the institutional context.
In this view, their preferences and actions are more context‐driven (March and Olsen
1984; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Pollack 1997). Thus, for the theory of supranational
governance/expansion, the role of transnational exchange is central to generating
demands for regulation and governance capacity at the European level (Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet 1998). However, without some form of leadership and an arena within
which politics unfolds and gives shape to demands, it would be ineffective. The more
globalized the issue domain, the more demand it generates in transnational society. As
Commission influence depends on its ability to mobilize support among civil society,
socio‐economic problems enjoy a better chance of becoming supranationalized
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).
In sum, the theory of supranational governance is based on a self‐sustaining logic
of institutionalization. An expansion of the tasks or autonomy of supranational
organizations creates opportunities for political action, which actors and groups will
exploit, thus expanding transnational society. As societal actors adjust their behaviors in
response to new supranational rules, these rules can gradually be locked in (Stone
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Sweet et al. 2001; Pierson 1996). If broader, global trends promote growth of
transnational society, there will be a corresponding demand for increased organizational
capacity and rules to coordinate and guide interactions (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet
1998: 11). Treaty‐based policy domains have the advantage of having a legal basis in the
Union’s fundamental rules and should move more quickly toward supranational
governance than policy areas for which a legal basis is lacking. Conversely, policy
domains mentioned in the treaty but lacking cross‐border transactions are not likely to
move toward supranational governance. This could partially explain the late emergence
of common energy policy.
The theory of supranational governance provides useful insights for explaining
the emergence of the common energy policy in the EU. It is, however, not immune from
shortcomings. Although it brings in the discussion the role of globalization, it
insufficiently accounts for how institutional logic may be undermined, strengthened or
changed as a result of external shocks. Empirically, it still needs to be explored to what
extent transnational interests have been driving the demand for the integration in the
energy domain. Sometimes integration is driven by supply rather than demand side
forces, which can originate not only from the EU institutions, but also from the member
states.
An attempt to bridge the gap between the intergovernmentalists and the
supranationalists with respect to main drivers of European integration, has been made
with the multi‐level governance approach. This approach is based on the assumption
that the “various institutions interpenetrate in a complex and messy, but creative,
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conglomerate” (Wincott 2002). The laws that are created at the European level result
from the interaction between different actors at different levels of governance.
According to Peters (1992: 75‐123), the policymaking process is influenced by different
“games” played between member states and the European Union, between different
institutions of the EU, and between different Directorates General (DGs) within the
Commission involved in a certain area. This picture is complemented by Matláry (1997),
who adds a fourth game, which takes place between the DGs and interest groups from
the national and pan‐European levels. Among these interest groups trying to influence
the policy‐making process, are often created or at least financially supported by the
European institutions in order to gain backing for their policy proposals (see for instance
Cram 1997: 137‐138.). Thus, scholars who analyze the EU in terms of “multilevel
governance” focus on the process by which the contemporary EU produces policy
outcomes. However, they do not aim at explaining how some policy domains, or some
outcomes within those policy domains, get more integrated than others. Another pitfall
of multi‐level governance approach is that they take supranational governance for
granted.
There are various gaps in the existing literature on European integration.
However, some gaps are common to all approaches, which need to be addressed. First,
most of the theoretical approaches do not clearly distinguish between different
dimensions of integration outcomes (vertical or horizontal) (for an exception, see
Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Deepening the degree of institutionalization (vertical
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integration) does not necessarily lead or follow a change in harmonization of policy
instruments, laws or norms across national boundaries (horizontal integration).
Second, nowhere is the old adage that “crisis spells opportunity” more
applicable than in the case of European energy policy domain. External shocks have
been providing an impetus and redirecting and shifting integration. External shocks are
those events and forces – contingency frameworks ‐ that can affect sensitivity (how
quickly changes in one country bring costly changes in another and how costly are these
changes) and vulnerability (the country’s ability to offset these costly effects by making
policy changes), increase opportunity costs, change the range of available options and
alternative actions (Keohane and Nye 2000). External shocks can shift national
preferences by pushing member states to reassess, reevaluate and redefine courses of
action and provide the window of opportunity for institutional actors to advance
collective interests. The divergence of preferences among the member states due to
differences in their energy mix and different patterns of energy dependence on outside
energy suppliers does not necessarily hamper integration, sometimes even to the
contrary: dependence on outside energy supplies makes the EU as a whole vulnerable.
External shocks can exacerbate vulnerability and induce regional cooperation. If and
when member states realize advantages of collective power vis‐à‐vis their suppliers,
they become more willing to cooperate and coordinate their actions on the EU level.
Alternatively, higher levels of interdependence within the Union can raise the
opportunity costs of non‐cooperation leading to the integration path.
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2.3 Different Paths to Integration: Structure, Agency, Contingency – 3‐D of European
Integration
The interaction between national, European, and global forces are shaping the
integration process. Integration simultaneously internationalizes domestic politics and
domesticates international politics. The complexity and multifacetedness of
contemporary European integration are manifested in such features of the EU as its
changing treaties, the sheer number of policy‐making processes, and differing degrees
of integration in policy sectors. Integration is a dynamic process that yields divergent
outcomes. It is a sophisticated accommodation of national interests via the construction
of governance regimes and the consolidation of supranational policy. Michael O’Neill
(1996: 144) argues that the process of integration is driven by coexistent, yet
contradictory logics such as economic globalization on the one hand and the urge to
retain the primacy of national governance on the other. The actors involved in the
process operate with different expectations and interests. This means that the
theorization of integration requires corresponding eclectism.
So far, scholars have been content to examine “contending” theories of
integration (intergovernmental versus supranational approaches), or narrow their
explanations to emphasize the impact of either agency or the institutional/structural
factors. A well‐known and long‐standing debate between structure and agency, or
opportunity and willingness, or remote and proximate causes, has not been alien to the
European integration approaches. Remote structural causes are relatively stable over
time. Their origin is often remote on the time and/or space dimension from the
outcome to be explained and treated as exogenously given to the actors in most of the
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cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2006). Proximate causes do not originate far in the
past and are the products of purposeful actions of human agency. These are actor‐based
and process‐oriented events located at the micro‐level in structure‐agency approaches
(Mahoney and Snyder 1999). Structural factors provide for causal depth but fall short of
demonstrating the causal mechanisms that link deep, distant causes with an outcome.
In contrast, explanations based on agency‐driven arguments display causal mechanisms,
often, but not necessarily, at the micro level. In the European integration literature the
structure‐agency dichotomy is not always clear‐cut. Sometimes institutions are seen as
structural factors, while other times they are perceived as proximate causes of the
outcome.
Actor or agency‐based explanations emphasize the role of rational and
instrumental governments and see integration as a process in which they define a series
of underlying objectives and preferences. The integration outcome is a result of
aggregated individual actions based on these preferences and reflects bargained
agreements concerning cooperation and choice of institutions in which to embed them
(Moravcsik 1998; Schimelfenning 2004). Therefore, any explanation of European
integration has to take into consideration the actor preferences, motivations underlying
the support for or opposition to integration and what happens to those preferences in
the process of bargaining.
On the other hand, theories that recognize the importance of structural factors,
numerous variants of neo‐institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996) hold in common the
fact that they are responses to pure behavioralist views of policy making, and that they
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all emphasize some kind of institutions within which social action is embedded
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Hollingsworth 2000; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Indeed, the
basic idea is that social action is occurring in institutionally constrained arenas. In the
European integration context such structures could be the existing EU rules, institutional
balances, and functional‐economic interdependencies – the so‐called issue‐linkages
(Stone Sweet et al. 2001). Institutions determine how policy objectives will be translated
into political outcomes. Institutions provide constraints and opportunity structures for
strategic actors to achieve their goals. Their preferences are shaped by evolving
structures, norms and rules of the EU rather than exogenously given. Collective actions
are not merely the aggregation of individual preference and preferences are subject to
change (Niemann 2006).
Integration theories have been looking for basic causes of integration either in
purposive behavior of dominant and powerful states and their strategic interaction
(liberal

intergovernmentalism),

self‐reinforcing

dynamic

of

integration

(neo‐

functionalism), or transnational societal demand sponsored by supranational rules and
entrepreneurs (supranational governance). Scholars have been juxtaposing these
competing variables with the aim to come up with one single overarching explanation of
integration touching those parts of the elephant that seemed fit for the assumptions of
their theoretical framework (Puchala 1972). While scholars have unanimously been
admitting the complex nature, various phases or faces of European integration, the
‘either‐ or’ approach seemed to be the dominant State of the Art. Would it not be
reasonable to acknowledge multiple paths integration can take? The ensuing research is
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a modest attempt to reorient the study of the European integration in that direction.
Such an approach engages in theory improving rather than disproving exercise and
helps develop synergy between different theoretical approaches.
My dissertation questions both structural determinism and agency‐centered
voluntarism as singular explanations. As Schimmelfennig and Rittberger argue, “a
combination of the factors and conditions postulated by different theories of integration
may be necessary to account for phenomena of sectoral, vertical, and horizontal
integration” (Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006: 92). A good causal statement
consists in finding the right conjunction of structural, agency‐driven and contingency‐
induced causal conditions. I argue that integration does not necessarily need to follow a
single path. There are different paths to integration.
For that purpose, I put forward a set of propositions that rest on contending
liberal intergovernmental and supranational approaches to European integration. These
propositions correspond to different paths of European integration. I also propose an
alternative “punctuated equilibrium path” to integration that brings together structure,
agency and external contingency. Instead of assessing the relative importance of a single
variable, or claiming the preeminence of one theory over the other, my research
evaluates multiple causal recipes to integration with the aim to set ground for a
typological theory of European integration.
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2.4 Causal Paths to European integration
2.4.1 Liberal Intergovernmental path to European Integration: Convergence of
Preferences and Integration as a lowest‐common denominator outcome
The decisions on common policies on the EU level are preceded by preference
formation domestically. Preferences emerge from a process of domestic political conflict
in which issue‐specific sectoral interests (usually dominant economic interests), policy
adjustment costs and sometimes geopolitical concerns play an important role. Hence,
the decision to integrate energy policy should be preceded by pressure from domestic
interests and by the overt failure of unilateral policies to achieve regulatory or other
kinds of objectives.
Underlying demand for cooperation determined by global competition patterns
imposes a binding constraint on negotiations. Negotiations focus primarily on the
distribution of benefits, and outcomes are shaped by the relative power of governments
and their preferences, in particular the opportunity costs of foregoing agreement
(Moravcsik 1993; 1998). Governments will reject agreements that would leave them
worse off than unilateral policies. Those who gain the most economically compromise
the most on the margin to realize it. Those who gain the least with the highest costs of
adaptation impose conditions.
The pattern of preference intensity dictates the relative value each places on an
agreement, which in turn dictates the respective willingness to make concessions. The
decision to integrate only takes place when they are pareto ‐ improving as compared to
unilateral alternatives of dominant member states.
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The configurations of domestically determined national preferences define a
“bargaining space” of potentially ratifiable agreements (Moravcsik 1993; 1998).
Member states will resist policy proposals tabled by the European Commission when
these policy initiatives entail considerable costs of adjustments, and different prospects
of gaining or losing material benefits. Governments often dispute the scope of common
policy, precise nature of policy coordination and harmonization, degree of institutional
delegation, and associated side payments.
Therefore, successful integration outcomes depend on the convergence of
preferences of key member states. Even when decisions are adopted under a Qualified
Majority Voting (QMV) procedure, the key member states will be able to impose
conditions or build blocking coalitions. In addition, supranational entrepreneurs show
the path of least resistance where they anticipate opposition from the powerful
member states and tailor and revise proposals to fit national preferences.
Proposition 1 (LI): Convergence of preferences among the key member states
with the strongest bargaining positions determines variation in integration
outcome. Integration outcomes are lowest common denominator outcomes.
Proposition 2 (LI): Successful integration outcomes result only when the key
member states with strong bargaining positions have converging preferences in
favor of the proposed policy that extends the degree of institutionalization
(vertical integration) or level of harmonization (horizontal integration).
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2.4.2 Supranational path to European Integration: Transnational Interest Consolidation,
Rule Density and Supranational Entrepreneurship
Transnational interests, the capacity of supranational organizations to pursue
integrative agendas, and the structure of European‐level rules bind together, within
complex systems of mutual interdependence, which determines the course of European
integration (Stone Sweet et al. 2001).
Supranational policy entrepreneurs (the European Commission) can exercise
leadership in different ways. The Commission can define problems, set agenda, advance
proposals, mediate compromise and facilitate agreement, mobilize societal interest
groups and frame issues in a politically appealing manner (Lindberg and Scheingold
1970; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Sandholtz and Zysman 1992; Daviter 2007).
In the policy initiation phase, the European Commission has considerable
influence over legislative outcomes because its power to make proposals allows the
Commission to set the Council’s agenda. In other words, from all the potential outcomes
that would generate QMV support in the Council, the Commission can choose the
proposal most preferred by the European Commission, usually the one that puts
forward more integration. The Commission’s role as the institutionalized initiator of
policy is reinforced by the importance of cognitive arguments and the complexity
inherent to highly technical issues. Due to scarce personnel resources, the Commission
is dependent on information from outside sources but it is usually in a position to decide
which ideas or interests will feed into the policy process from the outset (Hix 2005: 227).
Thus, the Commission is central to deciding which topic will appear on the agenda and
how it will be framed.
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Supranational entrepreneurs can resort to “splitting the difference” among the
member states, exploiting issue‐linkages and upgrading the common interests to
facilitate agreement in the negotiation phase. Supranational entrepreneurs can
augment necessity, urgency, and compulsion and translate pressures into something
persuasive by highlighting issue salience (Niemann and Schmitter 2009: 57).
Supranational entrepreneurs can mobilize transnational interests in support of
their proposals. Such action may generate outcomes that go beyond the initial
intentions of governments. Proximity or expertise with the EU legal and administrative
procedures gives supranational policy entrepreneurs comparative advantage in
designing solutions and inventing institutional options. So, supranational actors exert
independent influence on policy outcomes through agenda setting due to privileged
access to information and ideas, through mediating due to recognized neutrality and
issue‐framing skills, through mobilizing support due to privileged position in
transnational society. As Niemann and Schmitter (2009: 56) argue, an issue’s failure to
climb up the policy agenda may be precisely due to failure of supranational
entrepreneurs to arouse interest, mobilize support or convincingly claim authority.
This purposive action of supranational agency is enabled and constrained by
discretion, which is determined by existing rule structures. Rules establish institutional
context in which actor’s interests and strategies take place. Rules can produce the so‐
called “structure‐induced equilibrium” by ruling some alternatives as permissible or
impermissible and by structuring the voting and veto power in the decision‐making
process (Pollack 2004; 2005). The system of rules can constrain as well as empower
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actors. For instance, QMV reduces power disparities between member states, widens
the range of possible winning coalitions, increases agenda‐setting power of
supranational entrepreneurs and encourages the higher level of compromise.
Rules affect the degree of power that any set of actors has over the policy
outcomes;

define

their

organizational

position

by

establishing

institutional

responsibilities and relationships with other actors that influence actors’ perceptions of
their own interests. Thus, rules affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to
bear on policy and the likely direction of that pressure (Hall and Taylor 1996: 19). In
order to understand how agency exercises power, one has to understand the
institutional environment in which power operates. It is the combination of these two
that defines the integration outcome.
Activation of transnational interests and their organization at the EU level is
another constitutive element of supranational integration recipe. A key point for
supranational path to integration is that increasing transnational activity creates room
for a more prominent role for supranational actors like the European Commission.
Transnational interest groups form coalitions to direct their demands to supranational
institutions while bypassing the state. There is a pervasively symbiotic relationship
between the European Commission and transnational groups. The Commission has an
interest in co‐opting industry‐specific elites into the policy process to help draft new and
assess existing legislation. The Commission is both a receptive institution as well as
adept at using societal group intermediation strategically in the policy change process,
in constructing constellations of stakeholders in policy domains (Mazey and Richardson
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2001). As integration advances, more and more interest groups discover that it is in
their interest to be consulted and they themselves push for more political voice in
Brussels. The incentive structure for transnational interest groups is twofold: either to
stop European regulations that could have an adverse effect on their interests, or
exploit the opportunity of shaping new European regulations to the disadvantage of
other actors unaware of the importance of the new venue or less able to mobilize the
necessary resources (Mazey and Richardson 2001).
According to supranational path, integration outcomes depend on the ability and
willingness of supranational entrepreneurs to exploit existing EU rules in the given policy
domains, and the presence of consolidated transnational interests at the EU level.
As EU rules in a given domain become dense, the potential for conflict between
national rules and practices and the interests of transnational society increases and
provides more opportunities for supranational entrepreneurs. EU policies may become
“locked in” as transnational societal actors adapt to and develop vested interest in the
continuation of specific EU policies. Previous decisions provide a new starting point and
create an altered context for the member states in the subsequent decisions. Previous
policy decisions can create feedback loops as they increase the costs of reversal because
societies domestically, in response to EU rules, might have already developed particular
skills, made certain investments, or undergone technological change (Pierson 1996).
Proposition 1 (S): Degree of consolidation of transnational interests at the EU
level, the density of EU rules in a given domain, and capacity and willingness of
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supranational entrepreneurs to advance integration (degree of supranational
entrepreneurship) determine variation in integration outcomes.
Proposition 2 (S): Successful integration outcomes result when supranational
entrepreneurs are successful in exploiting existing dense rules in a given policy
domain and are supported by highly consolidated transnational interests.
2.4.3 “Punctuated Equilibrium” Path to European Integration: Integration as a “Window
of Opportunity” Outcome
Time, planning, and policy‐making form a complex triangular relationship. Jolts
to the policy process, in the form of external shocks, such as a ‘focusing event’, including
a crisis, bring about shifts in authority, or the mobilization of new interests to an issue
(Pralle 2006: 989). Pushing an issue on the agenda then depends on how well interests
are mobilized, and the ability to secure interest in the issue. Changes in policy emerge
after ‘critical junctures,’ or ‘periods of contingency, during which the usual constraints
on action are lifted or eased (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 7). Sometimes these periods of
contingency can be cultivated by more distant and indeterminate structural conditions
but exacerbated by a focusing event with punctuating effect on the system. In the
European integration context, due to differences in extra‐regional dependence –
changes in the extent to which member states and the region as a whole are subjected
to asymmetric constraints by actors outside the region that reduce their capacity for
independent decision‐making ‐ member states may well find themselves increasingly
compelled to adopt common policies. Competition on world markets can sometimes
create pressures for integration from above the nation‐state. Asymmetric dependencies
and competitiveness pressures can raise the demand for multilateral approaches, EU
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involvement, and open new opportunities for supranational entrepreneurs, including
strengthened competencies and roles of the EU in external negotiations (Sbragia 1998).
Exogenous shocks may produce change in the preferences of member states in
several ways: External shocks may reveal deficiencies of unilateral policies and the need
for and expedience of policy coordination. Governments can become more receptive to
European level solutions as they feel domestic pressure to respond to external shocks in
a timely manner, especially if the crisis has a direct and severe impact on domestic
constituencies. The short‐term horizons of government leaders only contribute to the
compromising atmosphere in the EU level negotiations. External shocks will make
member states, especially ones with weaker bargaining positions, more amenable to
European solutions and package deals as they will be more sensitive and vulnerable,
more affected and less capable of responding, and with the highest cost. In addition, the
need for unpopular measures and simultaneously the temptation of governments to
blame unpopular measures on the EU may rise during the contingency periods. That
makes the EU solutions convenient scapegoats.
External shocks can have the effect of creating new coalitions of interests for a
common purpose: to design a new political space to respond to the shock. In already
existing policy spaces, such shocks can unhinge the perceived efficacy or legitimacy of
existing sets of rules and procedures governing interactions. Supranational
entrepreneurs can grab the opportunity provided by the external shocks and convince
member states that existing rules in the given domain need clarification, or extension to
adapt to novel situations exacerbated by the external contingency.
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Supranational entrepreneurs can play a crucial role in interpreting and
identifying a problem and suggesting possible solutions. Supranational actors can bring
about profound institutional change by exploiting existing rules, procedures, and access
points when the policy window opens up by the external shocks (Kingdon 1995; Heritier
1997; Mazey and Richardson 2001). External shocks can produce changes in the relative
costs of doing things, call for adaptation and provoke a search for organizational
alternatives (North 1995).
Changes in the external environment seldom have a clear self‐evident meaning.
Actors seek ways to interpret and understand crises and shocks. One must determine
what the problem is before assessing alternative responses. Therefore, external shocks
provide an opportunity for a supranational policy entrepreneur to develop new frames
for pushing “pet proposals” on the agenda (Kingdon 1984; 2002). External shocks may
contribute to providing new ways of understanding old political problems. Supranational
actors can suddenly claim jurisdiction over issues that previously have been decided on
the national level. The agenda‐setting power of supranational entrepreneurs may
become amplified by a crisis. Supranational entrepreneurs get a possibility to re‐label
and re‐contextualize issues in order to embed them in a different choice situation and
overcome resistance and deadlock (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
External shocks punctuate a previously stable situation, and if exploited
successfully by supranational entrepreneurs, can be conducive to more integrated policy
outcomes. When exogenous shocks are introduced, they may lead not just to a
momentary deviation from the normal, with more or less rapid return to status quo, but
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rather to the new points of stability, creating different starting points for subsequent
decisions (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).
Thus, alternative “punctuated equilibrium” path to European integration brings
together external contingency (external shocks), structure (EU rules) and agency
(supranational entrepreneurship and member state preferences). I argue that
integration outcomes will be defined by the punctuating impact of external shocks that
shifts member state preferences towards common European solutions, and open up
windows of opportunity for supranational entrepreneurs (the European Commission) to
expand existing rules in a given domain and advance integration.
Proposition 1 (PE): The degree of punctuating impact of external shocks,
consequent shifts in convergence of key member state preferences towards
common European solutions, and the degree of supranational entrepreneurship
determine variation in integration outcome.
Proposition 2 (PE): Successful integration outcomes result when supranational
entrepreneurs are successful in exploiting policy windows opened up by the
external shocks and existing EU rules in a given policy domain and permitted by
convergence of preferences in favor of proposed solutions.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
European integration is a complex process that takes place at the intersection of
forces and events. The present research reorients its interest from why to how question
by looking at the combination of causes, or how things happen. Instead of theorizing
about the progression of the integration project as a whole, extensively addressed in the
European integration literature, this dissertation seeks to identify recipes for explaining
particular policy‐making instances. For that purpose, the dissertation surveys not only
early research on European integration, but also studies on the EU’s public policy and
attempts to bridge them. After all, “integration” is nothing more than the cumulative
build‐up of successful agenda‐setting at the supranational level – the composite of
thousands of issues being consecutively and – often in parallel – propelled onto the
table of policymakers, to be later decided upon (Pollack 2004).
The major theoretical and methodological motivation of the proposed
dissertation is to lay the foundations for a typological theory of European integration
that allows assessing multiple pathways (equifinality) in the European integration
process and examining how various causal conditions combine to produce integration
outcomes which vary along two dimensions – degree of institutionalization (vertical
integration) and harmonization level (horizontal integration).
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According to George and Bennett (2005: 233), typological theorizing is a
“development of contingent generalizations about combinations or configurations of
variables that constitute theoretical types.” Typological theory specifies the generalized
pathways through which particular types relate to specified outcomes. Thus,
understanding European integration requires examining connections between specific
conditions and outcomes, or what Ragin calls causal recipes (Ragin 2008). These
combinations of conditions should make sense as causal recipes for an integration
outcome to occur. In this dissertation, I look at the configurations of the five causal
conditions – supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational
interest consolidation, rule density, and external shocks to identify causal recipes to
integration in the EU’s energy domain. These causal conditions are derived from existing
literature on European integration and from the theoretical framework discussed in the
previous chapter.
The causal recipes also serve to evaluate propositions derived from contending
integration theories (liberal intergovernmental and supranational approaches), and an
alternative path I suggested in the previous chapter that brings together agency
structure, and external contingency. The goal of this testing/evaluation exercise is
theory improving rather than disproving and is aimed at developing synergy between
different theoretical approaches.
To accomplish these goals, the research employs two methods: Ragin’s (2000;
20008) fuzzy set comparative analysis – a pioneering attempt in the European
integration scholarship, and a comparative case‐study of two contrasting cases.
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The next two sections of this chapter discuss these two modes of analysis and
their suitability for the research. The last section deals with the operationalization of the
five causal conditions and the causal outcome.
3.2 A Configurational Approach and fs/QCA
Addressing the question of under what conditions, and how European
integration succeeds in the EU’s energy domain, requires theoretical synthesis from the
existing theories of European integration. The best way to accomplish this goal is to not
simply juxtapose competing variables, but to explore how various factors work together
to produce integration.
European integration involves multi‐dimensional causal interactions, where
different conditions can be combined in different ways to produce similar outcomes
(Ragin 2000; 2008, see also Most and Starr 1989). George and Bennett (2005) call this
“equifinality,” which indicates that the given outcome may result from different
combinations of causal conditions.
In the dissertation, I articulate five causal conditions, which in various
configurations enable or disable specific empirical connections. The research aims at
capturing causal “recipes” – a specific combination of causally relevant ingredients
linked to an outcome (Ragin 2008: 9). I define causal condition as a factor conducive or
necessary (though itself insufficient) for a conjuncture of conditions that is sufficient for
a given outcome. A cause is thus any factor that is an insufficient but conducive or
necessary part of a sufficient but unnecessary condition. It is an unnecessary condition
because a combination of other conditions can have the same effect (Goertz and Starr
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2003). Such conditions are called “INUS conditions.” INUS stands for “insufficient but
necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result”
(Goertz 2003: 68; Mahoney 2008). Condition ‘A’ alone is not sufficient, but it is a
necessary component of the (combined) condition AB – which itself is not necessary but
only sufficient for Y.
As Ragin mentions, the efficient way to approach the issue of causal complexity,
both in conceptual and empirical analytic terms, is to make use of the notions of
necessity and sufficiency (Ragin 2000). The comparative method is well suited for the
task of building new typological theories, synthesizing existing ones and addressing
questions concerning the consequences of different combinations of conditions – that is
examining situations holistically and explaining outcomes configurationally. The
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) enables a researcher to deal with causal
complexity, understood as causation which is equifinal, conjunctural and asymmetric
(Berg‐Schlosser et al. 2008). In this context, Ragin’s (1987) notion of qualitative
comparison using Boolean and fuzzy set methods represents a very suitable model for
examining European integration, as a phenomenon with “constellations, configurations,
and conjunctures.” The qualitative comparative analysis, in general, is well‐suited for
interpreting an outcome or a process across a limited range of cases. It has an
advantage over statistical methods in exploring a phenomenon of causal complexity
(Ragin 2008). The fuzzy set analysis is especially useful for studying causal outcomes
with variation in the degree of membership in the target set of similar outcomes. This is
well‐suited for examining integration outcomes of particular policy‐making instances,
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since each outcome features different degrees of institutionalization (vertical
integration) and harmonization (horizontal integration).1 Likewise, the causal conditions
that lead to integration outcomes also vary in terms of intensity in their presence. In
order to identify the combination of certain causal conditions conducive to a particular
outcome, the researcher needs to specify much more precisely a range of possibilities
for key causal conditions. Fuzzy‐set calibration makes it possible to specify different
degrees of membership for each causal condition, not just dichotomous
presence/absence.
I use the fsQCA truth table algorithm (Ragin, Drass, and Davey 2006), to derive
solution formulas – causal recipes to integration outcome. I examine whether instances
of a specific combination of causal conditions invariably lead to the outcome across the
selected cases. This will establish the sufficiency of the causal recipe. The concepts of
coverage and consistency are used to evaluate the explanatory power of different
causal paths and the jointly sufficient causal conditions (Ragin 2008). Consistency
measures provide a numeric measure of to what extent the empirical data support the
set theoretic statement that a combination of conditions is sufficient. The coverage
parameters, in turn, evaluate how much of the outcome is explained by every single
path and by the overall solution term.
The fsQCA method takes full advantage of the gradations of the causal outcomes
and causal conditions from full non‐membership to full membership in the target set
and allows for a structured comparison (Ragin 2008). In sum, fuzzy set analysis by
1

These two dimensions of integration (vertical and horizontal) will be discussed in the last section of this chapter
(operationalization of causal outcome and causal conditions).
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studying cases as configuration and examining alternative recipes is an appropriate
method for the systematic study of complex phenomenon, such as integration, on the
basis of limited number of cases.
3.2.1 Case Selection and Data
The fuzzy set analysis rests on the examination of twelve policy proposals (cases)
in the energy domain of the European Union. Limitations of random case selection in
small‐n research are well known (Collier 1995: 463; King et al. 1994: 124). However, to
avoid the selection bias, scholars have been advised to select cases on the basis of
variation on the independent variables (Geddes 1979). Alternatively, the selection of
cases based on the variation of values on the dependent variable has been proposed as
a valid option (Collier 1993: 462; Seawright and Gerring 2008), and indeed, highly
legitimate for researches aimed at establishing necessary and sufficient conditions in set
theoretic relations (Most and Starr 1989; Ragin 2008) and a useful strategy in the
constitution of theoretically defined (as opposed to “given”) populations (Mahoney and
Goertz 2004).
The selected twelve cases represent a meaningful subset of proposals in the
energy domain. Indeed, they are representative of various sectors of the EU’s energy
policy, providing for cross‐sectional variation. Such a disaggregation of the integration
domain (energy) into discrete decision areas recognizes an important characteristic of
the process of integration: the combination of conditions that favors integration in one
particular area, does not necessarily spread to another one. Thus, what Haas called the
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“autonomy of functional context” can exist even within the same domain for different
decision areas (Haas 1968).
Based on substantive knowledge of EU’s energy domain and survey of secondary
literature, I selected cases with variation in integration outcome ranging from very
successful to unsuccessful and cases in between. More can be learned about the jointly
sufficient causal conditions conducive to integration outcome by including cases with
varying degrees of set membership in the fuzzy set analysis, which calibrates outcomes
on the continuum of full membership (integration success) to full non‐membership
(absence of integration/no success).
Finally, the selected twelve cases account for not only spatial but also temporal
variation. This is justified by methodological as well as theoretical considerations.
Including cases on policy‐making instances in the same policy area in different times
contributes to assessing arguments on path‐dependency and policy feedback in
integration process.
I include the following twelve cases in fuzzy set analysis: The consecutive three
energy packages that served as key legislative instruments in liberalization of EU’s
electricity and natural gas markets since the mid‐90s; first Energy Package – Directive
96/92/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive
98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas; the Second
Energy Package – Directive 2003/54/ EC concerning common rules for the internal
market in electricity, Directive 2003/55/EC concerning common rule for the internal
market in natural gas; the Third Energy Package ‐ Directive 2009/72/EC concerning
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common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning
common rules for the internal market in natural gas accompanied with the Regulation
(EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators and
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and 715/2009 on conditions for access to the network for
cross‐border exchanges in electricity. I include two cases in the field of EU policy on
Renewable Energy Sources: Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy
from renewable sources and its predecessor Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of
electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market.
Two other cases have been selected from the field of security of energy supply policy of
the EU: Regulation (EC) No 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of
natural gas supply and its predecessor Council Directive 2004/67/EC. The two final cases
are representative of the EU’s policies in the sector of energy efficiency: Directive
2012/27/EU on energy efficiency establishing a common framework of measures for the
promotion of energy efficiency within the Union and its predecessor Directive
2006/32/EC on energy end‐use efficiency and energy services.
The data for the fuzzy set analysis comes from the questionnaire‐based elite
survey (43 responses) and 52 semi‐structured interviews with EU officials and national
bureaucrats, energy policy stakeholders (e.g. industrial interest groups organized in
European federations and associations) directly involved in policymaking process of the
selected twelve cases.2 This kind of purposive sampling is well‐justified. Firstly, these
people have substantive knowledge of the cases, which is crucial for the case‐oriented
2

The detailed description of the survey instrument will be presented in Chapter 3.
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fuzzy set analysis (Ragin 2008: 86). Reliable substantive knowledge results in finer‐
grained calibration of fuzzy sets. Secondly, external criteria and “agreed upon
standards” for measuring complex concept, such as integration outcome, or similarly
complex causal conditions that are largely theoretic constructs, are lacking in European
integration studies. In this context, the perceptions of direct participants in the policy‐
making process and their assessment of the outcome and the causal factors across the
selected cases offer reliable data. Finally, elite survey and semi‐structured interviews
allow produce interval‐scale data on all twelve cases for each causal condition and the
causal outcome that can be calibrated into fuzzy set scores with direct method ‐ a
recommended procedure when conducting fuzzy set analysis (Ragin 2008; Verkuilen
2005; Wagemann and Schneider 2010).
3.3 Comparative Case Study Method
While the fuzzy set analysis produces solution formulas – causal recipes for
integration outcome addressing the question “under what conditions European
integration succeeds in the EU’s energy domain”, the “how” question also calls for
understanding causal mechanisms behind alternative paths to integration. The
comparative case‐study method based on process tracing technique is well‐suited to
uncover the causal link or causal mechanism between causal conditions and an outcome
in a narrative fashion. In addition, employing two modes of analysis (fuzzy set and
comparative in‐depth case studies) contributes to the validity of the research through
the triangulation of results from different methods for data collection and analysis.
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Triangulation can be defined as “using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying
the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (Stake 2005: 454).
Comparative case‐study methodology is well‐suited for this dissertation’s goal of
synthesizing previous contributions and proposing new, more holistic theoretical
framework. George and Bennett (2005: 67) consider this method “structured” in that
researcher approaches each instance of a historical episode (case) with the same set of
research objectives, thereby ensuring standardized data collection and enabling
systematic comparison.
The dissertation relies on three well‐known comparative case‐study techniques:
theoretical pluralism, process tracing, and pattern matching. Theoretical pluralism
implies combining different theories to explain a particular outcome. The choice of
causal conditions to be observed across the two cases is theory‐laden. It derives from
contending European integration theories and aims at finding more precise causal paths
to integration.
To accomplish this, the dissertation employs process tracing technique – a
systematic in‐depth analysis of each case under consideration. The case‐study narratives
are structured along the detailed investigation of the five causal conditions leading to a
particular causal outcome. Each case study can thus be read as an analytical narrative, a
structured set of relevant discrete observations.
Finally, the dissertation offers a comparative analysis of the two cases based on
pattern matching technique, which involves systematic comparison of typologies across
carefully matched cases (Mahoney 2003; George and Bennett 2005: 180‐203). At the
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very end of comparative analysis, dissertation discusses whether in‐depth case studies
validate the results obtained from fuzzy set analysis.

3.3.1 Case Selection and data:
According to George and Bennett (2005) and Gerring (2007), case selection
should be guided by the expectation of where a specific phenomenon is to be least or
most likely to be detected. Based on the fuzzy set analysis of the twelve cases in the
EU’s energy domain, I have selected the case, which turned out to be the most
successful in terms of integration outcome (vertical integration). This case has been
matched with a contrasting case from the same policy field in which integration did not
succeed. The logic behind this case selection strategy is to juxtapose the
presence/absence of causal paths identified by the fuzzy set analysis to the
presence/absence of integration outcome and see whether the findings of the two
different modes of analysis validate each other. Thus, 2009 RES directive and its
predecessor 2001 RES‐E directive have been chosen for in‐depth comparative case
study.
In order to improve the quality of process tracing, I have collected data from
various sources. I have closely examined official documentation of the EU institutions,
member states and transnational organizations. This has been complemented by 52
open‐ended in‐depth interviews with the EU bureaucrats, member state officials from
Germany, France, the UK and Poland, as well as representatives of various Brussels‐
based interest groups. These interviews have been conducted in face‐to face meetings
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during summers of 2011‐2013. Part of the interviews has followed a semi‐structured
design addressing a predefined set of questions; part consisted of open‐ended
questions tailored to the special experiences and competencies of each interviewee. All
interviews have been conducted on the basis of the principle of anonymity to allow
speakers to speak more openly. Interviews have provided valuable insider information
regarding positions of the key actors on particular policy proposals, which otherwise
would be extremely difficult to obtain.
Finally, I have consulted secondary literature and major media sources. This
triangulation of data collection methods have served to verify and falsify information
gathered from alternative sources, and consequently, mitigate any bias in data
collection.
3.4 Operationalization of Causal Outcomes and Causal Conditions
Variations in the intensity of causal conditions’ presence define causal paths to
policy‐making outcomes that in turn vary along the success/no success continuum.
Translating theoretical propositions into combinations of empirically testable conditions
requires operationalization of these conditions so that variations in causal outcomes
and causal conditions can be observed.
3.4.1 Integration as a Causal Outcome
European integration is a contested concept. Indeed it often overlaps with
another concept –Europeanization ‐ in terms of what it embraces. In that respect
integration is what Sartori characterizes as “conceptions without specified termination
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or boundaries” (Sartori 1970: 1042). Definitions of European integration abound. They
include but are not limited to the process of political integration (Deutch et al. 1957),
process of institutionalization of Europe (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998), process of
construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures,
policy paradigms, styles and ways of doing things (Radaelli 2000). Although these
definitions are useful, they suffer from a lack of precision (see Radaelli and Exadaktylos
2010).
To provide more precise conceptualization of European integration that will
permit empirical observation of variation in integration outcomes across the twelve
cases under consideration, I define integration outcomes along the two dimensions: the
degree of institutionalization, or what I refer as vertical integration and harmonization
level, referred as horizontal integration.
Vertical integration (degree of institutionalization) refers to the extension of EU
tasks into new policy issues, and increase in the authority for supranational institutions
to allocate values, in other words, pooling or delegating competencies from member
states to the EU level 3 (see Schmitter 2004: 54; Schimmelfennig and Rittberger 2006:
74‐75). In EU’s day‐to‐day activities, these are achieved by the adoption of EU’s
secondary legislation (directives or regulations) that brings new issues under the EU’s
legal remit, creates

binding rules and organizations at the EU level, grants new

institutional powers to the Community (the EU), or imposes obligations on member
3

Schmitter (2004) uses the term “scope” to denote expansion/contraction of the types of issue to be resolved jointly
at the EU level and employs term “level” to denote increased authority for regional institutions. Schimmelfennig and
Rittberger (2006) use the term “sectoral integration” or “broadening” that refers to a process whereby new policy
areas are regulated at the EU level and the term” vertical integration” or “deepening” refers to transfer of
competencies to the EU.
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states. Policy‐making outcome features advance in vertical integration when the
Commission or the European Parliament gain new rights or roles, when new European
level institutions are created, and binding legal rules, principles and methods are
extended. However, one must endeavor to avoid the pitfall of assuming that all binding
rules advance integration to the same extent. While certain binding rules instituted by
the policy‐making instances promote vertical integration and impose obligations and
constraints on member states, others clearly do not.
Horizontal integration4 (harmonization level) refers to the transnational
harmonization and standardization of diverse national laws, practices, and norms so
that internal market can function effectively for the benefit of all (see Puchala 1975). In
practice, this is achieved through the EU’s secondary legislation instructing member
states to harmonize and standardize policy instruments, norms, and laws across national
borders. In general, harmonization attempts are often resisted by member states
because they require various adaptations, adjustments of domestic laws, regulations
and practices that can be costly to implement domestically due to policy or institutional
misfit between the prescribed EU model and the domestic rules (Héritier et al. 1996;
Schmidt 2001; Börzel 2003).
One should not assume, however, that all policymaking outcomes at the EU level
are aimed at harmonization. At times, the EU attempts to positively prescribe or impose
a concrete model, or policy instrument, to create a level playing field across member
states (e.g. attempts to introduce harmonized renewable energy support schemes). At
4

The meaning of horizontal integration here should not be confused with Schimmelfennig and Rittberger’s (2006) use
of “horizontal integration” which refers to the extension of the EU acquis beyond the EU’s borders (“widening”).
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other times, the EU encourages regulatory competition leaving member states with
enough flexibility and discretion for domestic reforms (see for instance Schmidt 2001).
Integration outcomes of policy‐making instances vary in both dimensions:
vertical and horizontal integration. However, they do not necessarily co‐vary: change in
vertical integration, does not imply parallel change in horizontal integration and vice
versa. Therefore, integration outcomes are assessed separately along these two
dimensions ranging from successful integration (corresponding to full membership in
the fuzzy set analysis), to no success (corresponding to full non‐membership in the fuzzy
set analysis), with a point at which it is difficult to classify outcome (corresponding to
the cross‐over point of maximum fuzziness in the fuzzy set analysis).
3.4.2 Causal Conditions: Supranational Entrepreneurship
Supranational entrepreneurship denotes the activism of supranational actors in
an attempt to get support for their endeavors. Supranational actors have institutional
self‐interest ‐ stretch their authority as far as they can to further their own agendas ‐
and are usually supportive of more integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Thus,
supranational entrepreneurship denotes a degree to which supranational actors (e.g.
the European Commission)5 engage actively and deliberately in the promotion of new
policies, in bringing new issue under the EU’s legal remit, and in pushing harmonization
across member states.
In this dissertation, I examine the European Commission’s supranational
entrepreneurship throughout the policymaking process. There are different ways of how
5

In this dissertation, supranational entrepreneurship refers to the European Commission’s efforts.
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supranational policy entrepreneurs exert their influence in different phases of policy‐
making: in policy initiation phase by putting a problem on the EU agenda; in policy
formulation phase by mobilizing support of stakeholders through framing strategy and
issue‐linkages; in the negotiation phase by forming alliances with the supporters and
“splitting the difference” between member states to gain their backing for the proposal.
And of course, all these elements of policy entrepreneurship are not limited to a
particular phase. The European Commission, for instance, often employs framing and
mobilization strategies throughout the policy‐making cycle.
In the policy initiation phase, supranational entrepreneurship depends on the
willingness and capacity of supranational actors (the European Commission) to use
effectively its agenda‐setting powers that are now a shared and contested competence
among several European Union institutions, rather that monopolized by a single actor
(Kassim et al. 2003). The Commission has considerable leverage on agenda‐setting, but
it is conditional, not absolute. It depends on its ability to nurture diverse contacts,
anticipate and mediate demands, and use its unique policy expertise to advance
proposals. By publishing Green and White papers, policy roadmaps and strategies, the
European Commission can put an issue on the agenda, present solution formulas, and
mobilize various stakeholders by framing an issue in a salient and appealing manner
(Princen 2007; 2011).
Once a proposal is drafted, the Commission can initiate dialogues and debates to
mobilize transnational societal interest groups. Issue framing and issue linkages are two
crucial tools/strategies that supranational entrepreneurs resort to. Issue framing refers

52

to the supranational entrepreneurs’ strategy to generate and manipulate frames that
make sense of institutional or policy problems and offer persuasive solutions. Frames
can help mobilize cooperation among diverse actors by linking their interests to a set of
ideals, models and solutions that permit further integration (Surel 2000; Natorski and
Surralles 2008). An issue may be ‘initiated’ and be placed high on the agenda, but
interest may wane unless supranational entrepreneurs are able to maintain it (Cobb et
al. 1976; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The European Commission, as a policy
entrepreneur, can shape the agenda by emphasizing some issues and de‐emphasizing
others (Tallberg 2003). Successful entrepreneurship requires right tactics, right frames
and right timing to ensure issue receptiveness (Princen and Rhinard 2006). In the policy
formulation and negotiation phases, in addition to mobilization and framing strategies,
the European Commission can “shirk” within certain limits exploiting cleavages among
the member states. The Commission can push through proposals closest to its own
preferred policy that can also garner QMV in the Council (Pollack 1997: 129). The
European Commission’s success in creating the window of opportunity for a preferred
policy depends on the one hand on its long‐term commitment to a certain issue, and on
the other, on its adaptability and readiness to present solutions acceptable to all veto
players participating in the decision‐making process (Zahariadis 2007).
To sum up, the degree of supranational entrepreneurship is assessed in terms of
the European Commission’s efforts in the process of problem definition and proposal
initiation, the level of ambition enshrined in the proposal, framing strategies, and the
Commission’s success in mobilizing various stakeholders’ support for its proposal.
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3.4.3 Causal Conditions: Convergence of Preferences
Preference is a multifaceted concept composed of “interests, norms, identities
and interaction orientations” (Scharpf 1997: 63). National preferences are defined as an
ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes (Moravcsik
1998: 24). European integration is often viewed as the outcome of the interest‐based
preferences of sovereign member state governments and the majority coalition these
governments form within the European Council (Moravcsik 1998). Those preferences, in
the first place, are shaped through domestic bargaining with main societal and industrial
interests, such as the dominant national energy producers. The complexity of the
concept makes it difficult to apply empirically (Scharpf 1997: 64). A way out of the
problem is to alternate preferences of the actors with their positions. Preferences are
reflected in a position advanced on each issue by each member state in each
negotiation. A position is the stated location of an actor (member state) with regard to
one or more policy dimensions (Lynggaard and Nedergaard 2009). Positions can be
observed empirically by looking at how an actor is situated on an issue.
Member state preferences are reflected in the issue‐specific national positions
on the European Commission’s policy proposal. Member states positions are often
known by the European Commission even before it presents a proposal to the Council.
The Commission’s proposal defines possible options for action and may often be
different from the options desired by the member states. This dissertation shares an
important assumption from the literature on European integration and policy‐making
that the proposals that the European Commission puts forward, generally aim at
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advancing more integration, defined in terms of vertical (degree of institutionalization)
and/or horizontal integration (harmonization level). Of course, policy proposals vary in
terms of ambition level with respect to vertical or horizontal integration they intend to
bring about. The member state preferences/positions with respect to the Commission’s
particular policy proposal can be analyzed along two broad dimensions: objectives and
scope of a proposal, and the means or the ways in which to achieve those objectives.
The dissertation examines both dimensions separately.
Member state preferences in the European integration context have two
important aspects: direction and intensity: Firstly, a member state can either favor or
not favor the proposed objective(s), and favor or not favor the means and instruments
proposed to achieve the objective(s). Sometimes, a member state can be in favor of the
objective(s) of the proposal, but not be in favor of the proposed means or instruments.
Secondly, member states’ positions vary in terms of intensity – the relative degree of
support, or opposition, to the proposed objectives and means of the proposal. So, the
position of a member state on the objectives and means of the given proposal can vary
from strongly in favor to strongly opposing (not in favor).
As the decision outputs are achieved through negotiations in the Council of the
European Union, considerable overlap in the positions of key member states are
required in order to arrive at the substantial common accord determined by the balance
of common gains and distribution trade‐offs among countries (Moravcsik 1998). Even
when decisions are adopted under the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) procedure, as in
the case of energy policy, dominant member states will be able to impose conditions or
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build blocking coalitions. Supranational entrepreneurs often show the path of least
resistance where they anticipate opposition from the powerful member states and tailor
and revise proposals to fit national preferences. When the key member states have
converging preferences/positions not in favor of the objective(s) and or means
presented in the policy proposal, the policy either fails to be adopted (no success), or is
revised by the European Commission so that it is acceptable to the key member states
in the Council. As a result, policy outcomes represent the lowest‐common denominator
outcome and reflect the preferences/positions of key member state(s) least in favor of
the

proposal.

Therefore,

we

have

to

examine

the

convergence

of

the

preferences/positions among the key member states.
This dissertation examines the preferences/positions of four key member states:
Germany, France, the UK and Poland.6 These countries are some of the largest member
states with the most powerful positions in the EU. They hold most votes in the Council,
and are also representative of different cleavages in general (e.g. west‐east, leaders and
laggards in liberalization of energy markets or renewable energy developments,
contrasting energy mixes and energy dependency patterns). They are by far the largest
energy users, as well as energy producers in the EU. Germany ranks second in the
production of coal after Poland and second in nuclear electricity generation after
France.
The dissertation looks at the degree of convergence of preferences/positions
among the key member states with regard to vertical and horizontal integration
6

Poland is included in the analysis where relevant (proposals that were adopted after 2004 – Poland’s accession to
the EU
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separately. The fuzzy set analysis relies on data obtained from an elite survey. The
comparative case studies trace positions of key member states by examining their
original positions, revealing points of agreement/disagreement, and following the shifts
in their positions throughout the policy‐making process to identify if and how their
positions converged and changed over time.
3.4.4 Causal Conditions: Transnational Interest Consolidation
Formation of transnational interests and their organization at the EU level can
affect the integration process and policy outcomes. There are various transnational
interest groups that organize themselves at the EU level into European associations and
federations to participate in shaping the new European rules and regulations and exert
influence of the EU policy making. These interests transcend national boundaries. As
integration advances, transnational interest mobilization at the EU level also rises since
they find it necessary to participate in shaping EU legislation. Transnational interests
have two types of incentives: either to stop European regulations that could have an
adverse effect on their interests, or exploit the opportunity of shaping a new European
regulation to the disadvantage of others unaware of the importance of the new venue
or less able to mobilize the necessary resources (Mazey and Richardson 2001). To
succeed in their efforts, transnational interest groups have to mobilize into a coherent
group and present unified position against other potential transnational groups that
operate at the European level. The higher the degree of transnational interest group
consolidation, the better their chance to get their position reflected in the policymaking
outcome. On the other hand, when transnational interests are fragmented, the extent
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of pressure they can exert on policy process diminishes correspondingly. Formation of a
unified position on a specific issue entails a cumbersome consensus‐building process
and sometimes ends up with failure.
The dissertation examines transnational interest consolidation by looking at the
degree of cohesion among the positions of transnational interest groups and the extent
of their united lobbying at the EU level under the umbrella of the respective European
association and federations with respect to the European Commission’s proposals.
3.4.5 Causal Conditions: Rule Density
Rules facilitate exchange and create opportunities for collective action. Rules
that govern the passage and implementation of legislation in the EU define the
discretion of supranational actors vis‐à‐vis member states, each other and other EU
institutions. Formal rule structures play an important role in the process of European
integration. They specify what is permitted and what is not. For instance, the existence
of provisions in the treaties of the European Union (treaty basis) determines whether a
policy domain exists and delineates competencies between the Community and
member states (exclusive, shared, or no competence for the EU). Creation of new legal
basis for energy domain in the Lisbon Treaty might directly affect the production of
secondary legislation. This can give more discretion to the European Commission
because competence does not only comprise new objectives, but also provides new
rights and more treaty provisions to guide with (Fligstein and Mcnichol 1998).
The choice of legal basis determines voting rules. Voting rules and procedures
determine organizational capacity and inter‐institutional relations (e.g. QMV versus
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unanimity, co‐decision versus cooperation). Selecting a legal basis for a directive can,
therefore, become a contentious issue, especially when the European Commission
proposes a directive or regulation dealing with issues for which an explicit legal basis is
missing from the EU Treaties (energy domain before the Lisbon Treaty). In such cases,
the Commission has to rely on a legal basis from related policy areas. The choice of a
particular treaty provision as a legal basis for a proposed policy initiative can greatly
affect the integration outcome: some treaty provisions in some areas where the EU
already has extensive competencies can provide supranational actors with more
discretion and allow far‐reaching policy outcomes.
In addition to a legal basis, existence of formal and binding rules in a particular
policy domain may affect integration outcome as well. Pre‐existing rules make it hard to
undo the policy and may create a dynamic that facilitates the adoption of further rules
(Jordan and Lenschow 2010; Pierson 1996). Pre‐existing rules in a specific policy area
can lead to policy feedback loops and ‘lock‐in’ and embed issues in “joint decision traps”
(Scharpf 2007). The higher the density of the existing EU rules, the higher the feedback
effect on the subsequent policy outcomes. Thus, rule density in this dissertation refers
to the choice of legal bases and their implications for policy outcomes, as well as the
varying degree of impact that the pre‐existing domain‐specific rules (if and when
applicable) may have on integration outcomes.
3.4.6 Causal Conditions: External shocks
Changes in, and pressures from, the external environment may affect behavior
of national and supranational actors. External shocks are those events outside the EU
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that punctuate the equilibrium in the EU system. External shocks, though they can
constitute an obstacle to further integration, generally encourage or provoke it
(Tranholm‐Mikkelsen 1991). Those proximate contingencies can serve as critical
junctures and exacerbate long‐term structural conditions, such as EU’s energy
dependence, or EU’s relative position in global competition. Global competition/energy
dependency patterns can be important long‐standing structural exogenous conditions
pinpointing to the difficulty of isolating joint regional deliberations from a context of
global socioeconomic dependence. External shocks can contribute to opening up policy
windows that can be skilfully grabbed by policy entrepreneurs to push their pet
proposals (Kingdon 1995). External shocks can also contribute to a change in
perceptions of a particular problem (i.e. energy dependence) among national
policymakers, shift national preferences/positions on a given issue and provide window
of opportunity for institutional actors to pursue collective interests. External
contingencies can contribute to increased sense of sensitivity and vulnerability, and
make member states rally together to find common solutions and rely increasingly on
the new central institutions to increase collective bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the outside
world (Schmitter 1996: 165).
It is a difficult task to tease out the causal effect of external events or crises on
integration outcomes. Often monumental events that many take as critical points in the
policy developments are chimeras; they are the events that symbolize the policy change
but happen well after the issue has been redefined. Other times, they appear to be
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those proximate contingencies that open opportunities for supranational entrepreneurs
to seize the moment of turbulence and advance integration projects.
This dissertation examines the impact of external shocks, such as a focusing
event or crisis outside the EU (if any) on policymaking instances under consideration.
The survey method for collecting data is particularly apt here, since external shocks in
the first place change perceptions of policymakers and stakeholders. Comparative case‐
studies help reveal any such impact of external shocks through utilizing process‐tracing
techniques.
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CHAPTER 4. WHAT LEADS TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: A FUZZY‐SET QUALITATIVE
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines under what conditions European integration succeeds in
the domain of energy policy through exploring the twelve EU legislative proposals in
various sectors of energy policy. These cases include the so‐called three consecutive
“energy packages (directives)” aimed at liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors,
two renewable energy directives of 2001 and 2009, two energy efficiency directives of
2006 and 2012, the security of supply directive of 2004 and the regulation of 2010. The
chapter helps to assess propositions presented in the theoretical chapter from the
holistic understanding of integration processes. The results of this chapter contribute to
evaluating my argument that integration in the EU energy policy domain proceeds
under the conjunction of structural conditions, such as pre‐existing domain‐specific EU
rules, external contingencies (i.e. focusing events) pressing for the common solutions at
the EU level that are skillfully exploited by supranational entrepreneurs (the European
Commission) and/or permitted by the convergence of preferences (positions) among
the key EU Member States. In this chapter I examine five causal conditions identified in
the previous chapters in order to set ground for a typological theory of European
integration: supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational
interest consolidation, rule density, and external contingency. The combination of these
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conditions forms “recipes” to explain causal complexities leading to European
integration in the energy domain. The findings largely support my argument and cast
doubt on studies that emphasize the preeminence of either structure or agency to
explain European integration.
The chapter contains four sections. Before we start the fuzzy set comparative
analysis of the twelve cases, the reader needs to have a historical and institutional
background on the emergence of EU energy policy. In the first section of this chapter, I
will provide a brief overview of the EU energy domain with respect to the selected
twelve cases. In the second section, I will present data obtained from an elite survey and
semi‐structured interviews with EU and member state officials and other policy
stakeholders. In the third section, I will first briefly discuss the suitability of a
configurational approach to explaining European integration and then examine the
process of calibrating the five causal conditions and the outcome drawing on data
obtained from the survey and semi‐structured interviews. In the fourth section, I will
present the solution formulas of the fuzzy set analysis and discuss derived causal recipes
to European integration. Finally, I will briefly conclude with the key findings of the
chapter.
4.2 Emergence of the EU Energy Policy: Historical and Institutional Background
Until the mid‐1990s, energy policy was largely neglected within the European
integration process. In 1968, the European Commission in its “First Guidelines for a
Community Energy Policy” outlined an energy policy and offered some specific
measures to create a common market in the energy sector. However, the Council of
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Ministers could only agree on very general principles (Black 1977: 166). The 1980s and
early 1990s also witnessed several failed attempts in the energy domain. The European
Commission’s proposal to include an energy chapter in the Maastricht Treaty was
dropped as was a carbon/energy tax due to strong opposition from the member states
(Buchan 2009).
Since the mid‐1990s, a number of important EU initiatives have been proposed
to strengthen the supranational influence on energy policy (Matláry 1997). Community
actors made the best use of powers they possessed in related areas, especially in the
internal market and the environmental realms. The adoption of the Single European Act
(SEA) greatly facilitated the supranational entrepreneurship of Community actors
(European Commission). The introduction of the new decision rule in the Council based
on the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and strengthening of the European Parliament’s
role with the extension of the co‐decision procedure, gave more leeway to the
supranational actors, who have increasingly been linking energy issues to three general
perspectives: the EU's internal‐market program in which competition policy played a key
role; the EU's common environmental policy; and the security of supply in which
external relations with the energy suppliers was crucial. The last decade saw an
increasing number of proposals, directives, and regulations dealing with these various
dimensions of the common European energy policy.
The idea of an Internal Energy Market (IEM) was launched in the late 1980s and
the first electricity and gas market directives (the so‐called “First Energy Package”)
appeared in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Since then, the European Commission has been
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making intensified efforts to deregulate electricity and gas markets. These efforts
reached a high point in 2003 with the adoption of the “Second Energy Package,”
directives aimed at the full opening of the gas and electricity markets for all customers
by 2007 and the legal unbundling of supply and transmission functions. However, due to
the lack of overlapping interests between member countries in the energy sector, as
some experts and scholars argue (Kusku 2010), the adopted directives have on many
occasions represented watered down versions of the European Commission’s original
proposals. Even when adopted, the directives were not followed up by adequate
harmonization of provisions. For instance, the European Commission had always
preferred mandatory ownership unbundling of upstream and downstream activities,
and proposed this as a part of the so‐called “Third Energy Package” directives adopted
in late 2000s. The Third Package resulted in a considerable increase in the degree on
institutionalization. However, it did not succeed in introducing a fully harmonized model
of ownership unbundling as a result of a series of compromises in the face of opposition
from the dominant member states (Boschek 2009).
In the mid‐2000s, the efforts to establish a common energy policy became more
integrated. The European Commission, at the invitation of the Council, prepared a
Green Paper that outlined a comprehensive general strategy for obtaining “sustainable,
competitive, and secure energy” (European Commission 2006a). This became the basis
for the prominent 20/20/20 strategy with three ambitious goals: reducing greenhouse
gas emissions by 20 percent, increasing the share of the renewable energy by 20
percent, and reducing overall energy use in the EU by 20 percent. The European
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Commission followed up with the so‐called “Energy and Climate Package” presenting
concrete measures for achieving these goals. In line with the 20/20/20 strategy, the
European Commission presented a new directive on the promotion of the renewable
energy, which introduced significant changes to the previous directive of 2001. The
directive 2001/77/EC, adopted after several years of negotiations, set an overall EU‐
level target of 22 percent electricity from renewables by 2010. However the target was
only “indicative”7 and non‐binding. In addition, the directive failed to establish
integrated policy instruments. The proposed instrument of Tradable Renewable
Electricity Certificates (TREC) was turned down by the Member States (Toke 2008;
Lauber and Schenner 2011). The new directive, 2009/28/EC, established more ambitious
and binding overall as well as national targets for the member states. The directive also
widened the scope of the policy as it included the electricity, heating, and transport
sectors. The directive imposed obligations on member states to develop National Action
Plans. Although the directive represented an important upgrade in the degree of
institutionalization, it was not equally successful in terms of the level of harmonization
of policy instruments. The mandatory introduction of a trading system was again
opposed by the member states and was not included in the final text of the directive
(Wettestad et al. 2012: 72).
In June 2005, the European Commission introduced a Green Paper on energy
efficiency and declared energy efficiency to be on the top of the agenda. However,
energy efficiency has been somewhat overshadowed by renewable policies, the EU’s

7

Indicative targets are targets set by the EU that lack binding character and serve as recommended benchmarks
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Emissions Trading (ETS), and energy security of supply. At any rate, the directive
2006/32/EC on energy end‐use efficiency and energy services adopted in 2006 was a
significant development. The directive replaced the 1993 SAVE directive and set the
groundwork for future proposals geared towards energy efficiency policy. The directive
obliged member states to develop national energy efficiency action plans (EEAPs), asked
member states to set indicative energy savings targets and to make sure that final
energy consumption is measured and paid by the consumer. Although the scope of the
directive was quite broad, it was very modest in setting binding targets for the member
states and in establishing coordinated and harmonized measures (Dupont and Oberthur
2011).
In June 2011, the European Commission proposed a new directive to step up
member states’ efforts to use energy more efficiently at all stages of the energy chain –
from the transformation of energy and its distribution to its final consumption.
According to the directive, each member state should set an indicative national energy
efficiency target, based on either primary or final energy consumption, primary or final
energy savings, or energy intensity (Directive 2012/27/EU). The energy efficiency
obligation scheme required member states to set targets at least equivalent to achieving
new savings of 1.5 percent of the annual energy sales to final customers of all energy
distributors or all retail energy sales companies. In addition, member states should
ensure that starting from 1 January 2014, 3 percent of the total floor area of heated
and/or cooled buildings owned and occupied by each central government is renovated
each year to meet at least the minimum energy performance requirements. Thus, the
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directive is quite ambitious in terms of targets and had a broad scope. However, the
European Commission did not succeed in introducing individual binding targets or
harmonized measures and instruments. In any event, the directive represents an
important improvement compared to the previous one.
The energy security policy area has undergone a rapid evolution throughout the
last decade. For much of the 1990s, the relative significance of energy supply security
was somewhat overshadowed by concerns over the environmental consequences of
energy use. This reordering of priorities was perhaps not surprising as the salience of
climate change, as a policy issue, increased on the one hand, and energy prices
remained at very low levels compared with the 1970s on the other hand. The re‐
emergence of supply security concerns did not happen overnight.

The European

Commission produced a Green Paper on energy supply security as early as 2000
(European Commission 2000a). However, the debate on the security of the energy
supply only entered a new phase at the beginning of 2006. The disruption of gas
supplies to the EU as a result of a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices at
that time served as a wake‐up call for the European Union (Interview with Vinois 2012).
The dispute, along with subsequent reductions in supply due to a fiercely cold winter in
Russia and Eastern Europe, appeared to feed a sense of vulnerability about an
increasing reliance on energy imports. In 2000, the Commission’s 2000 Green Paper
“Towards a European strategy for the security of supply of energy policy” initiated a
broad debate about a common European energy policy resulting in several legislative
pieces. The idea of a common energy policy was also approved at the Hampton Court
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Summit in London in October 2005 at an informal meeting under the UK’s presidency.
From the 1990s onward, the European Commission has underlined the cost‐
effectiveness of harmonizing energy security supply policies at the supranational level
instead of administering them nationally (Surrey 1992: 27). However, the relative weight
of the energy security issues in the EU’s energy domain has gained a new momentum as
a result of the Russia‐Ukrainian crises in 2006 and later in 2009, as well as heightened
vulnerability in relation to rising energy dependence. The upgrade of the security of
supply directive from 2004 by the regulation on measures safeguarding security of the
gas supply in 2010 attests to the increased importance of energy security. The
regulation is based on Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty and places security of the gas
supply in the context of an integrated and interconnected internal market and the spirit
of solidarity. This was the first time that the Lisbon Treaty article served as a legal basis
for EU legislation in the energy field. Being directly applicable, the regulation aims to
ensure that member states and gas market participants take effective action well in
advance to prevent and mitigate the potential disruptions to gas supplies through the
new rules. The regulation also contains the obligation of member states to notify the
Commission of their existing inter‐governmental agreements with third countries with
regards to energy supply and infrastructure and to inform the Commission about the
new ones when they are concluded. The regulation has obviously been much more
ambitious in terms of its policy scope, the degree of institutionalization, and
coordination efforts compared to its predecessor directive.
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4.3 Elite Survey on the EU Energy Policy
Questionnaires have long been a primary means of gathering data on political
behavior, attitudes and perceptions (Bernard 2000). As Pasek and Krosnick (2009) argue,
the questionnaire‐based measurement offers tremendous efficiencies and convenience
for researchers since many explanatory variables thought to drive political behavior are
subjective phenomena that can only be measured via people’s perceptions and
description of their own thoughts. Ragin (2008) stresses the importance of the
researcher’s substantive knowledge of cases and external “agreed upon” criteria for the
calibration of fuzzy sets and recommends using interval‐scale indicators of concepts for
fine‐grained calibration of fuzzy set membership for the proposed causal conditions and
causal outcome (Ragin 2008: 85). Therefore, elite questionnaires and semi‐structured
interviews represent a useful data gathering strategy for obtaining systematic data
when dealing with highly contested concepts (e.g. integration) for which no “agreed
upon” standards of measurement exist. In addition, if properly designed, the
questionnaire can provide interval‐scale data that can be directly transformed into
fuzzy‐set membership scores through the process of transparent calibration (see Ragin
2008).
4.3.1 Stakeholders of Elite Survey and Semi‐Structured Interviews
I used purposive sampling when conducting semi‐structured interviews and
distributing the questionnaire. According to Bernard (2000), purposive samples are
effective for the intensive study of a few cases. My sample group consisted of energy
policymakers at the EU and national level, and other energy policy stakeholders, such as
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representatives of various interest groups. These are people who have been directly
involved in the elaboration and decision‐making of the selected energy policy proposals
under consideration. Therefore, their perceptions of particular concepts and issues offer
more reliable substantive knowledge and measurement criteria than single researcher’s
interpretation.
Semi‐structured interviews are considered to be effective for collecting
systematic data from high‐level bureaucrats and elite members of a community who are
accustomed to the efficient use of time. Semi‐structured interviews allow both
interviewer and respondent to follow new leads in addition to the set of predetermined
questions (Bernard 2002). I conducted fifty two semi‐structured elite interviews with
bureaucrats of the EU institutions (officials from the European Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Council Secretariat) directly involved in the process of
elaboration or decision‐making of the selected energy policy proposals, as well as
member state civil servants at the Permanent Representations to the EU and national
ministries in four key member states: Germany, France, the UK, and Poland. The sample
group also included energy policy stakeholders, such as representatives of various
interest groups (e.g. national and European Associations and federations of organized
industrial, consumer, or green groups, as well as transnational NGOs). All participants
have been asked to respond to a pre‐determined set of questions (see Appendix A)
followed with additional open‐ended questions to let respondents express themselves
in their own words, at their own pace. Due to limited resources, it was not possible to
interview more than fifty two respondents. As a substitute to semi‐structured
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interviews, I have also distributed the questionnaire by email entailing the same
questions to seventy policymakers and policy stakeholders based in Brussels as well as
national capitals. Forty three people responded to the survey. The response rate
constituted 61 percent. Overall, ninety five respondents answered the questionnaire.
4.3.2 Elite Survey Instrument
Respondents were asked to select from a list of the twelve EU energy proposals
those cases with which they were most familiar and answer the questions in reference
to the selected cases. The questionnaire consisted of fourteen questions aimed at
producing interval‐level data for each of the five causal conditions (supranational
entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational interest consolidation, rule
density, and external contingency) and the causal outcome – integration. As discussed in
the theoretical chapter, I conceptualized integration along two dimensions: the degree
of institutionalization (vertical integration) and the level of harmonization (horizontal
integration). Therefore, I asked survey participants to rank each causal condition in
relation to the objectives of the EU energy proposal aimed at institutionalization (such
as creation of binding rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of
competencies from member states to the EU), as well as in relation to the
harmonization of policy instruments, measures, standards across member states. The
last two questions (questions 13 and 14) asked respondents to rank integration
outcomes along these two dimensions.
I developed a ranking scale from 0 to 10. According to Bernard (2002) ranking
scales are powerful data generators and rank ordering produces valuable interval‐scale
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data. To cut down on the conceptual or definitional ambiguities associated with scales
and ensure uniform interpretation of scale meanings, I attached verbal labels to each
interval‐scale8: 0‐1 (none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium); 9‐10 (high). The
interval‐scales were devised to reflect qualitative categories in fuzzy set: full
membership (9‐10), full non‐membership (0‐1), partially in (6‐8), partially out (2‐4) and
cross‐over point of maximum fuzziness (5) (Ragin 2008).
The major limitation of an elite survey is that the people directly involved in the
decision‐making process may be unwilling to give an honest answer or will only provide
answers that represent the official position of the institution they represent (George
and Bennett 2005). To address this issue, the survey respondents were guaranteed full
anonymity.
4.3.3 Elite Survey Results
The questionnaire (questions 13 and 14) asked respondents to rank the two
dimensions of integration outcome: the degree of institutionalization (such as creation
of binding rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of competencies
from member states to the EU ‐ vertical integration), and the level of harmonization
(such as harmonization of policy instruments, measures or standards across member
states – horizontal integration), introduced by the selected directive/regulation. On
vertical integration 63 percent of the respondents ranked the causal outcome on the
interval scale 9‐10 (high) in the RES09 case and 59 percent in Pack 3EL case; the

8

On this question, please see Alwin 1992, Krosnick and Berent 1993. Krosnick and Berent (1993) recommend putting
verbal labels on all rating scale points to clarify their intended meanings, which increases the reliability and validity of
ratings.
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respect to the harmonization of policy instruments, measures, standards across
member states (horizontal integration). Eighty‐five percent of the survey participants
ranked supranational entrepreneurship on the interval‐scale 9‐10 (high) in the RES09
case with respect to vertical integration, while with respect to horizontal integration 78
percent of respondents ranked supranational entrepreneurship on the interval scale of
6‐8 (medium) in the RES09 case. The other case where a majority of respondents ranked
the supranational entrepreneurship on the interval scale 9‐10 (high) in reference to
vertical integration was the SOSR2010 case. With respect to harmonization of policy
instruments (horizontal integration), 71 percent of respondents ranked the
supranational entrepreneurship on the interval‐scale of 6‐8 (medium). The
supranational entrepreneurship with respect to vertical integration was ranked on the
interval scale 2‐4 (low) by majority of the respondents in four cases: Pack1EL, Pack2EL,
SoSD04 and EE06. In six other cases the supranational entrepreneurship was ranked as
medium by the majority of the respondents with respect to vertical integration. With
respect to horizontal integration supranational entrepreneurship was ranked on an
interval‐scale 6‐8 (medium) by the majority of respondents in 8 cases (All three
electricity packages, Pack 3G, RES 01, RES09, S0SR10 and EED12). Eighty‐five percent of
respondents ranked supranational entrepreneurship as low in Pack1G and 60 percent in
case of Pack2G. In two other cases (SoSD04 and EE06) 60 and 67 percent of the
respondents ranked it low. For detailed results, refer to Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below.
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Before we
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4.4 The Configuration Appro
oach and Callibration in FFuzzy Set An
nalysis
The conffigurational approach is
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mplex causaal
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olistically an
nd
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conditions (causal recipes) capable of generating the same outcome (Ragin 2008: 114).
Thus, the five causal conditions identified in this study are viewed as case‐oriented
conditions that either all together or in separate groups can form configurations to
explain integration outcome.
One of the major challenges in existing studies on European integration is the
lack of uniform conceptualization of the highly contested and multi‐dimensional concept
of European integration. Researchers agree that there are variations in integration
outcomes. However, they have difficulty capturing this variation in a consistent and
systematic manner. The fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, by permitting
gradations in the degree of set membership, can circumscribe uncertainties and
ambiguities associated with the measurement of variation in integration outcomes (see
Rihoux and Ragin 2008).12
In addition to the qualitative anchors of full membership (1.0) and full non‐
membership (0.0), fuzzy set calibration requires the crossover point (0.5), which
demonstrates maximum ambiguities (fuzziness) between the two ends. Deciding
qualitative breakpoints is the primary task in a fuzzy set calibration process (for
description of the calibration process see Ragin 2008, chapter 5). The three qualitative
anchors (full membership, full non‐membership, and crossover point) distinguish
between relevant and irrelevant variation, while varying degrees of fuzzy membership
scores between full membership and full non‐membership (1.0‐0.0) place the cases in
12

Fuzzy set QCA is an appropriate method for studies aimed at establishing necessary and sufficient conditions in set
theoretic relations rather than explanation of variance in large‐N analyses. (see, for example, Goertz, Gary and Harvey
Starr. 2003. Introduction: Necessary condition logics, research design, and theory, pp.1‐23 in G. Goertz and H. Starr,
eds., Necessary conditions: Theory, methodology and applications. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; and Goertz,
Gary. 2003. Cause, correlation, and necessary conditions, pp.47‐64 in G. Goertz and H. Starr, eds).
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positions relative to each other (Ragin 2008). The researcher’s decision on qualitative
breakpoints, as Ragin (2008) recommends must conform to the researcher’s
conceptualization, definition, and labeling of the set in question, reflecting both
theoretical and substantive knowledge that should provide “standardized context for
the interpretation of scores” (Ragin 2008: 78).
4.4.1 Calibration of Integration Outcome and Causal Conditions for Fuzzy Set Analysis
Ragin (2008) sketches two techniques for calibrating interval‐scale variables as
fuzzy sets: direct and indirect. In this study, I will employ the first method‐ direct
calibration. According to this method, the three qualitative breakpoints (full
membership, full non‐membership, and the crossover point) are used to transform the
original interval‐scale values to fuzzy membership scores. Table 4.1 illustrates both raw
and calibrated fuzzy scores of integration outcome (vertical integration) for all twelve
cases. The raw scores come from the data obtained from the elite survey described in
the previous section, in which respondents were asked to rank the integration outcome
for each case on the interval‐scale from 0 to 10. In each case the mode (the most
frequent rank order) was assigned as a raw (uncalibrated) interval‐scale value. For
instance, in the RES09 case, the mode of the responses on the question which asked
respondents to rank vertical integration was 9. Therefore, the integration outcome
(vertical integration) in RES09 case has a raw score of 9 in Table 4.1. I calibrated all raw
scores into fuzzy scores using the fs/QCA program (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006).13 I set
the three qualitative anchors to be used by the program when transforming raw scores
13

See Ragin’s (2008:104) practical appendix on using fsQCA to calibrate fuzzy sets with direct method through
“compute” command
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into the calibrated fuzzy scores: interval‐scale value 9 (fully in) corresponds to the fuzzy
set threshold for full membership (0.95), interval‐scale value 1 (fully out) corresponds to
the fuzzy set threshold for full non‐membership (0.05), interval‐scale value 5 (cross‐
over) ‐ the value of the interval‐scale variable where there is maximum ambiguity as to
whether a case is more in or more out of the target set – corresponds to crossover point
(0.5) of the fuzzy set. In Table 4.1, the Fuzzy Score column shows the fuzzy scores for
integration outcome (vertical) in each case. Among twelve cases, the RES09 case posits
the full membership in the fuzzy set (0.95). Below the crossover point (0.5) are Pack1EL,
Pack1G, Pack2G, RES01, SoSD04 and EE06, which, in terms of their calibrated fuzzy
scores, are closer to non‐membership in the set condition of vertical integration.
Table 4.1 Degree of Institutionalization (vertical Integration): Fuzzy‐Set Calibration
Raw Score
Fuzzy Score
Cases
Integration
Integration
(vertical)
(vertical)
Pack 1EL
4
0.32
Pack2El
6
0.68
Pack3El
9
0.95
Pack1G
3
0.18
Pack2G
4
0.32
Pack3G
8
0.9
RES01
3
0.18
RES09
9
0.95
SoSD04
2
0.1
SoSR10
8
0.9
EE06
3
0.18
EED12
7
0.82
Note: Integration (vertical) outcome is calibrated with fully in (9), fully out (1), and
cross‐over (5) points that correspond to three qualitative anchors: threshold for full
membership (0.95), threshold for nonmembership (0.05), and crossover point (0.5).
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Table 4.2 illustrates the calibration of the second dimension of the integration
outcome – the level of harmonization (horizontal integration) – using the same
procedure. Among the twelve cases, none of the cases posits the full membership in the
fuzzy set. The only case that is above the crossover point (0.5) is Pack3El.
Table 4.2 Harmonization level (horizontal Integration): Fuzzy‐Set Calibration
Raw Score
Fuzzy Score
Cases
Integration
Integration
(horizontal)
(horizontal)
Pack 1EL
2
0.1
Pack2El
3
0.18
Pack3El
6
0.68
Pack1G
2
0.1
Pack2G
3
0.18
Pack3G
4
0.32
RES01
2
0.1
RES09
3
0.18
SoSD04
1
0.05
SoSR10
4
0.32
EE06
1
0.05
EED12
4
0.32
Note: Integration (horizontal) outcome is calibrated with fully in (9), fully out (1), and
cross‐over (5) points that correspond to three qualitative anchors: threshold for full
membership (0.95), threshold for nonmembership (0.05), and crossover point (0.5).

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the calibration of the five causal conditions
explaining European integration outcome, vertical and horizontal respectively.
Reflecting my theoretical framework, these causal conditions represent agency‐driven,
external contingency, or structural causal conditions affecting integration outcome.
Ragin also recommends to “identify not only the factors that seem connected to the
outcome as proximate causes but also the conditions that provide contexts for the
operation of these proximate causes” (Ragin 2000: 122).
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Table 4.3 The Causal Conditions (vertical integration) and Fuzzy‐set Calibration
SUPRENTR
CONVPREF
TRANS
RULE
EXTSHOCKS14
Cases
Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy
Raw
Fuzzy
Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Score
Score
Pack1El
3
0.18
0
0.02
2
0.1
4
0.32
2
0.1
Pack2El
4
0.32
2
0.1
4
0.32
6
0.68
3
0.18
Pack3El
8
0.9
6
0.68
6
0.68
8
0.9
8
0.9
Pack1G
6
0.68
0
0.02
1
0.05
1
0.05
2
0.1
Pack2G
7
0.82
3
0.18
1
0.05
4
0.32
3
0.18
6
0.68
9
0.95
Pack3G
8
0.9
5
0.5
2
0.1
RES01
6
0.68
4
0.32
4
0.32
2
0.1
4
0.32
RES09
9
0.95
8
0.9
9
0.95
7
0.82
8
0.9
SoSD04
4
0.32
3
0.18
2
0.1
1
0.05
3
0.18
SosR10
9
0.95
7
0.82
3
0.18
7
0.82
10
0.98
0.32
4
0.32
3
0.18
2
0.1
2
0.1
EE06
4
EED12
8
0.9
4
0.32
4
0.32
8
0.9
8
0.9
Note: The causal conditions are calibrated with fully in (9), fully out (1), and cross‐over (5)
points that correspond to three qualitative anchors: threshold for full membership (0.95),
threshold for nonmembership (0.05), and crossover point (0.5).

Table 4.4 The Causal Conditions (horizontal integration) and Fuzzy‐set Calibration
SUPRENTR
CONVPREF
TRANS
RULE
EXTSHOCKS
Cases
Raw
Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw Fuzzy Raw
Fuzzy
Score
Score Score Score Score Score Score Score Score
Score
Pack1El
6
0.68
0
0.02
1
0.05
4
0.32
2
0.1
Pack2El
6
0.68
4
0.32
2
0.1
6
0.68
3
0.18
Pack3El
8
0.9
0
0.02
6
0.68
8
0.9
8
0.9
Pack1G
4
0.32
0
0.02
3
0.18
1
0.05
2
0.1
Pack2G
4
0.32
6
0.68
3
0.18
4
0.32
3
0.18
Pack3G
7
0.82
0
0.02
6
0.68
6
0.68
9
0.95
RES01
7
0.82
2
0.1
4
0.32
2
0.1
4
0.32
RES09
8
0.82
0
0.02
6
0.95
7
0.82
8
0.9
SoSD04
3
0.18
6
0.68
0
0.02
1
0.05
3
0.18
SosR10
6
0.68
3
0.18
0
0.02
7
0.82
10
0.98
EE06
4
0.32
6
0.68
4
0.32
2
0.1
2
0.1
EED12
8
0.9
0
0.02
6
0.68
8
0.9
8
0.9
Note: The causal conditions are calibrated with fully in (9), fully out (1), and cross‐over (5)
points that correspond to three qualitative anchors: threshold for full membership (0.95),
threshold for nonmembership (0.05), and crossover point (0.5).
14

Note: Abbreviation SUPRENTR stands for supranational entrepreneurship; CONVPREF stands for convergence of
preferences; TRANS stands for transnational interest consolidation, RULE stands for rule density; EXTSHOCKS stands
for external contingency/shocks.
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The five causal conditions presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are: supranational
entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational interest consolidation, rule
density, and external shocks. Similar to calibrating integration outcome, the raw scores
have been calibrated into fuzzy scores.
4.5 Results of the Fuzzy Set Analysis: What Leads to European Integration?
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the summary of the calibration processes presented in
the previous section using a truth table format. Each column demonstrates the fuzzy
membership scores of the five causal conditions and the causal outcome (vertical
integration in Table 4.5 and horizontal integration in Table 4.6). Truth tables are useful
tools to discipline the process of learning about cases. Fuzzy‐set based truth tables
represent “statements about the corners of the vector space formed by the fuzzy‐set
causal conditions” (Ragin 2008: 125‐130).
Table 4.5 Fuzzy Set Truth Table (vertical integration)
Causal Conditions
Cases
Pack1El
Pack2El
Pack3El
Pack1G
Pack2G
Pack3G
RES01
RES09
SoSD04
SosR10
EE06
EED12

SUPRENTR CONVPREF
0.18
0.02
0.32
0.1
0.9
0.68
0.68
0.02
0.82
0.18
0.9
0.5
0.68
0.32
0.95
0.9
0.32
0.18
0.95
0.82
0.32
0.32
0.9
0.32

TRANS
0.1
0.32
0.68
0.05
0.05
0.1
0.32
0.95
0.1
0.18
0.18
0.32
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RULE
0.32
0.68
0.9
0.05
0.32
0.68
0.1
0.82
0.05
0.82
0.1
0.9

Outcome
EXTSHOCKS INTEGRATION
0.1
0.32
0.18
0.68
0.9
0.95
0.1
0.18
0.18
0.32
0.95
0.9
0.32
0.18
0.9
0.95
0.18
0.1
0.98
0.9
0.1
0.18
0.9
0.82

Table 4.6 Fuzzy Set Truth Table (horizontal integration)
Causal Conditions
Cases
Pack1El
Pack2El
Pack3El
Pack1G
Pack2G
Pack3G
RES01
RES09
SoSD04
SosR10
EE06
EED12

SUPRENT CONVPREF TRANS
0.68
0.02
0.05
0.68
0.32
0.1
0.9
0.02
0.68
0.32
0.02
0.18
0.32
0.68
0.18
0.82
0.02
0.68
0.82
0.1
0.32
0.82
0.02
0.95
0.18
0.68
0.02
0.68
0.18
0.02
0.32
0.68
0.32
0.9
0.02
0.68

RULE
0.32
0.68
0.9
0.05
0.32
0.68
0.1
0.82
0.05
0.82
0.1
0.9

Outcome
EXTSHOCKS INTEGRATION
0.1
0.1
0.18
0.18
0.9
0.68
0.1
0.1
0.18
0.18
0.95
0.32
0.32
0.1
0.9
0.18
0.18
0.05
0.98
0.32
0.1
0.05
0.9
0.32

Utilizing the fs/QCA 2.0 program developed by Ragin, Drass, and Davey (2006), I
have conducted an fsQCA analysis to examine causal conditions for integration
outcomes using the Truth Table Algorithm. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show the solution
formulas after conducting the fsQCA analysis for vertical integration outcomes (Table
4.7) and horizontal integration outcomes (Table 4.8). Each row produces solution
formulas with different levels of complexity. Here the complex solution allows no
counterfactual cases in the analysis, whereas the parsimonious solution includes all
possible (easy and difficult) counterfactual cases (see Ragin 2008, chap. 9). The
counterfactual cases indicate the absence of empirical cases caused by the limited
diversity in the study of naturally occurring social phenomenon (Ragin 2000; 2008).
These solution formulas represent the “endpoints of a single continuum of possible
results” that at one end privileges complexity and at the other end parsimony (Ragin
2008: 168). It is the different level of tolerance on counterfactual cases that
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differentiates these solutions. Between the complex and parsimonious, the
intermediate solution includes only easy counterfactual cases. Therefore, the
intermediate solution is a superset of the most complex solution and a subset of the
most parsimonious solution. Ragin (2008) recommends using intermediate solutions
due to their strength in interpretation.
The last two columns of Tables 4.7 and 4.8 indicate the coverage and consistency
scores of each solution formula. Consistency and coverage are the measures evaluating
the set relations between causal conditions and outcome, similar to the statistical
significance and strength of coefficient in net‐effects analysis. Set‐theoretic consistency
represents “the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions
agree in displaying the outcome in question;” Set‐theoretic coverage represents “the
degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of outcome”
(Ragin 2008: 44‐45). When the consistency level of a solution formula satisfies the cutoff
point then we can evaluate the relative strengths of each causal path (or recipe) to the
outcome, using coverage scores. As the reader can see from Tables 4.7 and 4.8, I chose
frequency and consistency cutoffs (1/1) and (1/0.8) in accordance with Ragin’s (2008:
143‐144) recommendations: choose frequency (1 or 2) when having a relatively small
number of cases (here 12 cases) and choose the upper level (0.87 and up) consistency.
In the case of horizontal integration, I chose a consistency cutoff of 0.8 due to a very
limited number of positive cases. Based on the consistency scores, the coverage column
in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 measures both raw and unique coverage of each solution formula.
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Finally, each group of solutions (Complex, Intermediate, and Parsimonious) has its own
combined solution coverage and consistency values.
Table 4.7 Fuzzy Set Solution Formulas: Vertical Integration
Solutions
Complex

Intermediate

Parsimonious

Causal Recipes

Coverage (Unique)

Consistency

SUPRENT*~TRANS*RULE*EXTSH

0.51 (0.08)

1.00

SUPRENT*CONVPREF*RULE*EXTSH

0.57 (0.17)

1.00

~SUPRENT*~CONVPREF*~TRANS*RULE*~EXTSH

0.28 (0.11)

1.00

Solution Coverage and Consistency

0.80

1.00

EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*SUPRENT
EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF*SUPRENT
EXTSH*RULE*SUPRENT

0.51 (0.08)
0.57 (0.17)
0.51 (0.20)

1.00
1.00
1.00

Solution Coverage and Consistency

0.80

1.00

0.87 (0.87)

0.98

0.87

0.99

RULE
Solution Coverage and Consistency

Note: Frequency / Consistency Cutoffs: 1.00 / 1.00;
Assumptions for Intermediate solution: Causal conditions (absent or present)

Table 4.8 Fuzzy Set Solution Formulas: Horizontal Integration
Solutions

Causal Recipes
SUPRENT*~CONVPREF*~TRANS*RULE*EXTSH

Complex

Intermediate
Parsimonious

Solution Coverage and Consistency
EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*~CONVPREF*SUPRENT
Solution Coverage and Consistency
*~TRANS*EXTSH
Solution Coverage and Consistency

Coverage (Unique)

Consistency

0.79 (0.79)

0.83

0.79

0.83

0.79 (0.79)

0.83

0.79

0.83

0.81 (0.81)

0.66

0.81

0.66

Note: Frequency / Consistency Cutoffs: 1.00 / 0.8
Assumptions for Intermediate solution: Causal conditions (absent or present)
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4.5.1 Causal Reciipes: Joint‐Su
ufficient Con
nditions for Inntegration O
Outcome
In Table 4.7,
4 the inte
ermediate solution idenntifies threee different ccausal recipees
for ve
ertical integration outco
ome. Figure 4.13 summ
marizes the cconsistency aand coveragge
score
es of these th
hree causal recipes using XY‐plots.

Figurre 4.13 Jointlly Sufficient Conditions for
f Integratioon Outcomee
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The figure demonstrates the jointly sufficient causal conditions for the causal
outcome under causal complexity. The dispositions of cases on the left side of the main
diagonal line indicate that each causal recipe, as a combination of causes, is sufficient
(or nearly sufficient) for the outcome to occur. The consistency scores in each XY‐plot
evaluate the sufficiency for each causal recipe. Here sufficiency requires the causal
conditions to be less than or equal to the outcome. This means that the causal
conditions together become a subset of the outcome. In the figure, all three causal
recipes demonstrate perfect consistency scores (1).
In terms of coverage, recipes 1 and 3 cover slightly more than half of the cases
(51 percent) whereas recipe 2 covers little bit more, 57 percent of cases. As a whole, the
intermediate solution covers 80 percent of the cases with a consistency level of 1.00.
Each causal recipe explains different causal pathways to an integration outcome to
which we now turn.
4.5.2 Alternative Paths to Integration Outcome in the EU Energy Domain
Table 4.9 summarizes the findings from my fuzzy set analysis. The configurations
in each causal recipe demonstrate what leads to the integration outcome. Together,
recipes 1, 3 (vertical integration) and 4 (horizontal integration) demonstrate distinctive
paths to integration in the EU energy domain.
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Table 4.9 Causal Recipes: Multiple Paths to Integration Outcome in the EU Energy
Domain
Recipes

Configurations

Recipe 1

EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS* SUPRENT

Recipe 2

EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF* SUPRENT

Recipe 3

EXTSH*RULE*SUPRENT

Recipe 4
(Horizontal
Integration)

EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*~CONVPREF*SUPRENT

Cases
Covered
S0SR10;
Pack3G;
EED12
RES09;
Pack3EL;
SoSR10
Pack3G;
SoSR10;
EED12
SoSR10

Coverage
0.51
(0.08)
0.57
(0.17)
0.51
(0.20)
0.79
(0.79)

Recipe 1 (EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*SUPRENT), recipe 3 (EXTSH*RULE*SUPRENT),
and recipe 4 (EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*~CONVPREF*SUPRENT) are very similar in that they
all emphasize the importance of external contingency (external shocks), rule density and
supranational entrepreneurship as jointly sufficient conditions for integration outcome.
When these three causal conditions are present, integration outcome is present
regardless of transnational interest consolidation and convergence of preferences
among key member states present or absent. Recipe 1 as well as recipe 3, each
separately, covers half of the successful cases (cases with fuzzy‐set membership scores
higher than 0.5). Recipe 1 and recipe 3 both cover three out of six successful cases
(S0SR10; Pack3G; EED12). Recipe 4, which posits external shocks, rule density and
supranational entrepreneurship as jointly sufficient conditions for horizontal integration
outcome regardless of presence or absence of consolidated transnational interests and
convergence of member state preferences, only covers one case (SoSR10). It is also
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noteworthy, that recipe 3 (EXTSH*RULE*SUPRENT) is the most parsimonious out of
these three causal paths and has the same raw coverage as the more complex recipe 1
and higher unique coverage (0.20) compared to recipe 1 (0.08).
Recipe 2 (EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF*SUPRENT) in Table 4.9 informs us that an
alternative path does exist to integration. Instead of an absence from the configuration,
the second path to integration emphasizes the importance of convergence of
preferences among key member states in combination with external shocks, rule density
and supranational entrepreneurship. Recipe 2 also covers three out of six successful
cases (RES09; Pack3EL; SoSR10) and has higher raw coverage than recipe 1 and recipe 3
(0.57) and higher unique coverage (0.17) than recipe 1. It is noteworthy that recipe 2
covers RES09 and Pack3El cases that have the highest fuzzy scores on vertical
integration outcome (0.95). We could interpret this result as an indication that jointly
sufficient causal conditions that can lead to the most successful integration outcome
should entail convergence of member state preferences.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have conducted a fuzzy‐set comparative qualitative analysis of
EU’s twelve legislative proposals in the energy domain, based on data obtained from an
elite survey and semi‐structured interviews. This chapter’s investigation of the five
causal conditions contributes to the preliminary steps in developing a typological theory
of European integration. As a form of causal recipe, different configurations of
conditions explain how integration succeeds in the EU’s energy domain. Four
intermediate solutions show the existence of two different causal paths to integration
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outcome. In one path, external shocks, rule density and supranational entrepreneurship
are jointly sufficient conditions for the integration outcome. In the other path,
convergence of key member state preferences together with the three causal conditions
from the previous path are jointly sufficient for integration to occur.
As the findings of this chapter demonstrate, the two most successful cases in
terms of vertical integration, the renewable energy directive of 2009 and the third
energy package aimed at the liberalization of electricity markets, are covered by this
path. This indicates that the convergence of positions of key member states in favor of
the Commission’s proposal that aims at creating binding rules at the EU level, or
transferring competencies to the Community can lead to more successful vertical
integration outcome. However, the findings of this chapter do not support the liberal
intergovernmental path discussed in the theoretical chapter: external shocks,
supranational entrepreneurship and existence of dense EU rules in the given domain are
all crucial parts of the causal recipe together with the convergence of member state
preferences.
The findings of this chapter do not completely support the supranational path to
integration analyzed in the theoretical chapter either. As the solution formulas of the
fuzzy‐set analysis have shown, integration in the energy domain can succeed when the
European Commission can display a high degree of supranational entrepreneurship by
exploiting existing EU rules in the energy domain and external contingencies, regardless
of the presence or absence of consolidated transnational interests supporting the
European Commission in its efforts.
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Most importantly, the findings of this chapter largely support the “punctuated
equilibrium” path to integration proposed in the theoretical chapter, which underlines
the importance of external contingencies (external shocks) together with structural
condition (existence of dense EU rules) and agency by the supranational entrepreneurs
and/or key member states.
Both causal paths to integration in the EU’s energy domain resulting from fuzzy
set analysis support my argument that integration in the EU’s energy policy domain
proceeds under the conjunction of structural conditions, such as dense EU rules in a
given policy domain, and external contingencies pressing for the common solutions at
the EU level that are successfully employed by supranational entrepreneurs (the
European Commission) and permitted by the convergence of preferences among major
EU Member States (see Table 4.10).

Table 4.10 Evaluation of Causal Paths to Integration
Liberal
Intergovernmental
Path

CONVPREF

Not supported by the
findings

Supranational Path

SUPRENT *RULE*TRANS

Not supported by the
findings

“Punctuated
Equilibrium” Path

EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF*SUPRENT

Supported by the
findings

Thus, a fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis of the EU’s twelve legislative
proposals in the various sectors of energy policy has confirmed that there is equifinality
in the European integration process, and that different causal paths can lead to an
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integration outcome. The next challenge is to identify how the causal conditions that
together constitute a causal path interact to lead to an integration outcome, or in other
words, what are the causal mechanisms behind alternative paths to integration. In the
next two chapters I attempt to explore this by process‐tracing two contrasting cases in
the EU’s energy domain: 2001 RES‐E directive that did not result in a successful
integration outcome, and RES2009 directive – the most successful case in terms of
vertical integration out of the twelve cases analyzed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE OF 2001
5.1 Introduction
The primary goal of this and the next chapter is twofold. First, both chapters
process‐trace the five causal conditions to identify how these conditions came together
to produce a particular integration outcome. The second objective of the two in‐depth
case studies is to see whether a different mode of analysis (qualitative process‐tracing)
validates the findings derived from fuzzy set analysis. For that purpose, the next two
chapters will look at the two contrasting cases within the same field of the EU’s energy
domain: the results of the fuzzy set analysis have identified the renewable directive of
2009 as the most successful case (with the highest fuzzy set membership score) in terms
of vertical integration, while the RES‐E 2001 directive in the same field did not succeed
in this integration outcome. Systematic comparison of the two contrasting cases within
the same policy field along all causal conditions contributes to assessing the validity of
different causal paths to integration outcome found as a result of fuzzy set analysis. In
contrast to fuzzy set analysis, which relied solely on the elite survey data, in the case
studies to follow I utilize multiple data sources: official documents of EU institutions
and member state public agencies, position papers of transnational organizations, open‐
ended interviews and personal conversations with the EU bureaucrats, member state
officials, representatives of various interest groups, experts as well as news sources and
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secondary material, such as articles, books and policy papers by academics and experts
in the field. The data triangulation contributes to more reliable findings.
In chapter 5, I process‐trace the development of 2001 RES‐E directive. The first
section provides the reader with a historical and institutional context preceding the
elaboration of the directive. The following five sections are structured along the five
causal conditions: supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences,
transnational interest consolidation, rule density and external contingency/shocks. In
the last section, I discuss the integration outcome brought by the 2001 RES‐E directive in
terms of the degree of institutionalization (vertical integration) and harmonization level.
At last, I summarize the main points of the chapter.
5.2 Background: Emergence of Renewable Energy in the EC Energy Policy
The oil shocks in the early 1970s led many European countries to invest in
renewable energy research and development (R&D) and prompted the European
Community’s interest in renewable energy. European dependence on imported oil
became an issue that the Council echoed in its resolution of 1974 concerning
Community energy policy objectives for 1985. The Council set an objective of reducing
energy imports from 50 percent to 40 percent by 1985 and underlined the major role of
coal, nuclear power and natural gas for the achievement of this objective. Despite
cursory remarks on the need to invest in research and development of renewable
energy sources, the resolution was the first Council document to acknowledge the long‐
term perspective for RES in replacing traditional forms of energy (Council 1975). It was
not until a decade later that Council again reiterated its general commitment to increase
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the share of RES in its resolution of 1986 concerning new Community energy policy
objectives for 1995 in response to the communication presented by the European
Commission (Council 1986).
Despite dwindling oil prices, this was an important concern for the European
Commission amidst intensifying international discussion on global warming and GHG
emissions reduction. Since the late 1980s, the European Commission has presented RES
as one of the main instruments to the solution of climate change problems (European
Commission 1988). In addition to environmental and security of supply considerations,
the European Commission envisioned a new developmental model based on positive
‘ecolo‐economic’ relationships. Investment in environmentally friendly technologies
would give the Community the “first mover advantage” and result in increased exports,
competitiveness and employment – a particularly relevant issue in light of rising
competition from the United States and the “Asian tigers” (European Commission 1993).
Aiming to establish the EU as a leader in global environmental talks at the 1992
Rio Summit, the European Commission proposed binding renewable targets and several
directives dealing with the safety and environmental impact of wind turbines, licensing
of small hydro, and technical specifications of biofuels for diesel engines (Hildingsson et
al. 2010: 108‐109). However, the member states rejected all initiatives of the
Commission except the requested R&D support for renewables. The Council’s decision
of 1993 specified the details of the ALTENER program – a specific EU financial
instrument for renewable promotion. ALTENER constituted the very first element in the
implementation of the EU’s RES policy aimed at supporting the development of
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renewable energy technologies that have not yet reached the stage at which they could
compete against traditional industry. ALTENER, for the first time, proposed an indicative
RES target: increase the share of RES of total energy demand from around 4 percent in
1991 to 8 percent in 2005 (European Council 1993).
Apart from external context and European Commission’s efforts, internal
institutional developments also created a favorable ground for the first seeds of
Community’s policy on RES. The Single European Act in 1986 with the new article 100a
introduced an explicit Community competence to regulate environmental matters in the
context of internal market developments and provided explicit legal basis for European
environmental policy (Lenschow 2005). The EU’s voice in environmental policy was
further reinforced with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The Maastricht Treaty
in 1993 extended QMV to the environmental matters, established the co‐decision
procedure for most environmental policies and granted more influence to the EP in the
environmental policy field. This was an important procedural change in EU rules that
stimulated a new policy dynamic in the environmental and energy domains in general,
and for the EU RES policy in particular (McGowan 1996; Matláry 1997).
Although the liberalization agenda was the predominant driver in the early
1990s, environmental issues and climate change gained in importance in the run‐up to
the Kyoto summit in 1997 as the European Commission, and in particular DG
Environment, was increasingly keen to establish itself as a global leader in climate
change policy (Skjærseth and Wettestad 2008).
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Influenced by the international negotiations, the so‐called CoP1, on CO2
emissions reduction that took place in Berlin in 1995, the European Commission in its
Green Paper of 1996 suggested doubling the share of renewable energy to 12 percent in
the EU’s gross inland energy consumption by 2010 through a number of measures, the
most important of which was a Community‐wide framework for RES based on a system
of renewable energy credits obliging electricity suppliers to purchase credits covering a
certain percentage of its electricity (European Commission 1996). The goal of the
document was to initiate a discussion on the most effective strategy for supporting the
development of RES.
In the follow‐up White Paper “Energy for Future: Renewable Sources of Energy,”
the European Commission reiterated the need to set the 12 percent target for RES in the
energy mix by 2010 that should be “a political, and not a legally binding tool” (European
Commission 1997: 9‐10). The twelve percent figure was accompanied with a figure for
renewable electricity. The Commission suggested that electricity production from
renewables could grow significantly from present 14.3 percent to 23.5 percent by 2010,
if appropriate measures were taken (European Commission 1997: 43; Rowlands 2005).
The White Paper also proposed a variety of measures to be adopted at the Community
and national level across different policy sectors and envisaged the new directive
proposals on “fair access for RES to the electricity market” and the “promotion of
biofuels in the transport sector” (European Commission 1997: 8 ).
The Energy Council agreed that the 12 percent target represented a “useful
guideline” and asked the Commission to elaborate proposals aimed at removing barriers
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for the wider deployment of RES and for facilitating trade of green electricity (Council
1998: 4). The European Parliament was more ambitious than the Council or even the
Commission. The EP underlined its position as a strong supporter of RES policy and
called for the share of renewables in the EU’s primary energy mix to be increased to 15
percent by 2010 with binding national undertakings on national overall goals and targets
for each type of energy (European Parliament 1998).
It took the European Commission several years to come up with the proposal for
a directive on RES. In May of 2000, the European Commission tabled a proposal for the
so‐called RES‐E directive, which translated the 12 percent RES target in the EU’s energy
mix presented in its 1997 White Paper into the overall EU‐target for the share of RES in
the EU electricity gross consumption of 22.1 percent by 2010 (European Commission
2000b). However, the 22.1 percent target was less than the 23.5 percent target
previously mentioned in the Commission’s White Paper and strongly supported by the
European Parliament, RES associations and environmental groups. The indicative nature
of the target as suggested in the proposal aligned more with the position of the Council
than that of the European Parliament or the RES associations that called for mandatory
national objectives (Cordes 2000). During the directive negotiations several member
states questioned even the indicative targets listed in the annex to the directive
proposal (Council 2000a).
However, the fiercest debate concerned the appropriate measures and
instruments through which member states were supposed to achieve set targets
(Interview with the European Commission official 2011). Since it was not realistic to
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combine 15 different support schemes, the European Commission suggested
introducing a European‐wide quota system to be managed at the European Union level.
In light of severe opposition of some big member states (Germany, Spain), the European
parliament and RES associations, the European Commission finally gave up on the
European‐wide support scheme and left it to member states to decide on their own
what support scheme they wished to implement at the national level.
So, the concern about Community’s energy dependence, the emergence of
transnational issues, such as climate change, as well as the expansion of the Community
competence in the field of environmental policy contributed to new initiatives of the
EU’s RES policy and resulted in the RES‐E Directive of 2001 on the promotion of
electricity produced from RES after several years of negotiation involving debates on the
definition of RES, nature and level of targets and the harmonization of national support
systems. It set overall indicative target of 22 percent from electricity from RES by 2010,
and included individual targets for each member state. The European Commission was
eager to introduce a European‐wide support scheme, but member states resisted both
harmonization of national support systems and a common system. The time was not
ripe for harmonization and no agreement could be reached at that point (Lauber 2007).
5.3 Supranational Entrepreneurship
The European Commission is the most important actor in the EU policymaking
process. The European Commission claims to act for the common good. However, as all
other international organizations, the European Commission as well has a goal to
survive and extend its competencies (Cram 1997: 28). The European Commission enjoys
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the exclusive competence to initiate policy in many policy fields and, therefore, it can
effectively keep or extend its competencies by providing solutions to different problems
even if the member states do not task the Commission to take action. “EU institutions
are not just passive venues waiting for issues and demands from other political actors to
come their way, but active players who try to promote issues themselves by taking
initiatives and developing policy debates” (Princen 2007: 30). The Commission can be
viewed as a policy entrepreneur that takes advantage of the window of opportunity to
take action (Kingdon 1994; Zahariadis 2007). The Commission bureaucracy often has
much deeper expertise on the issues it deals with and is ready to use the window of
opportunity as soon as it opens up for a particular policy. Policy expertise and
institutional persistence can provide them with certain informational advantages vis‐a‐
vis both competing agenda setters and the Council of Ministers in a setting of
incomplete information (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).
The European Commission, as a policy entrepreneur, is not only waiting for the
window of opportunity to open up, but is also precipitating in its emergence. By
publishing Green and White papers, policy roadmaps and strategies, the European
Commission can put an issue on the agenda, present a wide array of measures that
should be taken to solve it, mobilize various stakeholders by framing an issue in a salient
and appealing manner (Princen 2007; 2011). The ability to mobilize the support of
stakeholders on a particular policy proposal is an important aspect for the successful
supranational entrepreneurship by the European Commission. The influence of
supranational institutions is greatest in situations where those institutions possess clear
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translational constituencies of interest groups, which can act to bypass the member
governments and/or to place pressure directly on them (Pollack 1997).
In addition to mobilization and framing strategies, the European Commission has
another leverage to influence member states to agree on a policy that may not fully
reflect their interests but is preferred over a “default condition” of no policy at all
(Scharpf 2006). The European Commission has the right to withdraw its proposal if
changes and revisions introduced by the Council and the Parliament during the
negotiation stage on the draft proposal of the Commission are not acceptable. This gives
the Commission means for ‘bureaucratic shirking’ to push through proposals that does
not fully represent interests of member states and is inimical to member state
preferences (Pollack 1997: 129). The European Commission can shirk within certain
limits exploiting cleavages among the member states and push through proposals
closest to its own preferred policy that can also garner QMV in the Council (Pollack
1997: 129). The success of the European Commission in creating the window of
opportunity for a preferred policy depends on the one hand on its long‐term
commitment to a certain issue and on the other on its adaptability and readiness to
present solutions acceptable to all veto players participating in the decision‐making
process (Zahariadis 2007).
In the ensuing section, I will process‐trace the development of the 2001 RES‐E
directive in light of the extent of supranational entrepreneurship by the European
Commission. I will pay particular attention to the important components to
supranational entrepreneurship: European Commission’s efforts in the process of
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problem definition and proposal initiation, to the level of ambition enshrined in the
proposal, framing strategies and to the Commission’s success in mobilizing various
stakeholders’ support, including member states.
5.3.1 Setting an Agenda: Problem Definition and Policy Initiation
On 20 November 1996, in the run‐up to Kyoto, the European Commission
stepped up its efforts to put renewable energy on the EU agenda and released a Green
Paper on renewable electricity in the Union, entitled ‘Energy for the future: renewable
sources of energy’ (European Commission 1996). Green papers generally “propose the
first ideas for discussion in a specific field where a Community action might be
envisaged, often presenting a range of alternative approaches” (McGiffen 2001: 29). The
aim of the Green Paper was to stimulate wide consultation and discussion with all
interested parties and Community institutions and put forward a more detailed
Community Strategy with Action Plan by mid‐1997 based on the feedback from various
stakeholders. The European Commission underscored the need for attaining a
significantly higher share of renewable energy in EU’s energy balance for complying with
the international commitments concerning environmental protection in light of
upcoming Kyoto obligation regarding Co2 and other greenhouse gas emissions
reduction, for improving security of supply in light of forecasted increase in energy
dependence on imports to 70 percent, as well as for economic competitiveness in light
of employment creation and improved RES‐technology export potential for European
renewable energy industry (European Commission 1996).
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In the Green Paper, the European Commission called for a common EU policy on
renewable energy and proposed an indicative target of 12 percent RES share of gross
inland consumption by 2010 that meant doubling of the RES contribution to the EU’s
energy balance – “a clearly ambitious, and yet realistic objective” (European
Commission 1996). It should be clear that a Community target implied that the
Community as a whole, rather than individual member states, should aim to increase
the percentage of RES in the energy mix. Without outlining specific details, the
European Commission also sneaked in an idea about a prospective harmonized
Community framework for promoting RES based on a market approach by mentioning
the possibility of introducing tradable renewable energy credits at an EU‐wide scale that
would prevent market distortions arising from similar measures applied by individual
member states (European Commission 1996). A broad public debate followed focusing
on the RES targets and the type and nature of measures that could be undertaken at
Community and member states’ levels. The Commission organized two conferences
during the consultation period where those issues were extensively discussed (Interview
with the Commission official 2011). Meanwhile, the European Commission also adopted
a negotiating position for the upcoming Kyoto conference that argued for 15 percent
greenhouse gas emissions reduction target for industrialized countries by the year of
2010 from the 1990 level (European Commission 1997). The Council in its resolution on
the Green Paper invited Commission to prepare an action program and present a
strategy for renewable energy and confirmed indicative targets as a guideline for
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ambitious objective of doubling the overall share of RES in the Community by 2010
(Council 1997).
After receiving comments from various institutions and parties, the European
Commission published the White Paper in November 1997 with more detailed
suggestions. The Commission also proposed to follow‐up with a directive in 1998 that
would provide a harmonized framework for member states to ensure that renewable
energies make up a sufficient contribution to overall electricity supply, both at the EU
and at national level (European Commission 1997: 15, 34). The European Commission
again underscored the need to set the 12 percent target for RES in the energy mix by
2010 that should be “a political, and not a legally binding tool” (European Commission
1997: 9‐10). This time, the 12 percent figure was accompanied with a figure for
renewable electricity. The Commission suggested that electricity production from
renewables could grow significantly from the present 14.3 percent to 23.5 percent by
2010, if appropriate measures were taken (European Commission 1997: 43). The White
Paper also called for a market approach stating liberalization “can form the basis for a
dynamic and secure role for renewables so long as adequate market‐based instruments
are provided” (European Commission 1997: 15). The Commission suggested establishing
a working group involving Commission and member state representatives to monitor
the measures undertaken and evaluate the impact of energy policy decisions at all levels
with regard to the use of RES, whereas member states would be asked to report to the
working group about their contribution to the 2010 target and on how they intend to
promote renewables sector by sector (European Commission 1997: 14). In this manner,
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the European Commission tried to carefully introduce reporting obligations on member
states regarding their national targets and measures already in its White Paper. Most
importantly, the White Paper envisaged the new directive proposals on “fair access for
RES to the electricity market” and the “promotion of biofuels in the transport sector”
(European Commission 1997: 15).
In addition to the White Paper, the Commission sponsored the so‐called TERES II
study on possible future scenarios for the RES development. These scenarios predicted
the contribution of renewable energy sources to gross inland energy consumption to be
between 9.9 percent and 12.5 percent by 2010 European Commission 1997). It is
noteworthy that the European Commission took the higher figure predicted by these
scenarios when suggesting the 12 percent indicative target in its White Paper.
The Energy Council agreed that the 12 percent target represented a “useful
guideline” and asked the Commission to elaborate proposal aimed at removing barriers
for the wider deployment of RES and for facilitating trade of green electricity (Council
1998: 4). The Energy Council supported the Commission’s emphasis on renewable
energy as a key to reach the Kyoto target (ENDS 1998a).
Thus, the European Commission was able to generate wide discussions on
possible ways of RES promotion. As a policy entrepreneur, it was quite successful in
putting the RES issue on the European agenda and preparing the ground for the
legislative action.
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5.3.2 Formulating the Proposal: Not so Ambitious?
In 1998, the European Commission drafted a proposal for the directive requiring
member states to produce at least 5 percent of their electricity from RES. The proposed
quota was not very ambitious but would still require a big increase in countries with
lower than average share of RES (ENDS 1998b). The draft directive intended a Union‐
wide shift to more deregulated power markets insisting on a “transition towards more
competition and trade‐based system” for renewable support, while limiting the ways in
which EU member states could support renewables15. This meant the Commission was
eager to demand that countries with subsidy or fixed‐price based schemes (i.e. Germany
with FIT) adapt their support system to make them more compatible with the free
market within the transition period until 2010 (ENDS 1998b). Thus, the draft directive
envisaged the harmonization of RES support policies so that national schemes were
mutually acceptable in all member states (European Commission 1998).

15

At that time there were two types of support schemes operating in the member states: feed‐in Tariffs (FIT) and
tendering system. In FIT RES‐E is supported via guaranteed fixed prices, coupled with a purchase obligation by the
utilities. The price is set as a percentage of the electricity price actually sold by the utility to final ‐ usually industrial ‐
customers. RES‐E‐ producers receive a fixed proportion of this final price. The levels of the guaranteed prices may
vary considerably from country to country. (Germany, Denmark, Spain and Italy offered the highest prices to ‐RES‐E
producer). The fixed tariff may be modified from time to time by the appropriate regulatory authority to reflect, for
instance, falling prices due to technological progress. The tariff may also be supplemented with subsidies from the
state (e.g. Denmark) where a subsidy per kWh delivered to the grid is paid to independent producers.
In the tendering system (e.g. UK, Ireland), the member state decides on the desired level of RES, in
accordance with public policy choice of the source mix (wind, biomass, solar, waste, etc.). State places a series of
tenders for the supply of the electricity, which would thereafter be supplied on a contract basis. The electricity is then
sold by the authority responsible for organizing the tender at market prices, financing the difference between sale
and purchase price through a non‐discriminatory levy on all domestic electricity consumption. According to the
European Commission, this system allows member states decide the level of RES, the mix between different RES
sources, their growth rate over time, and the level of long‐term security offered to producers over time (European
Commission 1999: 14).
In addition to these two systems, some member states supported RES‐E in the form of voluntary green
pricing schemes (the Netherlands and Sweden). In green pricing schemes, consumers can voluntarily opt to pay a
premium for renewable electricity (European Commission 1999).
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The draft directive met fierce resistance from the German government
influenced by Germany’s wind‐power industry, which has profited from the German
feed‐in‐tariff (FIT) system of fixed pricing to develop the largest installed wind power
capacity in the world and saw the proposed competition and market‐based funding
scheme favored by the European Commission as a real threat to FIT. Particularly
problematic for the German government was the second objective of the proposal:
ensuring that renewable energy support schemes do not create trade barriers in the
context of Europe's rapidly liberalizing electricity supply market (Interview with the
German official, Ministry of Economy, 2012). German political pressure and nearing of
the end of the incumbent Commission’s term on September 1999 has forced the
European Commission to shelve the draft directive altogether and announce further
consultations with the energy ministers of member states (ENDS 1999a).
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) and a coalition of European
environmental groups were discontented with the of the directive and criticized the
German government for killing a directive that could have actually been used to protect
FIT and give a level playing field to develop RES to full maturity and become more
competitive within the transition period, which they argued, was long enough (ENDS
1999b). They called for a stalled EU directive on renewable energy to be resurrected
without limiting renewables support schemes and with the stronger national binding
targets (8 percent by 2005 rising to 16 percent by 2010) if EU’s Kyoto commitments
were to be met and a market lead in RES technology were to be maintained. The
coalition agreed that a single EU system for supporting renewables was a desirable goal
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in principle, but argued that market liberalization should not jeopardize systems that
had proved successful in boosting renewable energy (ENDS 1999b).
The European Commission in April 1999 came forward with the working
document instead, which outlined various options for promoting RES and setting rules
for support schemes. The European Commission reiterated in the working document
that if a situation with a range of support schemes across Europe were allowed to
continue, it appears likely to result in “distortion of trade and competition in
increasingly liberalizing European electricity market” (European Commission 1999: 4).
The Commission assessed direct support schemes presently existing in the member
states in terms of their compatibility with the basic Community rules on internal market
and state aids, their ability to provide a stable regulatory environment, their efficiency
and political administrative consequences. The Commission clearly favored quota‐based
system over a feed‐in‐tariff option as a possible future European support scheme for the
RES. In its assessment, the European Commission concluded that whilst a fixed feed in
tariff might be considered an appropriate mechanism to ensure low‐level market take‐
off, it may suffer from a number of important disadvantages in the medium term, and
therefore, the move from a fixed tariff approach towards one based on trade and
competition is at some stage inevitable (European Commission 1999: 23). More
importantly, the European Commission laid out two possible routes for achieving
internal market in the area of renewable energy: Gradual achievement of an internal
market through continued application of EU Treaty rules, particularly rules on state aids
that would be applied with regards to support schemes in member states. Under this
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option each member state would continue to freely choose the support scheme
regarded as most appropriate, however subject to Treaty rules on state aid that would
progressively lead to the development of a single market. Alternatively, the European
Commission suggested a proactive creation of a single market through the adoption of a
basic Community framework in the form of a directive that would ask member states to
adjust their direct support schemes for renewal generated electricity so that, after an
appropriate transitional period, different schemes were sufficiently compatible with one
another and permit effective trade and competition (European Commission 1999). As
one of the European Commission bureaucrats noted, the Commission clearly preferred
the latter option that would provide more regulatory certainty and avoid consequences
of legal action under the state aid rules to the national support schemes that might have
discouraged new investment in RES. However, with the former option, the European
Commission was giving a “warning signal” to member states that it would still “chase”
after their national support schemes in case they decided to deter the proactive course
of action (Interview with the European Commission official 2011).
Eventually, in May 1999, the EU energy ministers agreed to give a political
backing to the development of a directive as long as it explicitly allowed national
governments to steer the development of national support schemes and formally asked
the Commission to submit a proposal on RES promotion. However, they gave no clear
message on whether or not they would back binding targets (ENDS 1999c). The
Commission, in turn, promised to adopt a proposal before the end of its term in
September, but at the end of the day failed to do so.
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Later in the fall of 1999, the European Commission under an incoming energy
and transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio elaborated a new proposal, which was
criticized for the absence of binding national targets for increasing the share of RES
while imposing restrictions on member states’ rights to limit support schemes to
national suppliers (ENDS 1999d). The first point was objected to by the renewable
industry and green groups, and the second point was not particularly welcome by some
of the member states (Interview with the European Commission official 2011). As a
result, the formal adoption of the draft directive was postponed again, already for the
second time.
Since the European Commission lost hope for instantly publishing a formal draft
directive, Loyola de Palacio presented a short summary of proposed measures in
December of 1999 and asked EU energy ministers, as well as other stakeholders, to
provide feedback. The Commission’s proposal included an option for a binding EU‐level
target, or a requirement for member states to set national targets consistent with the
EU’s objective of doubling the share of RES. That would mean burden‐sharing and
differentiated targets for each member state.
The Finnish Presidency of the EU at that time expressed the position of the
Council that envisaged national targets “in terms of improvement rather than absolute”
(ENDS 1999d). It was pretty obvious that member states were not ready for binding
national targets set by the EU.
On the other hand, the European Parliament as well as the European renewable
energy industry and environmental groups called for the legally binding minimum
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national targets to be set so as to achieve doubling the share of RES in total EU energy
consumption by 2010, while arguing for maximum flexibility for member states over
national support schemes (European Wind Energy Association 1999). In the report
drafted by the Green MEP Claude Turmes in March 2000, the European Parliament also
warned the European Commission about potential risks of the planned revisions to EU
rules on state aids with regard to renewable support schemes. The report argued that
instead of treating RES support schemes as straightforward subsidies under the state aid
rules, the Community should view them in a special manner (European Parliament
2000). This was an important point in the report, because the Commission had already
issued a warning to Germany about a possible challenge to its FIT scheme that was
considered as an illegal subsidy by the Commission (ENDS 1999d).
Finally, in May 2000, the European Commission published its long‐awaited
proposal for a directive on renewable energy sources. The basic objective underlying
the draft directive was to create a framework which would facilitate the medium‐term
significant increase in renewable generated electricity ("RES‐E") within the EU. The
Commission ended up proposing a draft law with no binding national targets for
increasing RES. Instead the proposal contained indicative targets for member states that
were designed to enable the EU to double the proportion of “green” energy from 6
percent to 12 percent in primary energy supply by increasing the share of renewable
electricity from 14 percent to 22 percent by 2010. The European Commission in the
preamble of the proposal recognized that binding targets could facilitate the
achievement of 12 percent objective and ensure that RES makes a significant
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contribution towards the attainment of the EU’s Kyoto commitments. However, the
Commission, at the same time, acknowledged that there were “good arguments for
maintaining a large degree of flexibility for member states, enabling them to identify the
strategy best suited in light of national circumstances” (European Commission 2000b: 3‐
4). The European Commission, in the draft directive, tried to find a middle ground
(Rowlands 2005). So, the draft proposal reiterated the indicative objective of 12 percent
for RES in the gross inland consumption as set out in the White Paper in 1997 and
endorsed by the Council in 1998. In addition, the 12 percent share of RES in the gross
inland consumption has been translated into a specific share of 22.1 percent of RES in
electricity consumption (European Commission 2000b: 3). This figure, though, was lower
than 23.5 percent proposed in the White Paper. The Commission claimed that while the
draft directive still aimed for consumption of RES generated electricity to be at 675TWH
in 2010, because of increase in the estimates of total electricity consumption by 2010,
this number would correspond to lower 22.1 percent share for RES instead of 23.5
percent (European Commission 2000b).
The European Commission turned a deaf ear to the requests of the European
Parliament, renewable industry and green groups concerning ambitious binding national
targets. The Commission seemed to bow down to the Council’s concerns. The new
Commissioner responsible for the Directive—Loyola de Palacio—was reported to have
preferred binding targets, but apparently she had to drop this idea in the face of firm
resistance from member states (Frost 2001: 17).
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The European Commission’s ambition to create a harmonized Community wide
support scheme for RES was diluted as well. The draft directive proposed to leave
existing national financial support schemes for renewables intact for five years on the
grounds that the European Commission lacked sufficient evidence and experience to
decide for one particular system. However, the European Commission’s draft law stated
that a harmonized EU system remained the Community’s objective and promised to
propose a harmonized system by 2005, after thoroughly studying schemes currently in
place in EU member states. The European Commission also reserved the right to
propose mandatory national targets in the future in case member state’s indicative
targets turned inconsistent with the overall EU target (European Commission 2000b).
The draft directive put an obligation on member states to report annually on their
progress in terms of target achievement, as well as adaptation of direct price support
schemes to the principles of the internal market in the medium term. The directive
proposed the harmonization of rules for national schemes within five years and outlined
procedures for detailed EU monitoring of national progress in RES policy. Furthermore,
the Commission proposed certification of origin of electricity produced by RES. The draft
directive required member states to introduce a system for the certification of origin of
RES‐E, the so called guarantees of origin (GOs). The rationale was that these green
certificates could become tradable securities in the future that would facilitate the
transition to market‐based support schemes (ENDS 1999d; Interview with the European
Commission official 2011). The draft law also asked member states to review planning
and administrative procedures to reduce regulatory barriers for RES. The European
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Commission abstained from introducing harmonized mandatory rules on sharing the
costs of electricity transmission. However, the draft directive imposed obligation on
system operators to grant priority to renewable energy generators (European
Commission 2000b: 8).
The proposal for the directive on renewable energy, elaborated through a slow,
drawn‐out process and shelved twice, finally marked an uneasy compromise between
the EU member states, majority of which have opposed binding national targets, and
the renewable industry, environmental groups and the European Parliament that
repeatedly requested targets to be mandatory in order to have real effect. Even though
the European Commission opted for the proactive route of legislative action outlined in
its working paper of 1999, the level of ambition enshrined in the final proposal was
substantially diluted. Both binding targets and the issue of harmonized support schemes
were side‐stepped for the moment.
In parallel, the European Commission resorted to the gradual route of internal
market creation for renewable energy relying on the EU Treaty rule on state aid,
especially once it realized that the introduction of the harmonized support scheme in
the directive was not realistic at that stage. The Commission presented a revised version
of the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection to ensure the
compliance of national RES support schemes with the state aid rules of the Treaty.
Furthermore, the European Commission challenged the German FIT scheme, insisting
that it was “potentially disruptive to the EU’s single market” (ENDS 2000a). In this
manner, the European Commission tried to circumvent the Council with the help of the
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ECJ and exploiting the Treaty rules. The Commission had taken a similar approach in the
process of liberalization of electricity markets when it relied on Treaty rules on
competition and decisions of the ECJ. However, this time, the European Court of Justice
refuted the Commission’s arguments with its ruling in the Preussen‐Electra case, which
stated that Germany’s feed‐in law did not constitute state aid (Kuhn 2001).16 As a result,
the European Commission’s effort to derail feed‐in schemes in favor of market‐based
instruments failed as well.
The European Commission’s entrepreneurship efforts in the proposal
formulation stage of the policy‐making process were not as successful as in the policy
initiation phase. The Commission’s draft proposal was shelved twice in face of strong
pressure from the renewable industry and green interest groups on the one hand, and
resistance from member states on the other. Despite pursuing the proactive route of
legislative action laid out in the working paper of 1999, the European Commission
turned out not to bold enough to suggest either binding measures or harmonized
support scheme against the will of member states.
5.3.3 Mediating Negotiations: Framing Strategy and Mobilization of Stakeholders
After the adoption of the draft proposal by the European Commission, pursuant
to Article 251(2) and Article 95 of the Treaty, in accordance with the steps of the co‐
decision procedure, the Commission forwarded the proposal to the European

16

A leading German electric utility launched what proved to be an ultimately unsuccessful challenge to the FIT. This
challenge, made under EU competition law, failed in 2001 when the European Court of Justice held that the law did
not involve state aid, arguing that the government at no stage had control over the funds that paid for the extra cost
of renewable generation and which flew directly from the consumers to the utilities, which in turn passed them on to
the generators (European Court of Justice 2001).
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Parliament and the Council for consideration. The draft directive generated mixed
responses from the European Parliament and the member states, especially with regard
to the three most contentious issues: definition of renewable energy sources, level and
nature of targets, and support schemes for RES. This sub‐section will discuss each of
them in light of European Commission’s entrepreneurship efforts to survive the draft
directive through the negotiation and co‐decision stage, facing a pressure from the
Council on the one hand, and from the European Parliament on the other.
In the draft proposal, the European Commission mentioned wind, solar,
geothermal, wave, tidal and biomass, and hydro‐only if generated in power plants
smaller than 10 MW ‐ as renewable sources of energy. The Commission’s definition of
renewable power was somewhat vague: “electricity generated by plants using only
renewable energy sources, including the part of electricity produced from renewable
energy sources in hybrid plants using conventional sources of energy, in particular for
back‐up purposes” (European Commission 2000b: 3) Based on the presented
definitions, three issues turned out to be contentious in the negotiation state: what
does biomass include, whether or not large hydroelectric power plants should benefit
from the RES support schemes, and the role of renewable sources in hybrid plants.
The European Commission defined biomass more narrowly, including only
products and waste from agriculture and forestry in the definition. In the report, after
the first reading, the European Parliament suggested to incorporate biodegradable by‐
products of the pulp and paper industry and the biodegradable fraction of separated
municipal wastes, and clearly exclude environmentally harmful substances, such as
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wood preservatives (European Parliament 2000) The European Commission took into
account the EP’s suggestions and reflected them in its amended proposal for a directive
(European Commission 2000c). The Council, in its common position, put forward a much
broader definition for biomass, which counted biodegradable fraction of industrial and
municipal waste without exclusively demanding that waste should be separated (Council
2001). In response, the EP reiterated in its recommendations for a second reading, that
non‐separated waste cannot be treated as RES (European Parliament 2001). However,
on this point, the European Commission disregarded the EP’s position and in the final
proposal included a broader definition of biomass proposed by the Council (European
Commission 2001).
With respect to electricity produced in hydroelectric installations, the European
Commission displayed some inconsistency. In the draft proposal, the Commission
underlined that only electricity produced in installations with an installed capacity below
10 MW would be considered as coming from renewable sources. However, electricity
from large hydro power plants would still count towards the RES‐E target of a given
country (European Commission 2000c). Such formulation implied that large hydro
power would not benefit from the introduced support schemes for RES. The Council was
not satisfied with this formulation and in its common position got rid of such
differentiation between large and small hydroelectric power plants ensuring that
member states could subsidize large hydro power plants under their support
mechanisms designed for RES (Council 2001). The European Commission, once again,
revised its original proposal to reflect Council’s concerns.
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The other issue that came to be contentious concerned the definition of hybrid
plants, more specifically whether electricity generated during biomass co‐firing could be
regarded as a renewable source of energy. According to the European Commission’s
definition, to be regarded as RES‐E, electricity had to be generated in plants using only
renewable energy sources, but conventional sources of energy could also be used
“particularly for back‐up purposes.” The European Parliament advocated more
restricted definition of hybrid plants limiting the use of conventional sources “for back‐
up purposes only” (European Parliament 2000). The Council, again, came up with a
broader definition and in its common position stated that “the proportion of electricity
produced from renewable energy sources in hybrid plants also using conventional
energy sources” can be counted as coming from renewable energy sources (Council
2001). So, the European Commission tried to find a middle ground between the Council
and the EP, but even when its opinion was in line with the EP’s position (i.e. exclusion of
large hydro plants from support schemes, limitation of the role of biomass co‐firing in
hybrid plants), the European Commission went on a compromise on many definitional
issues with the Council not to risk the fate of the entire directive.
As we have already seen, setting targets for renewable energy source was a
controversial issue from the very beginning. The controversy with respect to RES targets
entailed two dimensions: the level and the nature of targets. The European Parliament,
early on, advocated for the higher target of at least 15 percent share of RES in the EU’s
inland energy consumption to be divided among member states and broken down by
different sectors (i.e. electricity, heating and cooling, transport) (European Parliament
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1997). However, the 15 percent target as well as sectoral targets was too ambitious for
the Council (Interview with the European Commission official 2011). Therefore, it never
found its way in the Commission’s draft proposal. In the draft proposal presented to the
EP and the Council, the European Commission converted the overall 12 percent target
of RES in energy mix into 22.1 percent share of RES in the gross electricity consumption.
This was a strategic decision by the European Commission. As one of the Commission
bureaucrats involved in the elaboration of the directive mentioned, the Commission
hoped that those member states, which had already designed national support schemes
for electricity generated from RES (i.e. Germany, Spain, Denmark), would back up
Commission’s proposal (Interview with the German official, Ministry of Economy, 2012).
The European Parliament was ready to push for more ambitious targets and
suggested 23.5 percent of RES share in the gross electricity consumption, 1.4 percent
higher than the one proposed by the Commission, arguing that an expected rise in
energy efficiency would facilitate to achieve a higher share of RES in electricity
consumption. With respect to the nature of the national targets, the European
Parliament asked for the binding minimum national targets for the share of RES‐E in
electricity consumption, stating that only legally binding targets would be able to
guarantee that member states take all necessary efforts to develop renewable sources
of energy. In addition, EP argued that member states should set targets for production
of RES‐E to utilize potential with regard to sustainable energy as fully as possible
(European Parliament 2000: 22).
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In the amended proposal, however, the European Commission disregarded EP’s
suggestions. The Commission again referred to 22.1 percent RES‐E indicative target to
be achieved by 2010 based on the national targets that should be of indicative nature as
well. The European Commission realized that 22.1 percent target was already more
ambitious than member states initially desired (Lauber 2005). A majority of member
states in the Council ensured that only indicative RE‐E targets were set. The European
Commission only succeeded in keeping a future reference to mandatory targets in the
final version of the directive. According to the Article 3(4) of the directive, the European
Commission can bring forward mandatory targets if three years after the entry into
force of the directive the national indicative targets turn out to be inconsistent with the
overall 12 percent target and the 22.1 percent indicative share of electricity produced
from renewable energy sources in total Community electricity consumption (European
Commission 2001: 3).
The Council adopted individual national targets suggested by the European
Commission for member states with only minor changes. Only three member states (the
Netherlands, Portugal and Finland), out of fifteen, demanded to reduce their national
targets. Sweden and Austria requested to include a note in the directive acknowledging
that the achievement of their national targets was conditional on climate factors that
could affect the productivity of their hydro power plants (European Commission 2001:
8).
Overall, the European Commission’s policy entrepreneurship was partly
successful on the issue of targets. The Commission’s suggestions, though not as
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ambitious as the EP would like, were adopted by the Council with relatively slight
changes (Rowlands 2005: 970)17. But the European Commission did not succeed in
persuading member states to set binding targets and left the issue of mandatory targets
as a future possibility. However, even an indicative target of 22.1 percent share of RES in
electricity consumption derived from the overall 12 percent target of RES in EU’s energy
mix was already a step ahead.
The most contentious issue throughout the entire process of policy elaboration
on RES concerned, however, not the objectives, or how much RES‐E should be
generated, but the means, or how the development of RES should be supported.
The European Commission was affected by neoliberal worldviews, and therefore,
viewed support for renewable electricity as a source of market distortion and favored
the so‐called market‐based instruments over command and control regulation. In its
early papers, even before the drafting process of the RES‐E directive had begun, the
European Commission framed the problem and presented a solution from a perspective
focusing on the fulfillment of the recently liberalized electricity market, viewing the
existence of different support schemes as “likely to result in distortion of trade and
competition” (European Commission 1999: 4). This is hardly surprising since within DG
Energy the subdivision of Competition and Internal Market was in charge of the
question. DG Competition also argued strongly in favor of market‐based instruments,

17

Six of the Union’s 15 member states have qualified their target in some manner. Several of them pointed that the
percentage target is a function of overall electricity demand, and therefore, should the estimate for overall demand
be incorrect, then the target should no longer apply. Austria and Sweden noted the weather‐dependent nature of
hydropower (note that hydropower accounts for a significant contribution of RES in these countries). Luxembourg
requested that all of the electricity produced by its municipal waste incinerator needs to be counted as renewable to
be able to reach its assigned target (European Commission 2001:8).

128

such as Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) that would conform to Community rules of
state aid.18 Other supporters of Commission’s official frame and offered solution ‐ an
EU‐wide harmonization of support schemes based on TGC ‐ included EURELECTRIC on
behalf of the traditional electricity industry and the European Wind Energy Association
(EWEA) dominated by British and Danish interests at that time. They all advocated
quantity‐based instruments, which implied either tender systems such as the non‐fossil
fuel obligation (NFFO) in the UK, a leader member state in liberalization, or quota and
TGC systems (Lauber and Schenner 2011: 514). Price‐based systems, such as feed‐in
tariffs existing in Germany, were referred to as regulation and considered disruptive to
the internal market (European Commission 1998).
Thus, from the very outset of the process, the European Commission was clearly
keen on harmonization of support schemes, and preferably in the form of the tradable
certificates model, arguing that with increased competition on energy markets,
regulatory policy measures such as feed‐n tariffs had to be replaced by more market
oriented measures (European Commission 1996: 34), the position that was repeated in
the White Paper (European Commission 1997; Rowlands 2005).
The very early draft proposal for the directive developed by the Commission in
February 1999 emphasized that support schemes applied in member states should be
based on the competition between the producers of renewable electricity and should
enable trade between producers and consumers in the internal market; the exemptions

18

Under TGC scheme, the RES‐E generators can sell their green power for the price they can get in the electricity
market, but they can also sell accompanying ‘green certificates’ to suppliers who need the certificate to show they
have fulfilled their obligation. Thus, RES‐E producers’ income is dependent on market price of green certificates and
market price of electricity (Buchan 2009: 145).
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from these rules would only apply until 2010 (European Commission 1999: 56). In
reality, this actually implied the abolition of feed‐in tariff support system in member
states such as Germany, Spain, and others that already had such schemes in place with
considerable success rates (Interview with the German official, Ministry of Environment
2012). The proposal was dropped due to controversy within the Commission, which
eventually paralyzed it on this issue (Hirschl 2008: 349). And even if the proposal was
adopted by the Commission, it would never get Council’s approval, as some big member
states, namely, Germany and Spain, strongly committed to FIT were already expressing
their discontent. They argued that member states should be able to choose their own
support schemes, referring to the principle of subsidiarity (Interview with the German
official, Ministry of Environment 2012; Interview with the European Commission official
2011).
After the failure to adopt the draft proposal, a change in the position of the
Commission was becoming obvious. In its 1999 Working Paper, the European
Commission reviewed various support mechanisms and presented a number of options
for potential inclusion in the prospective directive, with tradable certificates still being
the preferred model (European Commission 1999). The European Commission
downplayed the merits of the FIT, such as long‐term stability to investors and
technology differentiation according to the maturity. On the other hand, Commission
heavily criticized FIT for being too rigid to stimulate enough competition between
generators, politically difficult to adjust in time, and therefore, incompatible with
liberalized electricity market and environmental state aid regulations (European
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Commission 1999: 16, 25). In contrast, quantity‐based support schemes were praised
for steering investments to the most efficient technologies and reducing costs. The
European Commission argued that the harmonized EU‐wide support scheme based on
the Tradable Green Certificates, as a market‐based policy instrument, would be most
compatible with liberalized electricity market. Competition under a TGC scheme would
accelerate innovation (dynamic efficiency), lower prices, thereby preventing excess
profits and promoting lowest‐cost technologies (static efficiency). The consequence
would be a faster deployment of RES‐E (effectiveness) at lower costs (cost‐efficiency)
(European Commission 1999). Furthermore, the European Commission hinted that there
was no alternative to TGC at some stage “the move from fixed tariff approach towards
one based on trade and competition” would be inevitable (European Commission 1999:
17). Thus, the European Commission clearly focused on economic arguments in light of
energy market liberalization and used ‘competition’, ‘cost‐efficiency’, and ‘market‐
based’ as key words in its pro‐TGC framing strategy (Lauber and Schenner 2011). In the
working paper, the European Commission was less explicit and direct about
harmonization of support schemes on TGC model than previously. However, its
preference for market‐based instruments was easily discernible.
The European Commission’s arguments and framing strategy, supported by
some stakeholders (i.e. conventional industry represented by the Eurelectric) met
resistance from others. The European Parliament and national renewable energy
associations, though sympathetic to a common pan‐European approach, were not
flattered with the tradable certificates system. Instead, they were strongly supporting
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FIT schemes – so far the most effective in Europe in terms of adding renewable
electricity capacity (European Parliament 2000, Interview with German Wind Energy
Association Representative 2012). They argued for the right of member states to freely
choose the support mechanism, countervailing the European Commission’s ‘internal
market’ frame with ‘subsidiarity’ frame that was in line with the position of majority of
member states in the Council (European Parliament 2000; Interview with the EWEA
representative 2011).
The other important factor was the change of the European Commission. The
new energy Commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, who occupied her post in fall of 1999, was
inclined to take less radical and more gradual and cooperative position on the issue –
give member states freedom of choice concerning the support schemes. In addition, the
new Commissioner put a newly founded Renewable Energy Division within the DG
Transport and Energy in charge of the RES directive. The new division was less
ideologically motivated and more technically‐oriented (Interview with the European
Commission official 2011). This also contributed to the change of the tone in the draft
proposal officially adopted by the European Commission in May 2000.
In the draft directive presented to the EP and the Council, the European
Commission concluded that there was “insufficient evidence to provide, at this stage,
for the introduction of a harmonized Community‐wide support scheme” (European
Commission 2000b: 2). Instead, the proposal tasked the European Commission to
“monitor the application of support schemes in member states with the intention to
present a report, within five years, on the experience gained with the application and
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the co‐existence of different support schemes, and if necessary, propose a Community
framework with regard to support schemes for electricity produced from renewable
energy sources that should be compatible with the principles of internal electricity
market, be as efficient as possible in terms of cost, and include sufficient transitional
periods for national support systems (European Commission 2000b; Rowlands 2005).
The proposal also required member states to issue guarantees of origin (GOs) – a
certificate showing whether the electricity was from renewable sources – to enable
producers of electricity from renewable energy sources demonstrate that the electricity
they sell is produced from RES (European Commission 2000b: 7‐8).19 Introduction of
Guarantees of Origin (GOs) was an important element in the proposal in light of future
Community‐wide trading of RES. At this point, the GOs were for disclosure purpose only.
However, this was a technical procedure on which a future mandatory EU‐wide scheme
could be based (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 87). Thus, the European Commission’s
‘internal market’ frame could still find its way in the directive. The possibility of a
Community framework was indeed strongly related to an internal market frame.
Since the draft directive entailed no direct market or harmonization scheme at
this point, the major discussion with regard to support schemes concerned the length of
a transitional period that would be sufficient to adapt national support schemes and
maintain investor confidence, if the Commission made a proposal for a prospective
Community‐wide framework on the basis of its monitoring report in 2005.

19

The

Introduction of this procedure enabled electricity utilities to offer securities to customers who would pay a little
extra for green electricity. In this way the consumers contributed financially to the production of the renewable
energy, but they were not guaranteed that they themselves would be supplied with the electricity generated by a
particular source or plant (Wettestad and Boasson 2012: 87).
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European Commission did not specify the timeframe for ‘sufficient transitional period’ in
the draft directive (European Commission 2000b).
The European Commission’s internal market frame was strongly contested by
the European Parliament. The EP also wanted to dilute the Commission’s emphasis on
economic criteria, with respect to how any future proposal would eventually be
evaluated, and focus more on environmental criteria, more specifically, on the
effectiveness of support schemes to add RES capacity in the EU (Rowlands 2005: 972).
The EP also criticized TGC‐based systems for leading to geographical concentration of
RES investments in areas most endowed with RES potential that in turn might induce
local opposition to new developments (European Parliament 2000). In the report
adopted by the EP’s ITRE Committee after the first, and later, after the second reading,
the EP suggested amendments to the Commission’s proposal, including the possibility of
extending transitional period for support schemes to 10 years, thereby enabling
successful national support schemes to continue during this period. The EP argued that
longer transitional periods were necessary to be able to compare different systems and
only then decide on the appropriate model for harmonized scheme, as well as to ensure
certainty for investors (European Parliament 2000).
In response to the EP’s amendments, the European Commission presented an
amended proposal in which it partially took into consideration the EP’s suggestions.
More particularly, the European Commission specified transitional period as ‘up to 10
years’ (Recital 16, amended proposal of 2001) and added environmental criteria to the
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internal market criteria for the evaluation of support schemes for the purpose of
proposing prospective Community‐wide system (European Commission 2001).20
The Council’s position on support schemes, as reflected in the Common Position
on the Commission’s proposal, was not a surprise. Member states from the beginning
considered that it was too early to decide on a Community‐wide framework, in view of
the limited experience with national schemes and the current relatively low share of
price supported electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the Community
(Council 2001). The ‘subsidiarity’ frame put forward by the European Parliament and
national renewable energy industry was appealing to many governments that wanted to
retain national support schemes, particularly pro‐FIT Germany and Spain (Interview with
the German official, Ministry of Environment, 2012). Regarding GOs, the member states
insisted that such certificates should only be used for disclosure purposes only and
should not oblige member states to count GO’s purchased from other member states
towards the fulfillment of a national targets (Council 2001). On the question of
transitional period, the Council shared EP’s concerns. In the Common Position, the
Council suggested ‘at least seven years’ as a sufficient transitional period, the timeframe
that appeared in the final text of the directive (Council 2001).
Except for the three most relevant and contentious issues that we have
discussed (RES definition, targets and support schemes), there were several other

20

The amended draft directive stated that “proposal should be compatible with the principles of the internal
electricity market, take into account the characteristics of the different technologies, be efficient and simple, and
include sufficient transitional regimes of up to 10 years to maintain investors’ confidence and avoid stranded costs In
evaluation criteria, the progress in internalizing external costs, high degree of utilization of electricity from RES, as
well as lower prices for the public and a level playing field for market operators were also included” (European
Commission 2001:6).
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elements in the Commission’s proposed directive, which got watered down by the
Council. The issue of grid access for RES was one of such components. In the existing
situation, where the electricity system was dominated by few companies responsible
not only for the production, but also transport and distribution, it was obvious that RES
generators would be disadvantaged with inappropriately high fees and technical
requirements to feed in electricity to the grid. The European Parliament has been
arguing that network/grid operators should have been obliged to give priority access to
RES generators and provide the requisite infrastructure, as part of the process of equal
treatment with other forms of energy production, while the connection costs should
have been borne by operators of renewable energy plants (European Parliament 1998;
2000). The European Commission was largely in line with the EP. The first draft proposal
presented by the Commission contained an obligation for operators of the transmission
and distribution network to guarantee priority access to electricity grid for electricity
generated from RES (European Commission 2000, Art. 7(1)). However, in its Common
Position on the Commission’s proposal, the Council considerably watered down this
obligation on priority access and made it optional for member states to implement it
and conditional on the reliability and safety of the electricity grid and its capacity
(Council 2001). Eventually, the Council and the EP, unwilling to delve into the
conciliation procedure after the second reading, reached an agreement to oblige
operators of transmission and distribution system to guarantee the transmission and
distribution of the RES‐E while taking into account the reliability and safety of the
electricity network (Directive 2001/77/EC, Art. 7).
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The European Commission’s effort to remove bureaucratic barriers in the
development of RES was bogged down by the Council as well. In the draft proposal, the
European Commission required member states to streamline their procedures and
reduce regulatory and non‐regulatory barriers in nine areas (European Commission
2000). The Council accepted only three of these areas and Commission’s request to
introduce a fast‐track planning procedures for RES producers was devoid of mandatory
character in the final directive (Directive 2001/77/EC).
So, the European Commission’s framing strategy based on ‘internal market’
frame to introduce a harmonized market‐based RES support scheme did not prove
successful. The ‘subsidiarity’ frame used by FIT supporters turned out to be more
appealing for the member states. The Commission’s mediation efforts to maintain the
common RES framework in the final version of the proposal had failed. The Commission
was not able to mobilize the support of the Council that was not yet ready to cede
control over national support mechanisms, nor the support of the European Parliament
that was in general backing the idea of common framework, though not the market‐
based system suggested by the Commission.
5.4 Convergence of Preferences
European integration is often viewed as the outcome of the interest‐based
preferences of sovereign member state governments and the majority coalition these
governments form within the European Council (Moravcsik 1998). Those preferences, in
the first place, are shaped through domestic bargaining with main societal and industrial
interests, such as the dominant national energy producers. During the decision‐making

137

at the EU level, preferences are reflected in the issue‐specific national positions that
each government advances on the policy proposal proposed by the European
Commission throughout the negotiation process, and often in the pre‐negotiation stage
of proposal elaboration. The positions of member state governments can be affected by
their earlier political choices, preferences/positions of other actors (i.e. other member
state governments, the European Parliament, the European Commission), and the
institutional set‐up of the system in which decision‐making takes place.
In the EU policy‐making context, for the energy policy domain, possible options
for action is limited by any proposal tabled by the European Commission since this
institution is responsible for drafting a policy proposal. As a result, options that member
states have to choose from may be different from what they would be satisfied with. In
that case, each member state will choose the option that is closest to its national
preference/position, or alternatively propose a new option. However, in order for the
new option to be viable, it needs to be closer to the position of other member states as
well. As the decision outputs are achieved through negotiations in the Council of the
European Union, a considerable overlap in the positions of key member states are
required in order to arrive at the common position. There is a generally accepted rule of
thumb that if two of the key countries in the EU are against something, then it will not
proceed (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 54). Even when decisions are adopted under the
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) procedure, as in the case of energy policy, dominant
member states will be able to impose conditions or build blocking coalitions.
Supranational entrepreneurs often show the path of least resistance where they

138

anticipate opposition from the powerful member states and tailor and revise proposals
to fit national preferences.
In the context of the EU day‐to‐day policies (such as our case of RES Directive),
the positions of the member states, and correspondingly, the convergence of their
preferences/positions with respect to a particular policy proposal can be analyzed along
two broad dimensions: objectives and scope of a proposal, and the means or the ways
in which to achieve those objectives. Position of a member state with respect to the
proposed objectives and the means can be characterized in terms of two features:
direction and intensity. A member state can either favor or disfavor the proposed
objective(s), and favor or disfavor the means and instruments proposed to achieve the
objective(s). Sometimes, a member state can be in favor of the objective(s) of the
proposal, but not be in favor of the proposed means or instruments. Second feature of
the member state’s preference/position is its intensity – the relative degree of support,
or no support, to the proposed objectives and means of the proposal. So, the position of
a member state on the objectives and means of the proposal can vary from strongly in
favor to strongly opposing (not in favor).
As we have discussed in the theoretical chapter, according to liberal
intergovernmental path to integration, the necessary condition for the policy to be
adopted (and for that matter, the integration to succeed) is that key member states
(with strong bargaining positions) have converging preferences/positions in favor of the
policy proposal. In that case, the integration outcome will depend on the extent of
vertical (i.e. binding rules at the EU level, ceding competencies to the EU) and/or
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horizontal integration (degree of harmonization) that proposed objective(s) and/or
means and solutions can bring about. Correspondingly, when key member states have
converging preferences/positions not in favor of the objective(s) and or means
presented in the policy proposal, the policy either fails to be adopted (integration
failure), or gets revised by the European Commission so that it is acceptable to the key
member states in the Council. Following this logic, policy outcomes represent the
lowest‐common denominator outcome and reflect the preferences/positions of key
member state(s) least in favor of the proposal. As a result, the integration outcome can
be watered down substantially, even to the point of minimal or no integration.
According to liberal intergovernmental expectations, the higher the gains from
the proposed policy for a government, or higher the costs of non‐agreement (i.e. higher
the costs of not having a common objective(s), or harmonized solutions), as well as
higher the risks of non‐compliance by other governments, the higher the readiness of a
member state to support the proposed policy and the policy outcome, and
correspondingly the extent of vertical integration (i.e. more binding rules at the EU level,
ceding competencies to the EU) and/or horizontal integration (more harmonization)
that a particular outcome entails.
In this section, I will examine the preferences/positions of key member states
(Germany, France, the UK)21 on the objectives and means of the Commission’s proposal
on RES directive focusing on direction and intensity of their preferences/positions. At
the end of the section, I will discuss the extent of convergence between their positions.
21

Poland’s position is not considered here, as it only joined the European Union in 2004 and did not have
a say during the elaboration and negotiation of the proposal for the RES directive.
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5.4.1 Different RES Strategies in Germany, the UK and France
All key three countries ‐ Germany, the UK and France – developed different
renewable strategies and had different situations in terms of the role of RES in the
energy mix.
Until the 1980s, the electricity supply structure in Germany was dominated by
very big utilities, mostly relying on coal and nuclear generation. They considered small
and decentralized forms of generation, such as renewable energy, uneconomic and
foreign to the system. The German government, particularly the Ministry of Economy
(BMWI), ruled by Social Democratic Liberals (till 1982) and later by Conservative Liberals
(till 1998) supported the coal and nuclear industry (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
Following the oil crisis of 1979‐1980, German energy self‐sufficiency has been
declining and the overall share of energy imports has been rising, reaching 58 percent in
1995 (IEA 2002). Dwindling domestic gas production and reliance on imported (mostly
Russian) natural gas, accompanied with German public reluctance to rely on nuclear
energy after the Chernobyl Accident of 1986 and the Federal government’s decision in
1990 to slow down on coal production due to the enlarged price gaps between domestic
and imported hard coal, has called attention to the security of supply issue.
In parallel with heightened energy security concerns, since the late 1980s,
increasing attention has been devoted to the environmental protection, and particularly
to climate change and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In 1990s, The German
government announced the goal of cutting CO2 emissions by 21 percent (compared to
1990 levels) within the EU burden‐sharing agreement under the Kyoto Protocol (IEA
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2002: 38), followed by a comprehensive National Climate Protection Program (German
Government 2000). Renewable energy, in light of achieving energy security and climate
protection goals, has becoming popular since then.
The first major step in the promotion of renewable energies was the 1991
Electricity Feed Law, which obliged power companies to buy electricity generated from
wind, hydropower, biomass and solar energy at a rate which for wind and solar cells
amounted to 90 percent of the average tariff for final customers (Jacobsson and Lauber
2006; StrEG 1990). An alliance of engineering research communities, small‐scale
cooperative ventures of some 3500 owners of small hydropower plants and the Green
party (later supported by Social Democrats) put forward the Electricity Feed‐in Law. The
alliance strongly supported feed‐in scheme that was offering reliable support for various
technologies and not just to the most profitable ones (Meyer 2003: 671; Bechberger and
Reiche 2004: 248). The law was easily adopted despite the opposition of utilities, which
were not entitled to receive any benefits under this law if they invested themselves in
the in the new technologies (Scheer 2001 cited in Lauber 2005). With the adoption of
the Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (StrEG) in 1990, Germany launched feed‐in schemes,
relying on politically decided electricity prices, differentiated for various technologies.
This led to the rapid development of renewable energy industry and offered substantial
financial incentives to investors. In 1991, Enercon, currently the largest German
producer of wind turbines, had already produced its first 500 kW wind turbine, the
largest available for sale at that time. The Feed‐in Law stimulated RES market expansion
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from about 20MW in 1989 to about 490 MW in 1995 (BWE 2000), and also resulted in
politically stronger wind industry (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
The energy utilities, supported by the Ministry of Economy, realizing that the
StrEG might herald the first step towards a new energy system that favored small and
decentralized generation, lobbied for the replacement of feed‐in tariff with a quota
system that would fix quantity of electricity to be generated from RES, allow utilities to
pick specific RE technologies, run their own installations and shut out competitors
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006:). However, they failed to mobilize political support against
FIT (Interview with the German official, Ministry of Economy, 2011).
With a Red‐Green Coalition of SPD and Green Party coming to power in 1998,
the RES acquired stronger political support. To achieve the newly announced target of
12.5 percent of RES share in electricity market by 2010, the new government launched
100.000‐roof program, providing backing to the struggling photovoltaic sector (German
government 1998). At this time, the German wind turbine industry had grown to be the
second largest in the world and exhibited great dynamism (Bergek and Jacobsson 2003).
With liberalization launched by the European Union’s first electricity directive,
the price of electricity went down, and consequently, profits for wind industry owners.
Fearing the loss of a dynamic home market and green jobs, the Green Party and the
environmental wing of the SPD argued for the reformed Renewable Energy Sources Act
(EEG) that would have extended coverage to additional renewable sources, such as
photovoltaic, and revise the feed‐in tariff formula to reflect the costs of each technology
to provide long‐term certainty for both developers and users (IEA 2002: 94). A key

143

industrial association VDMA (Equipment and Machinery Producers) joined the ranks of
FIT supporters—again demonstrating the increasingly broad legitimacy of renewables
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
The Federation of German Industries and the opposition parties (conservative
CDU/CSU and the Liberals) strongly opposed the law. However, opposition was
internally divided on number of issues and could not come up with a viable alternative.
They argued for more competition and sometimes for state subsidies instead of passing
on costs to final customers (Bechberger and Reiche 2004).
In 2000, the Feed‐in Law was replaced by the Renewable Energy Source Act
(EEG). Under the new law, the rates of feed‐in tariffs were guaranteed for up to 20
years, thereby providing favorable conditions for investments in ‘‘green’’ electricity
production over the long term (Hirschl 2000 et al. 2002; Frondel et al. 2010). EEG also
introduced much higher tariffs for electricity from photovoltaic panels, and an annual
digression of the feed‐in tariffs for all kinds of RES (Hinsch 2000: 11). As a result, both
wind and solar industry development was greatly stimulated.
Due to the early introduction of a favorable feed‐in‐tariff with the Electricity
Feed‐in Law of 1990 and the subsequent Renewable Energy Law of 2000 (with a target
for doubling the share of renewable energy in the electricity market from 5 to 10
percent by 2010) Germany doubled the share of RES from 1990s to 2000s from 3.4
percent of primary energy consumption to 7.3 percent. In 2000, Germany was a world
leader in the wind power production and the leader in installed solar electricity capacity
in Europe (IEA 2002: 91). The FIT turned out to be the most effective instruments in
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supporting the development of RES that was based on German tradition to place
emphasis on new market entrants against concentrated market power of incumbents
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).
In the United Kingdom, unlike Germany, market ideas gained hold and the
traditional electricity producers (utilities) had a primary role in renewable energy
development and no substantial small‐scale renewable industry emerged (Mitchell and
Connor 2004). Compared to Germany, the role of renewables has been relatively
modest. It focused on large‐scale hydroelectric capacity in the North Scotland.
From late 1960s, the discovery of large reserves in the North Sea enabled the
country to meet most of demand for gas and oil through domestic sources. The coal
industry that was the heart of the UK’s energy economy for many decades, has been in
relative decline in the post‐war period, but still constituted a substantial share in the
energy mix. The UK has also been a significant producer of non‐fossil fuel energy in the
form of nuclear energy. Prior to the energy crisis of 1970s, primary consideration in the
UK’s energy policy was to maintain national control over the exploitation of its energy
resources (Cook and Surrey 1977). Starting from 1980s, the government’s approach to
energy policy shifted towards more competition and private enterprise. The energy
policy of Mrs. Thatcher’s neoliberal Conservative government involved the privatization
of state owned energy companies and the opening up of markets to encourage
competition (Helm et al. 1989).This period of privatization was concurrent with the
period of low energy prices, diminishing the motivation of utilities to invest in capital‐
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intensive technologies, such as nuclear and switching to gas‐fired power generation
(Surrey 1996).
The New Labor party, under the leadership of Tony Blair, pledged a commitment
to an environmentally friendly policy, especially to climate change. This has been
reflected in the government’s approach to energy policy that sought to encourage
renewables (Politt 2010). Renewable energy policy review was undertaken to consider
what would be necessary and practical to achieve 10 percent of the UK’s electricity
supply from renewables by 2010 (Department of Trade and Industry 1999). RES were
viewed as contributing to the government’s commitment to sustainable development,
as well as bringing new opportunities for business and growth (Department of State and
Industry 1999: 2).
The inception of the renewable energy program in 1999 was a side effect of a
Non‐Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which was originally designed as a way for financing
the extra costs of nuclear power in the post‐privatization period forcing electricity
suppliers to buy nuclear power at higher than market price in auctions for non‐fossil fuel
power (Helm 2003). To avoid problems with the European Commission that might see
this as a discriminatory subsidy to the nuclear industry, NFFO was extended to non‐fossil
fuel generation more generally defined and a portion was allocated to support
renewable energy (Mitchell and Connor 2004). The scheme involved awarding contracts
to supply electricity from various renewable technologies according to a competitive
bidding system. The winner of a tender would be the company that offered to sell
electricity at the lowest price. The winner would be given a contract to construct a
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certain amount of capacity. Tendering led to a situation in which all projects were to be
implemented at once with a long break between them. Bidders tended to minimize
their estimates of the actual delivery cost of the project due to the least cost nature of
the auction. As a result, relatively small portion of the total contracts were actually put
into operational schemes since speculative bids often proved unprofitable to implement
(Mitchell and Connor 2004).
Thus, unlike German fixed price‐based feed‐in tariff, UK’s NFFO scheme was a
hybrid market‐interventionist system that permitted short‐term price and market
factors to shape important long term strategic choice regarding patterns of
technological development (Politt 2010). The stop and go character of the system
hindered the development of a viable wind energy industry in the UK. However, market
liberalization policies ensured that the UK would easily meet its Kyoto commitment
without any further action. In line with the UK’s emphasis on the use of market‐based
instruments, government’s New and Renewable Energy consultation paper of 1999
proposed a new quota‐based long‐terms instrument – Renewable Obligation
Certificates (ROCs) scheme – to be operational from 2002, providing an incentive for an
annually increasing proportion of electricity to be supplied from RES and establishing a
trading scheme (Politt 2010).
France, unlike Germany and the UK, hardly engaged in renewable energy
development at all. The share of renewables in TPES was below 7 percent in 2000,
mainly from combustible renewables, such as incineration of municipal and industrial
wastes, biogas, noncommercial wood use, and from hydroelectricity (IEA 2000). France
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had relatively low ambitions regarding RES due to the specificity of France’s energy mix
and its energy policies.
France is poor in resources compared to better endowed Germany and the UK.
However, France has the highest share of nuclear power in the EU, with 40 percent
share in TPES and 75 to 80 percent in electricity generation. The nuclear program was
built up essentially to address the security of supply concerns that were foremost in the
national and international debate after the two oil crises. Since early 1990s, France has
been the largest net electricity exporter (Meritet 2011).
The electricity market in France has been dominated by the fully vertically
integrated, state‐owned power company Electricité de France (EDF) that was created
through the Nationalization Act in 1946 together with its gas industry counterpart Gaz
de France (GDF). EDF has been enjoying statutory monopoly in electricity transmission
and de‐facto monopoly in electricity generation (around 91 percent in 1997). This is why
France has consistently argued against EU energy policy of market liberalization that
was perceived as a threat to large state‐owned companies.
When climate change became an issue in the wake of Kyoto negotiations,
nuclear power contributed significantly to France’s favorable position with respect to
carbon emissions with low per‐capita and per‐GDP carbon emissions. Under the Kyoto
Protocol and the EU burden‐sharing mechanism, France has committed to stabilize its
greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels compared to German target of 21 percent and
the UK’s 12.5 percent (Meritet 2011: 162).
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However, due to continued growth of fossil energy demand, particularly in the
transport sector, France had to come up with some measures to meet its climate
commitments. This was actually the first time that the government introduced
measures in relation to renewable energy promotion. The National Program to Combat
Climate Change entailed long‐term policies targeting supply side, such as development
of renewables. The program introduced a requirement for EDF to purchase renewable
energies. The purchasing requirements were based on standardized contracts spanning
for 15 years co‐developed and approved by the government between EDF and
renewables suppliers aimed at avoiding investment costs. Such contracts for
hydroelectricity, cogeneration, and household waste incineration were approved in
1997, 1998 and 1999. A similar standard contract for photovoltaics was approved in
1999. Other RES support measures included a program to install 20,000 solar‐thermal
water boilers on the French islands launched by EDF and the so‐called EOLE wind
program that aimed to install 250 to 500 MW of new wind capacity by 2005.
“Electrification Gap” program was initiated to electrify isolated areas in France
(especially in the DOM) using renewable energies. Renewable energies have suffered
from the principle of geographic uniformity of tariffs, an important element of the
public service principle that has been an inalienable feature of French energy policy.
The notion of public service has been defined as “any activity the accomplishment of
which must be ensured, provided, regulated and controlled by the government because
this activity is indispensable to the realization and development of social
interdependence” (IEA 2009). In the electricity sector that meant the obligation of
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supply and the equal treatment of customers. This policy has created distortions in the
energy market and eliminated niche markets for renewables in France’s overseas
territories where they would be economic by imposing the same price as in
metropolitan France, regardless of costs (IEA 2000).
Overall, France’s approach to energy policy has been characterized with a
tendency to seek sufficient independence in policy‐making, including from supranational
EU. This tendency to maintain autonomy in deciding over means and instruments has
also been reflected in its position on RES directive.
5.4.2 Convergence of Preferences/Positions on Policy Objectives and Instruments
By the time the European Commission proposed the directive for RES, climate
change was an issue on the agenda in all three member states. Therefore, Germany, UK
and France supported the major objective proposed by the European Commission in the
draft directive: doubling renewable energy's contribution to Europe's gross energy
consumption from its current share of 6percent to 12percent in 2010 and facilitating its
access to the internal electricity market that would help meet the Kyoto commitments
on the reduction of CO2 emissions. Indeed, they gave a political backing to the
development of a during the Energy Council meeting in May 1999.
After the European Commission presented its draft directive in 2000, positions of
these key member states converged on the issue of RES definition. They argued for a
broader definition of RES in particular with regards to biomass and hydropower to
enlarge the choice of RES that could be used to achieve the targets. This was particularly
important for France and the UK due to a significant portion of biomass and hydropower
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in their RES break down. So, they had a firm position that large hydropower should have
been eligible to benefit from the RES support schemes and insisted that "biomass" shall
mean the biodegradable fraction of products, waste and residues from agriculture,
forestry and related industries, as well as the biodegradable fraction of industrial and
municipal waste (Council 2001). The European Commission, in face of the united front of
key member states on this matter, revised its original proposal to reflect their common
position (Interview with the European Commission official 2011).
Despite the fact that the European Commission proposed more ambitious
targets that some of the member states (i.e. France) wanted, majority of the member
states in the Council, including three key member states, clarified their position that the
national targets to be set by member states for the future consumption of electricity
produced from RES should be of an indicative nature. They referred to the subsidiarity
principle while arguing that indicative rather than mandatory targets would be more
appropriate (Minutes of the Council 2001). That the French and British aligned their
stance on subsidiarity issue is not surprising, as the sovereignty over energy resources
and autonomy in energy policy has been the hallmark of energy policies of both
member states.
Preferences/positions of the key member states were less uniform with respect
to the means and instruments for achieving objectives. Since feed‐in tariffs turned out
to be the most effective instrument in supporting the development of renewable energy
and a strong renewable industry has begun to emerge, the German government was
strongly opposed to the Commission’s proposals from late 1990s to harmonize the
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support scheme for RES‐E on the basis of the quota system (Interview with the German
officials, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Environment, 2012). The UK, as it relied on
market‐based system and was a strong supporter of the EU’s energy market
liberalization policy, backed the Commission’s idea of a harmonized trading scheme
based on market‐based instruments (Interview with the official, Permanent
Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU 2011; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). The
French position was more ambivalent regarding the nature of the future harmonized
scheme, since it was reluctant to see any centrally governed harmonized RES support
mechanism in the first place (Interview with the French official, Ministry of Sustainable
Development 2013). Germany, supported by Spain, saw a threat to the further
functioning of the well‐established FIT scheme in the Commission’s initial idea of
introducing quota‐based system based on the trading of Green Certificates/Guarantees
of Origin. The UK, together with other member states supportive of harmonized trading
schemes (i.e. the Netherlands, Sweden) emphasized the problems that different
national support systems could pose for level playing field competition among electricity
companies in the EU energy market (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006). Germany, backed up
by other pro‐FIT member states, focused on two points in its argumentation: First,
Germany underlined the proven effectiveness of FIT, a strong position FIT would give to
RES‐E generators vis‐a vis incumbents and new employment and export industry
potential (Hirschl 2008: 348). The second argument turned out to be more appealing for
other member states, especially France, and even the UK, which was initially supporting
the Commission’s idea. The coalition of the FIT support group, led by Germany, invoked
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the issue of subsidiarity and questioned the EU’s competence to impose an EU‐wide
support scheme (Lauber and Schenner 2011). Eventually, Germany’s argument that
national solutions would better serve national industrial interests won over
liberalization and internal market based arguments. As a result, no strong member state
pressure existed to develop a harmonized support scheme. Indeed, all member states
agreed that no harmonization was necessary at that stage give the limited experience
with national support schemes. This position was later reinstated in the Council’s
common position of the draft proposal (Council 2001). The perspective of massive
resistance in the Council led the European Commission to back down. The draft proposal
contained no harmonized framework for RES. The Council in its common position also
clarified that the mutual recognition of guarantees of origin as proof of RES‐E would not
have implications in terms of fulfillment of national obligations or the right to benefit
from national support schemes. Thus, member states again agreed with Germany and
pro‐FIT advocates on the issue of GOs. On the question of grid access, that was
particularly important for France because of its very slow progress in liberalization of its
vertically integrated electricity sector, the Council’s common position stated that “due
to technical constraints or the organization of distribution systems, it is not always
possible to provide priority access stricto sensu to transportation and distribution of
electricity from RES while nevertheless guaranteeing the transmission and distribution
of this electricity” (Council 2001: 8).
Thus, by the time the European Commission officially presented its proposal for
the directive, the positions of the key member states were closely aligned and
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converged at a point where they would not favor binding targets (vertical integration),
or a common harmonized support scheme for RES (horizontal integration). Overall,
much of the Commission’s proposal survived since it was already a watered down
version compromised to the common position of member states. If the European
Commission insisted on its original idea on a quota‐based harmonized scheme, member
states that were against it from the beginning – Germany (10 votes), France (10 votes),
Spain (8 votes) and Austria (4 votes) ‐ would be able to block the proposal under the
QMV that requires 26 votes to block the proposal (Interview with the Council official,
Council Secretariat 2012).
5.5 Transnational Interest Consolidation
There are various transnational interest groups that organize themselves at the
EU level into European Associations and Federations to participate in shaping the new
European rules and regulations and exert influence of the EU policy making. They not
only react to the already tabled proposals, but also push the policy‐making process in a
direction that corresponds to their interests. To succeed in their efforts, transnational
interest groups have to mobilize into a coherent group and present unified position
against other potential transnational groups that operate at the European level. The
higher the degree of transnational interest group consolidation, the better is their
chance to get their position reflected in the policymaking outcome. In this section, I will
discuss the role of two major transnational interest groups and the degree of their
activism and consolidation in the process of RES directive elaboration.
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The renewable energy industry and renewable activists entered the European
policy making process during the discussion over the RES‐E directive in the late 1990s.
As early as 1996 the newly founded German wind power association (BWE) began its
lobbying activities in Brussels. National niche organizations relating to wind power,
biomass, etc. that were already organized in Brussels‐based associations also joined.
These groups mobilized under the common umbrella of the European Renewable
Energy Council (EREC). International environmental non‐governmental organizations,
such as Greenpeace, also took an active role. After the formulation of internal drafts by
the Commission’s DG Energy, Spanish MEPs initiated the European Forum for
Renewable Energy Sources (EUROFORES), initially having renewable energy companies
as well as MEPs as members (EUROFORES 2010; Hirschl 2008). All these actors
supported greater EU involvement in renewables. They argued for ambitious and
binding targets, requiring all countries to increase the share of renewables by two
percentage points annually and by eight percentage points by 2010 (ENDS 2000b).
However, initially internal disagreement existed as to which EU steering method
was better for achieving the objectives of the directive: technology development that
fostered national feed‐in schemes or more market‐based approaches (ENDS 1999b).
This was a major issue of contention between the German and Spanish wind energy
associations that felt threatened by the Commission’s plan to harmonize support
schemes for electricity from renewable sources on the basis of a quota system, on the
one hand, and the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), on the other. During the
early stages of proposal discussion, the EWEA was a London‐based organization chaired
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by the British representative. Until EWEA’s move to Brussels in 1999, the organization
failed to take a clear stand on the issue as it could not reconcile differences in the
German and Spanish versus British and Danish wind industry positions (ENDS 1999b;
Interview with the EWEA representative 2011). When the first version of the
Commission’s directive got shelved due to the resistance of the German and Spanish
governments, representatives of Danish and British wind energy associations criticized
the German government: “The German government is inexperienced and acted out of
fear….Renewables are the new kid on the block, and we needed a directive to give us a
level playing field while we develop to full maturity and be more competitive” (Soren
Krohn in ENDS 1999b). After moving to Brussels, the German representative replaced
the British chairman and EWEA took a unified position strongly opposing the
Commission’s plan to introduce a quota‐based system (Interview with EWEA
Representative 2011).
A coalition of the renewable energy industry and European environmental
groups lobbied the European Commission to revive the stalled EU directive with
stronger national binding targets without limiting renewables support scheme. They
argued that without the directive entailing legally binding targets, EU would not be able
to deliver on its Kyoto commitments and maintain its market lead in renewable
technology (EREC 1999). The group also advocated the flexibility for the EU member
states to implement whatever renewable support schemes they wanted. “We agreed
with the European Commission that a common framework for supporting renewables
was

a desirable objective in principle, but made our position clear that market
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liberalization objective should not endanger national support schemes that already
proved successful in boosting RES”‐ EWEA representative mentioned during the
interview (Interview with EWEA representative 2011). The German Wind Energy
Association (BWE) was particularly active in advocating flexibility for member states to
decide on support schemes. The European Renewable Energy Federation together with
the World Wildlife Fund and the BWE presented a paper in response to a request for
feedback on the directive made by the EU Energy Commissioner Loyola de Palacio in
December 1999 after the draft directive was shelved the second time (ENDS 2000c).The
paper advocated the setting of legally binding minimum national targets so as to achieve
23.5 percent share of RES in total EU energy consumption by 2010. It also proposed that
the EU should explicitly permit direct price support schemes as compensation payments
to renewable energy producers, as well as tax differentials (ENDS 2000c).
In parallel, another transnational interest group from the conventional energy
industry – of which the electricity industry was most active – started to mobilize at the
European level. The most influential actor representing their interests at the EU level
was EURELECTRIC, an association of national electricity associations. In general,
Eurelectric accepted the need to take action against global warming. However, it was
much less ambitious concerning CO2 emissions reduction (Eurelectric 1998). Eurelectric
supported the emergence of pan‐European, market‐based support mechanism. German
utilities, one of the Europe’s largest electricity producers, advocated the development of
a green certificate scheme (Rowlands 2005). The German utilities in collaboration with
Eurelectric called for a European‐wide market‐based renewable energy system as a
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cost‐effective alternative to the FIT (Eurelectric 2004). Their arguments were very much
in line with the Commission’s arguments that feed‐in tariffs may be effective at the
initial stage of developing RES, but FIT is the distortive support mechanism hindering the
development of liberalized electricity market (Eurelectric 2000).
The Commission, in turn, encouraged the increased involvement of the utilities.
The European Commission even sponsored several pilot projects to figure out the
possible design of the European green certificate (Mayer 2003: 670). In addition, the
European Commission supported the creation of Renewable Energy Certificate System
(RECS), an organization for the promotion of a pan‐European market scheme (ENDS
2000c).
Despite their efforts the electricity industry mobilized under the umbrella of
Eurelectric could not win over better consolidated renewable industry and green
groups, partly because few utilities invested much in renewable energy by that time and
stakes were not that high. The decision of the European Court of Justice, which
dismissed the claim brought by the German utility Preussen‐Electra arguing that the
feed‐in scheme contradicted the EU regulation on state aid, marked a final blow for the
electricity industry. European Renewable Industry, in turn, could not succeed in making
the European Commission include binding minimum national targets in the draft
directive. Overall, neither the electricity nor the renewable industry was consolidated
enough to have a strong stamp on the directive, perhaps because the issue was too
novel to have well‐articulated interests and positions.
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5.6 Rule Density
Rules that govern the passage of legislation in the EU are important as they
determine the competence of the Community vis‐à‐vis member states and the
discretion of supranational organizations in a specific domain. Treaty rules also
prescribe the voting procedure and define inter‐institutional relations in the
policymaking process. The choice of a legal basis for a particular directive, therefore, can
have important implications on the decision‐making outcome. Selecting the legal basis
for a directive can become a contentious issue, especially when the European
Commission proposes a directive to deal with issues for which an explicit legal basis in
missing from the EU Treaties (i.e. energy domain before the Lisbon Treaty) and,
therefore, has to rely on legal basis for related policy areas. In addition to a legal basis,
existence of formal and binding rules in a particular domain can also affect the
policymaking outcome. Pre‐existing rules can make it hard to undo the policy and can
also create a dynamic that facilitates the adoption of further rules (Jordan and Lenschow
2010; Pierson 1998). In other words, pre‐existing rules in a particular policy area can
lead to policy feedback loops and ‘lock‐in’ and embed issues in “joint decision traps”
(Scharpf 2007). In this section I will discuss the choice of legal basis and its implications
for the RES directive, as well as pre‐existing rules in the domain of renewable energy.

5.6.1 Legal Basis
Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU lacked a formal legal basis for
energy policy. Initially, the European Commission, however, was able to skillfully use
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internal market related treaty provisions for initiating proposals in the energy domain.
The Single European Act in 1986 ended the informal status of Community’s
environmental policy. The new Article 100a introduced an explicit Community
competence to regulate environmental matters in the context of internal market
development and Article 130 r‐t provided an explicit basis for European environmental
policy (Lenschow 2005). While under the SEA QMV and the then newly introduced
cooperation procedure with the EP was restricted to internal market issues, the
Maastricht Treaty in 1993 established QMV and the co‐decision procedure for most
environmental policies and granted more influence to the EP in this policy field. This was
an important procedural change and stimulus for European energy policy in general
(Matláry 1997), and for the RES policy in particular.
When the European Commission proposed the draft directive, it used Art 95
(formerly Article 100), which allowed the Community to “adopt the measures for the
approximation of the provisions….. in member states….with the aim of progressively
establishing the internal market without internal frontiers in which the free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured” (Article 95 and Article 14 of TEEC).
This is not surprising given the Commission’s objective to introduce a harmonized
framework for the RES support and given its market‐based attitude with emphasis on
Community‐wide trade for the RES. In addition, Article 95 prescribed to act in
accordance with the procedures referred to in Article 251 – that meant with the
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council and with the active involvement of the
European Parliament (co‐decision).

160

The choice of legal basis was questioned by the Council’s Legal Service. It argued
that Article 175 (formerly article 130) would be the appropriate legal basis for the
directive because it would contribute predominantly to environmental objectives, such
as GHG emissions reductions, and not to market harmonization (Council 2000). The
rationale behind the Council’s position was that Article 95 would give more discretion
and leeway to the European Commission to introduce prospective harmonized
Community‐wide RES support scheme. The Article would also impose reporting
obligations on member states (after the adoption of a harmonized measure) to notify
the Commission and justify the grounds if member state “deemed it necessary to
maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs relating to the protection of the
environment or the working environment” (Article 95(4‐5)). After having verified
whether or not national provisions are a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they constitute an
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market, the Commission would have the
prerogative to approve or reject the national provision.
The Council has retained article 175, paragraph 1 of the EC Treaty as the legal
basis, contrary to the Commission's proposal based on article 95. Article 175(1) referred
to objectives of Article 174 and authorized the European institutions to adopt measures
aimed at “preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment; prudent
and rational utilization of natural resources; and promoting measures at an
international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems”(Article
174 and 175 (1)).
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Interestingly, there was another option for the choice of a legal basis. Since the
aim of the directives was the increase of the share of energy from renewable sources in
total energy consumption, which undoubtedly had an impact on the energy mix in the
member countries, the European Commission could rely on article 175 (2c) as the legal
basis. Article (175 (2c) provided the EU with the option to adopt “measures significantly
affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general
structure of its energy supply" (Article 175 (2c). However, this article would require
unanimity in the Council and only consultation with the European Parliament, whereas
Article 175(1) required Qualified Majority Voting and the co‐decision of the European
Parliament, which shared many of the interests of the European Commission.
Although the European Commission did not succeed in its attempt to base the
directive on the far‐reaching internal market article (Article 95), the choice of article
175(1) as the legal basis for the adoption of the directive (as opposed to 175(2c)
significantly strengthened the role of the supranational actors in the process of
negotiations over the directive. From the legal perspective, under QMV, the law could
have been adopted even if some member states disagreed with its content, and more
importantly, the agreement of the European Parliament was essential for the adoption
of the directive. That influenced the course of the debates about different aspects of the
directive (i.e. level of targets) which took place between 1997 and 2001.
As for the pre‐existing domain‐specific rules in the area of renewable energy
sources, there was no existing legislation at the EU level. Therefore, the RES 2001
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Directive cannot be characterized as a “lock‐in” or “joint decision trap” result of pre‐
existing rules in the RES policy domain.
5.7 External Contingencies/Shocks
External Contingencies are those particular events outside the EU, or in other
words, external shocks that can punctuate the equilibrium in the EU system and have
important implications on the policymaking outcomes. Those proximate contingencies
can serve as critical junctures and exacerbate long‐term structural conditions, such as
EU’s energy dependence, or EU’s relative position in global competition. External shocks
can contribute to opening up policy windows that can be used by policy entrepreneurs
to push their pet proposals (Kingdon 1995). They can also contribute to a change in
perceptions of a particular problem (i.e. energy dependence) among national
policymakers, shift national preferences/positions on a given issue and provide window
of opportunity for institutional actors to pursue collective interests. In this section, I will
discuss whether any external features have affected the policymaking process of the
directive and the outcome.
Throughout the development of energy policy at the EU level, the need for a
common energy policy has been presented as a part of a solution formula in light of
increasing energy dependence, environmental challenges, such as climate change, and
EU’s global competitiveness. The relative importance of these problems has varied over
time as dictated by external events.
From the very beginning, the EU’s energy policy has been sparked by the
international oil crisis of the early 1970s, which contributed to the realization among
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Community member states of the increased role of electricity. The Council’s resolution
of 1974 “concerning measures to be implemented to achieve the Community energy
policy objectives” underlined that the role of electricity, as the form of energy
consumed by the final consumers, should be increased to lower the consumption of
imported hydrocarbons. However, renewable sources of energy did not deserve
particular attention at that time. The resolution stated that the electricity supply of
member states “shall be based chiefly on nuclear energy for high‐capacity power
stations, in addition to the contribution made by solid‐fuel power stations (Council
1974). The oil embargo showed that the supply of energy resources cannot be taken for
granted. However the immediate EU response was surprisingly weak and did not affect
the EU RES policy process until after several decades. With the global recession of the
1980s and dwindling oil prices, energy dependence on outside supply lost its relative
importance. Environmental issues were gaining importance in light of Chernobyl
catastrophe and international discussions on global warming. The issue of security of
supply and energy dependence made a return in 1990s in the wake of instability in the
Middle East (Gulf War) and Russia (dissolution of the USSR). In addition, the EU’s
dependence on imported coal was on the rise due to the reduction of subsidies for the
domestic coal production. Overall EU energy dependence increased from around 42
percent in 1985 to almost 49percent in 1999 (EUROSTAT 2002).
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The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 on climate change with its emissions reduction
targets was the most important reference point in the preamble of the directive. As the
directive states, “Community recognizes the need to promote renewable energy sources
as a priority measure given that their exploitation contributes to environmental
protection and sustainable development ….makes it possible to meet Kyoto targets
more quickly” (Directive 2001/77/EC: 1). The Kyoto commitment was an external
contingency that the European Commission, together with RES industry, tried to use as
an incentive for the development of RES policy. But the Commission was not able to
exploit this external contextual factor to achieve stronger centralization or
harmonization of RES policy at the EU level. The Kyoto Protocol does not focus
specifically on RES and cannot explain why the EU should meet climate challenge with
RES. Therefore, this line of argument did not prove persuasive for member states.
Overall, external contingencies, or a focusing event, that could affect
vulnerability of member states, exacerbate the perceptions of the EU’s energy
dependence or environmental challenges, and necessitate the adoption of binding RES
targets (vertical integration), or harmonized RES support schemes (horizontal
integration) were absent.
5.8 Integration Outcome
5.8.1 Degree of Institutionalization (Vertical Integration)
After several years of elaboration and negotiation, the RES‐E directive was
officially published in October 2001. The first important point that needs to be
mentioned when evaluating the outcome is that the scope of the directive was limited
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to the role of renewable energy in electricity generation. The directive did not cover
renewable heating and cooling, even though the 1997 White Paper identified the
strategic importance of renewable heating in achieving the 2010 target.
In terms of the extent of institutionalization, which in this dissertation refers to
the creation of binding rules and organizations at the EU level and delegation of new
institutional powers (competencies) to the Community, the directive cannot be
considered as a successful integration outcome. The directive set an overall EU‐level
target of 22 percent electricity from renewables in the energy mix by 2010, but only
made this target indicative, not binding. Furthermore, the national targets for member
states were also made non‐binding, having only indicative nature. Introduction of
mandatory targets was put off to future. According to Article 3(4) of the directive,
mandatory targets can be brought forward by the Commission if the national indicative
targets and the 12 percent overall target are not met (Directive 2001/77/EC: 3). Instead,
the directive imposed reporting requirements on member states to publish a report
every five years beginning from 2002 setting national indicative targets for future
consumption of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in terms of a
percentage of electricity consumption for the next 10 years, and outlining the measures
taken or planned, at national level, to achieve these national indicative targets.
The directive also required member states to take necessary measures to ensure
that transmission system operators and distribution system operators in their territory
guarantee the transmission and distribution of electricity produced from renewable
energy sources. However, this obligation was made conditional on the reliability and
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safety of the grid that member states would be able to refer to escape the obligation.
Priority access for RES‐E to the grid was made optional, not mandatory, for member
states, as well as the requirement for transmission system operators and distribution
system operators to bear the costs of grid connection.
5.8.2 Level of Harmonization (Horizontal Integration)
With regard to the second dimension of integration outcome – harmonization
level – the directive failed to achieve common, or even coordinated, policy instrument.
Attempts to create a harmonized RES support scheme proved unsuccessful. Guarantees
of Origin were introduced, but only for disclosure purposes to verify the energy source.
GOs were explicitly distinguished from tradable green certificates. Recital 10 of the
directive stated that “This Directive does not require member states to recognize the
purchase of a guarantee of origin from other member states or the corresponding
purchase of electricity as a contribution to the fulfillment of a national quota obligation.
….the guarantees of origin do not by themselves imply a right to benefit from national
support mechanisms established in different member states.”
Instead, the directive tasked the Commission to assess the success, including
cost‐effectiveness, of national support systems and if necessary, draft a proposal for a
Community‐wide framework for RES support mechanism. However, the prospective
proposal on harmonization of supports schemes could only be drafted by the
Commission in 2005, and even in that case, transition time of seven years was foreseen
before such harmonization would take effect (Directive 2001/77/EC).
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One could argue that the directive entailed an indirect mechanism to push for
harmonization in the Article 4, which subjected the RES support schemes to state aid
rules, namely Articles 87 and 88 of the Community Treaty. This would enable the
Commission to intervene against feed‐in tariffs if considered in breach of Community
rules on state aid. However, the ECJ ruling on Preussen‐Electra case, in which the ECJ did
not find FIT in violation of state aid rules, prevented such a possibility of indirect
meddling in national support schemes (Lauber 2007).
Overall, the integration outcome cannot be classified as a success either in terms
of institutionalization or harmonization. Neither binding RES targets, nor harmonized
support scheme could be achieved by the RES‐E directive of 2001.
5.9 Chapter Summary
It took several years to elaborate, negotiate and finally adopt the directive on
the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. Policy
entrepreneurship by the European Commission was successful in raising the issue of RES
on the EU agenda and paving the way for the important piece of legislation aimed at
development of RES.
The objective of 12 percent share of energy from renewable sources in the gross
EU consumption, later translated into 22.1 percent share of renewable energy in total
Community electricity consumption by 2010, remained unchanged over the long period
of negotiations. However, facing resistance from member states, the Commission’s
entrepreneurship efforts to make these targets binding failed, as well as its half‐hearted
attempt to introduce binding minimum national targets as requested by the EP and
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renewable industry. In the proposal formulation phase, the European Commission was
under pressure from two sides: renewable industry, green interest groups and the EP
calling for binding targets, on the one side, and member states resisting mandatory
targets, on the other side. In addition, there was an internal disagreement within the
Commission itself. As a result, the Commission’s draft proposal was shelved twice.
When the draft proposal was finally adopted by the Commission, it lacked
binding targets. All targets were to be of indicative nature. Furthermore, the European
Commission backed off on its initial idea to introduce harmonized EU‐wide support
scheme based on market instruments. European Commission’s framing strategy relying
on ‘internal market’ frame to justify the introduction of a harmonized scheme based on
tradable green certificates has been surpassed by ‘subsidiarity’ argument of Feed‐in
tariff advocates arguing for member states’ right to choose freely their national support
instruments. The draft directive was a watered down version, compromised to fit the
preferences of key member states in order not to endanger the fate of the whole
directive.
The European Commission’s entrepreneurship in policy formulation and
negotiation phases has largely failed. The Commission has not succeeded in mobilizing
the support of the Council either for binding targets or a harmonized support scheme. It
also failed to impose mandatory obligation on member states regarding RES priority
access to the grid, as well as regarding the introduction of a fast‐track planning
procedures for RES producers.
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One important element in the policy‐making process that can affect the
integration outcome is the choice of legal basis for the directive. The European
Commission did not succeed in its attempt to base the directive on the far‐reaching
internal market article (Article 95) that would give more discretion and leeway to the
European Commission to introduce prospective harmonized Community‐wide RES
support scheme. The Council insisted on using Treaty Article 175 (1) referring to
environmental policy objectives. In addition, there was no pre‐existing legislation on
RES at the EU level that the European Commission could refer to and exploit for its
entrepreneurship purposes.
Three key member states, Germany, France, and the UK, due to different energy
resource endowments, structurally different energy mixes and different energy policy
priorities, have developed different approaches to renewable energy sources. Yet, all
three supported the major objective of increasing RES share proposed by the European
Commission in light of the Kyoto commitments on the reduction of CO2 emissions.
However, by the time the European Commission presented the draft directive, the
positions of the key member states were closely aligned and converged at a point where
they would not favor binding targets (vertical integration), or a common harmonized
support scheme for RES (horizontal integration).
The European Commission, forced to drop the harmonization idea, attempted to
circumvent the Council, with the support of the ECJ, through the indirect and gradual
route of internal market creation for RES by exploiting EU Treaty rules on state aids
against direct price support schemes (i.e. FIT) also turned futile. Unexpectedly for the
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Commission, in the dispute between Preussen‐Electra and Schleswag, the Court made a
political decision to choose environmental benefits from the development of RES over
the rules of common market.
In its endeavors, the European Commission has been supported by one group of
transnational interests: conventional electricity industry (utilities) under the umbrella of
Eurelectric. Despite their efforts, Eurelectric could not win over better consolidated
renewable industry and green groups, partly because few utilities invested much in
renewable energy by that time and stakes were not that high. European Renewable
Industry, on its turn, could not succeed in making the European Commission include
binding minimum national targets in the draft directive. Both groups have been active,
but neither electricity nor renewable industry were consolidated enough to have a
strong stamp on the directive, perhaps because the issue was quite new for the
transnational interest groups to develop well‐articulated interests and positions.
Finally, in terms of external contingencies, no external shock, or a focusing event,
was present that could intensify the perceptions of the EU’s energy dependence or
environmental challenges, have a disturbing impact on member states’ vulnerability and
consequently push them adopt binding RES targets or harmonized support schemes.
The Kyoto obligation was an external factor that the European Commission often
referred to. However, it has not been a sufficient incentive to allow stronger
institutionalization or harmonization of RES policy at the EU level.
Hence, the result of five‐year long negotiations was a directive with the outcome
that cannot be classified as a success either in terms of vertical or horizontal integration.
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Neither binding RES targets, nor harmonized support scheme could be achieved by the
RES‐E directive of 2001. The directive entailed targets as ambitious as member states
were ready to accept at that time. This was perhaps to be expected since there were no
pre‐existing domain specific rules at the European level, no external contingencies that
could provide window of opportunity for the supranational entrepreneur to advance its
“pet proposals.” With three key member states having a converging stance not in favor
of increased institutionalization or harmonization, the degree of European Commission’s
policy entrepreneurship could at best be assessed as moderately successful. In any
event, the legislative output predetermined the central elements of the subsequent
policy debate: targets beyond 2010, a Community framework for the support of RES and
additional legislative measures for RES‐H/C. In that regard, the RES‐E directive was an
important step forward.
The reader will more clearly discern that in the next chapter, which discusses the
successive 2009 RES directive following the same analytic structure. At the end of the
following chapter, I conduct a comparative analysis of the two cases with a contrasting
integration outcome. After comparing the two cases along all five causal conditions, I
present my conclusions derived from the in‐depth case studies in relation to the findings
of the fuzzy‐set analysis and my overall theoretical framework.
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CHAPTER 6. RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE OF 2009
6.1 Introduction
The chapter process‐traces the successful case of vertical integration in the field
of EU’s renewable energy. In the first section, I present a brief historical overview of the
period in between the prior 2001‐RES‐E directive and the new directive on renewable
energy that came into force in 2009. In the next five sections, I process‐trace the
elaboration and adoption of the directive looking at the five causal conditions ‐
supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational interest
consolidation, rule density and external contingency/shocks – to explore the causal
mechanism that resulted in successful vertical integration and not so successful
horizontal integration. After discussing the integration outcome attained by the
directive along these two dimensions, I summarize the key points of the chapter. Finally,
I draw a systematic comparison between the two cases in the field of EU’s renewable
energy, followed by concluding remarks on the findings that I obtained from the two
different methods of analysis.
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6.2 Background: Post‐2001 RES‐E Period
The RES directive of 2001, to some extent, predefined the future course of action
with regard to RES policy. Since the directive only included targets for 2010, post‐2010
targets would naturally be the key element of successive policy debates. Even more so,
as only few member states (Germany, Denmark and Hungary) met their specific targets
before 2007 and the EU was still short of its overall indicative target of 22 percent RES‐E
(European Commission 2006a). In addition, the RES 2001 directive dealt only with
electricity. Therefore, the new legislation that would extend to other sectors (e.g.
heating and cooling) seemed necessary, since in many member states the support for
RES was disproportionately skewed in favor of RES‐E and only increased the share of
electricity from RES. Other resources, such as for instance biomass co‐firing, were
utilized inefficiently to produce electricity instead of using it more effectively for local
heating purposes.
In parallel to deliberations on how to cope with the aftermath of the RES‐E
directive, the Lisbon Strategy, an effort to promote high tech job growth was proving to
be a failure already by 2004. This was a serious concern for President of the European
Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, one of the most prominent proponents of the Lisbon
Agenda.

As one of the representatives from Brussels‐based NGO has mentioned,

“Barroso has remained empty‐handed once the Lisbon Agenda got totally bogged down.
If he wanted a second term as the Commission’s President, he needed to support an
issue of high salience. At that time, climate change proved to be such an issue,
supported by Germans and Brits both of which aspired to act as leaders in international
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climate negotiations. So, from climate‐sceptic he turned into climate‐convinced”
(Interview with an expert, Center for European Studies, Brussels; see also Jӓnicke 2011).
Upcoming enlargement was an important consideration as well, as most of the Eastern
European countries lacked any RES experience.
In January 2004, the European Commission, supported by the German Federal
Ministry of Environment (BMU) and the European Renewable Energy Council organized
the “European Conference for Renewable Energy ‐ Intelligent Policy Options.” The
conference was an important event for initiating a policy discussion on post‐2010
targets. The conference conclusions mentioned an EU‐wide RES target of at least 20
percent of gross inland energy consumption by 2020 as a desirable target, and urged the
EU institutions to start a political process for setting ambitious RES targets (Conference
Conclusions 2004). The European Parliament, on its turn, called upon the Commission
and the Council “to make all necessary efforts to reach a target of 20percent for the
contribution by renewable energy to total domestic energy consumption in the EU by
2020” (European Parliament 2005). The EP, especially EUROFORES members, has been
pushing strongly for including heating, cooling and transport sectors in the future
directive (European Parliament 2006).
In December 2005, the European Commission, as tasked by the RES‐E directive,
published an evaluation report on support schemes for RES‐E (European Commission
2005). The major objective of this report was to comply with Article 4 of the RES‐E
directive, which called for an assessment of national schemes and possibly follow‐up
with a proposal for a Community framework with regards to support schemes. At that
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time, market‐based instruments such as Tradable Green Electricity Certificates (TREC)
under a quota obligation had been implemented in seven member states (including. the
UK, Sweden, Italy, and Belgium). Typically, this instrument fixes a quantity of RES to be
achieved and facilitates this by issuing Green Certificates that can be traded. On the
other hand, technology‐specific support measures coupled with the obligation of
distributors to purchase renewable electricity at fixed prices – the FIT or premiums –
had been implemented in 19 member states. Two frontrunner countries in developing
wind power capacity, Germany and Spain, had FIT schemes. Germany also accounted for
86 percent of current installed PV capacity in the EU, an unusual figure for
comparatively dark Germany, reflecting subsidy rather than sunshine (Buchan 2009:
138).
Thus, when the time arrived for the European Commission to table the
evaluation report on national support schemes, it was facing a dilemma: the
architecturally most apt system (quota obligations) for the whole EU appeared to be less
effective in actually increasing green power than the system (FIT) less suited to the EU
scale (Buchan 2009). In the evaluation report of 2005, the systems based on tradable
green certificates were not only found to be less cost‐efficient and less effective at the
actual RES deployment, but also to minimally contributing to technological innovation.
The European Commission concluded that the track record of FIT and quota obligations
were too short to make a proper comparison and “the Commission does not regard it
appropriate to present at this stage a harmonized European system” (European
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Commission 2005: 16). The Commission gave itself another two years to answer the
question.
In 2006, the European Commission in its energy Green Paper from March 2006
announced a prospective RES Road Map that would consider post‐2010 targets and the
nature of such targets (European Commission 2006a: 12). The Spring Council of 2006
also welcomed this idea. The Council considered increasing the RES share in the EU to
15 percent by 2015 and invited Commission to proposed a set of actions, which should
serve as a basis for the future Action Plan to be adopted during the Spring European
Council in 2007 (Council 2006: 15). Out of two central issues – targets and
harmonization of support schemes – it was target‐setting that dominated the agenda
during the policy initiation phase, more specifically, the nature of the target: whether
targets should be binding or indicative and whether targets should be overall or
sectoral.
6.3 Supranational Entrepreneurship
In this section, I will process‐trace the development of 2009 RES directive in light
of the degree of supranational entrepreneurship undertaken by the European
Commission. I will pay particular attention to the important components of
supranational entrepreneurship: the European Commission’s efforts in the process of
agenda‐setting and proposal initiation, the level of ambition of the proposal, the
Commission’s framing and mobilizing strategies in the policy formulation phase, as well
as the Commission’s success in mobilizing various stakeholders’ support, including
member states’, during the proposal negotiation phase.
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6.3.1 Setting an Agenda: Policy Initiation – the Issue of Binding Targets
The European Commission started to prepare ground for the new RES directive
that would include binding RES targets when it published the Green Paper in 2006. The
paper did not specify targets, but the Commission underlined that the choices of one
member state regarding its energy mix had an impact on the energy security of other
member states and pointed out that it would be necessary to set objectives regarding
EU’s overall energy mix (European Commission 2006a).
Similar to the RES‐E directive, the various DGs in the Commission had different
opinions regarding targets. The GHG‐target was a key priority for the DG environment,
which was reluctant to see the separate RES target. It argued that the EU‐wide carbon
trading system would be sufficient to achieve GHG reductions. DG TREN, on the other
hand, considered the RES‐E directive as a necessary and effective instrument for carbon
emissions reduction and advocated for the new RES targets. However, Barroso’s strong
interest in climate issues, and consequently in ambitious RES policy, was a decisive
factor in overcoming disagreement within the Commission (Interview with an expert,
Center for European Studies, Brussels, 2011).
In the policy initiation phase, publication of the Renewable Energy Roadmap
played a key role in the Commission’s agenda‐setting on binding RES targets. In the
Roadmap, the Commission was arguing that “the absence of legally binding targets for
RES at the EU level, the relatively weak EU regulatory framework for the use of
renewables in the transport sector, and the complete absence of a legal framework in
the heating and cooling sector, means that progress is to a large extent the result of the
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efforts of a few committed member states (European Commission 2006: 5). The
Commission proposed establishment of a mandatory overall 20 percent RES of energy
consumption in the EU by 2020 that could produce a more even development of RES
across sectors and across countries.
To ensure political receptiveness of binding targets, the European Commission
framed the issue in a politically appealing manner and tried to tie it with stated policy
priorities and commitments of policy‐makers. Climate change and security of supply
were two key frames during policy initiation used by the Commission. In the Roadmap,
the Commission stressed the importance of RES for the reduction of GHG emissions and
for Europe’s energy security to strengthen EU’s resilience in the event of external shocks
(European Commission 2006b). Both climate change and security of supply frames
employed by the Commission were politically appealing. Climate change was appealing
because of upcoming Copenhagen Climate Talks in which the EU was seeking to play a
leading role. The security of supply frame was appealing in light of the gas dispute
between Russian and Ukraine that left Europe in a black‐out for several days in January
2006 and served as a focusing event, bringing attention to the EU’s energy vulnerability
owing to its heavy reliance on Russian natural gas (Natorski and Surralles 2008).
Therefore, the European Commission had a good reason to expect that framing the
need for binding renewable targets in terms of climate change and security of supply
concerns would ensure favorable reception.
The Commission also concluded that it would be easier to gain support for one
binding target for all energy sources and sectors, than to develop separate binding
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targets for electricity, heating, cooling and transport. As one of the Commission officials
mentioned, “a single overall binding target would give member states more freedom to
steer the development of RES, and less hassle in the negotiation process. We thought
that negotiating one target would be easier than negotiating several different targets”
(Interview with the European Commission official 2012).
Thus, the European Commission’s proposal was more ambitious than proposals
supported by member states: a 20 percent of RES share instead of 15 percent, binding
instead of indicative targets, and with a longer term vision – 2020 instead of 2015. The
Commission, however, gave up the sectoral approach that the EP advocated in its
resolution, which also called for overall 25 percent share of RES in primary energy
consumption by 2020 (European Parliament 2006). Taking into account the past
experience of the RES‐E directive with indicative targets, it was the Commission’s
strategic decision to go for the overall RES target rather than sectoral targets, as
proposed by the EP and the RES industry.
The European Commission made an impact assessment and came to the
conclusion that 20 percent overall target for RES would be an optimal figure. In addition,
setting a 20 percent target of RES increase, together with other climate‐energy
objectives – 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and 20 percent reduction
in energy consumption (efficiency) – would give a clear political message ’20‐20‐20 by
2020’ (interview with the European Commission official 2011).
The European Commission, however, knew that it would not be an easy task to
persuade member states to accept binding targets. By the time the Commission
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suggested binding targets, only Germany and Denmark supported the Commission’s
proposal (ENDS 2006). The Commission had yet to prove its skills as a policy
entrepreneur by selling its proposal and mobilizing winning coalition behind it (Pallis
2006). The Commission chose the right timing for proposing binding targets and then
successfully exploited this window of opportunity. Several factors provided this window
of opportunity for the Commission’s successful policy entrepreneurship on binding
targets.
In light of the Stern Review in Britain (Stern 2006), and the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change Report (IPCCR 2007), both of which offered pessimistic
assessments of the severity of the damage being done by climate change, the
Commission rightly expected that no European leader would say ‘no’ to the ambitious
RES policy presented as an important element of the solution to climate challenge. This
expectation was reinforced by the informal Hampton Court Summit under the UK’s
Presidency in 2005, during which European leaders stressed the importance of an
integrated approach to climate change, energy and competitiveness objectives, and
underlined the importance of having a common European energy policy (Hampton
Court Summit Press Release 2005). The dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January
2006, when Russia cut off all gas supplies to Europe passing through Ukrainian territory
was an external shock that provided another window of opportunity for the Commission
to advance the issue of binding targets. It was a strategic decision of the Commission to
present the target as part of the Energy Policy for Europe to be adopted by the Council.
The proposal for Energy Policy for Europe also included provisions on the security of
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supply that was one of the key priorities for the new EU member states, including the
biggest newcomer Poland. Inclusion of the binding RES target in the package increased
the chance of the binding target to be adopted by the leaders who would reject
mandatory targets if proposed separately.
Another consideration in the timing of European Commission’s proposal was the
incoming German Presidency in the first half of 2007. The European Commission knew
that Germany would support ambitious, binding RES targets and expansion of
renewable energy (Interview with the German official, Ministry of Economy, 2013). The
German Presidency program gave a clear signal that it would support ambitious climate‐
energy policy (Presidency of the Council Program 2007). There seemed to be a perfect
alignment between the European Commission’s RES Road Map objectives and the
German Presidency’s agenda. So, the Commission could count on Germany, the
European Parliament, and the RES industry, which was becoming increasingly active on
the EU arena.
Responding to the call made by the European Council of March 2006 (Council
Document 7775/1/06 REV10) the Commission presented its Strategic European Energy
Review in January 2007. As part of the Review, the Renewable Energy Road Map set out
a long term vision for renewable energy sources in the EU. It proposed that the EU
establish a binding target of 20percent for renewable energy's share of energy
consumption in the EU by 2020, and a binding 10 percent target for the share of
renewable energy in transport petrol and diesel.
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In the beginning of 2007, the Council meeting of energy ministers agreed on the
20 percent overall target and differentiated overall national targets. However, due to
resistance from three key member states (France, the UK and Poland) with regard to 20
percent binding targets, it was left to the upcoming Spring European Council to decide
on the nature of the target, as well as on national sectoral targets (Power in Europe
2007).
In addition to the frequent meetings of the Commission high‐level officials,
including Barroso, with top‐level officials in various member states aimed at “selling”
the binding targets, the European Commission also tried to exploit the public support
when in Spring of 2007 it published the Eurobarometer survey results showing a strong
public backing for the climate and energy package (European Commission 2007).
In March 2007, the European Council, led by Germany, reached a landmark
agreement on overall binding 20 percent RES target for the EU by 2020, along with
targets of 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and a 20 percent increase
in energy efficiency (European Council 2007). As one of the high‐level Commission
official mentioned, some leaders thought that 20 percent binding target referred to the
share of RES in electricity sector (not the whole energy sector) and this confusion made
it easier to reach an agreement (Interview with the European Commission official 2011).
Adoption of an overall binding target was only a part of the job. The more
difficult task was to break the overall target down into differentiated national targets.
The European Council requested the Commission to enshrine this target in a new
comprehensive directive in which the Commission would also propose individual
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differentiated targets for member states, as well as the share of biofuels for transport in
each member state. The leaders gave the following guidance to the European
Commission: “Differentiated national overall targets should be derived with member
state’s full involvement with due regard to a fair and adequate allocation taking account
of different national starting points and potentials, including the existing level of
renewable energies and energy mix, and, subject to meeting the minimum biofuels
target in each member states”, leaving it to member states to decide on national targets
for each specific sector of renewable energies (electricity, heating, cooling biofuels)
(European Council 2007; Buchan 2009: 141).
Thus, the European Commission policy entrepreneurship efforts proved
successful in the policy imitation phase. Due to politically appealing issue framing and
apt timing for the proposal, the skillful exploitation of windows of opportunity opened
up by Russian‐Ukrainian gas crisis, upcoming Copenhagen talks, the German Council
Presidency, and active stakeholder mobilization efforts, the European Commission
finally achieved what it could not attain in RES‐E directive several years before.
6.3.2 Formulating the Proposal: Ambitions Compromised Again?
After the 2007 Spring Council’s political agreement on the overall 20 percent
binding target for RES, the Commission had the task of translating the political
commitment into a legislative proposal.

The Commission was faced with several

challenges. The key challenge was to allocate national contributions to the overall target
in a fair way while “taking account of different national starting points and potentials,
including existing level of RES and energy mix (Council 2007: 21; Johnson, Neuhoff et al.
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2008). In addition to the national binding targets, the Commission had to deal with the
question of sectoral (including the binding 10 percent target for biofuels in transport
sector) and interim targets, address the most contentious issue of support schemes,
tackle grid access issue, administrative and planning procedures and biofuels
sustainability criteria during the process of proposal formulation.22
Following the 2007 Council decision on the 20 percent overall binding target, the
Commission was facing the tricky job of breaking down this target into mandatory
national targets. The key issue was to decide on the methodology that the European
Commission would employ for calculating national targets. Initially, DG energy
informally proposed an option of distributing the 20 percent among the member
countries on the basis of the potential for the development of renewable sources of
energy in each country to ensure the production of RES at “the lowest possible costs.”
But member states that already had large shares of RES and the ones with financial
problems immediately rejected this approach (Boasson and Wettestad 2013). The new
member states, especially Poland, reacted very negatively since the potential‐based
approach would result in much higher targets for the new member states (Interview
with the Polish official, Ministry of Economy, 2012).
The European Commission realized that this option would not gain support from
the member states and decided to combine a 5.5 percent flat rate increase of the share
of RES in the energy mix in each member state with the GDP per capita‐based

22

In this dissertation, however, I discuss in detail the two most contentious issues: the binding targets and support
schemes
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distribution. This calculation resulted in higher targets for old member states23. For
instance, the UK ended up with 13.7 percent increase, whereas Romania with only 6.2
percent (Buchan 2009: 143). This formula contributed to a fair distribution of the overall
RES target among member states according to their economic strength as well as
starting conditions. This approach did not require member states to derive their RES
share from national production. The European Commission was planning to combine
this approach to national targets with the introduction of an EU‐wide support scheme
that would allow member states to invest in renewable energy in countries with better
potential (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 89). The European Commission continued its
policy entrepreneurship on the issue of national binding targets with stakeholder
mobilization efforts. It organized numerous high‐level meetings and visits with the
policy‐makers from member states to explain the economic rationale behind these
targets and gain support for the prospective RES proposal that would be presented as a
part of the climate and energy package. The Commission’s efforts proved quite
successful as only few member states claimed their targets to be too ambitious when
the draft directive got published.
As early as 2006, the European Parliament raised the issue of sectoral targets. A
very pro‐active MEP from the Green Alliance, Claude Turmes, called for separate binding
targets for RES in electricity, heating, cooling and transport sectors. The European
Parliament supported Turme’s request in its 2007 resolution on the RES Road Map

23

In the case of the countries with higher GDP per capita, the “early starter’s bonus” was included. This bonus was
granted to countries in which the share of renewable energy increased by more than 2percent between 2001 and
2005. In these countries one third of the increase during this period was deducted from their target by 2020
(European Commission, 2008: 84‐86).
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(European Parliament 2007, par 5). The RES industry also welcomed this idea
(Proceedings of the 3rd Session of the Amsterdam Forum, 22 Nov. 2006). The Council’s
statement from March 2007 asked the European Commission to request member states
to include sectoral targets and measures in the National Action Plans that every
member state would be obliged to develop according to the prospective RES directive
(European Council 2007: 21).
The European Parliament has been even more insistent on binding interim
targets. It repeatedly argued that as the timeframe for meeting 2020 targets was too
long, the binding interim targets were necessary to induce decision makers in member
states to take measures before it was too late. The EP requested the inclusion of
mandatory minimal interim targets and penalties (in case targets were not met) in the
action plans of member states to be reviewed every three years by the Commission
(European Parliament 2006; 2008). However, the European Commission ignored the
EP’s request and never referred to binding interim targets in its proposal. Instead, in the
draft directive the European Commission requested member states to include sectoral
targets and indicative trajectory in their National Action Plans tracing a path towards the
achievement of their targets by 2020 (European Commission 2008). It was only for the
transport sector that the European Commission proposed sectoral target of at least 10
percent renewables by 2020 for each member state. The European Commission’s
approach was to leave member states with the discretion to adjust the allocation to the
individual sectors as long as this would not compromise overall target achievement
(Schöpe 2010).
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The issue of target‐setting was closely linked to the question of support
schemes, around which much more contentious discussions took place, first within the
European Commission and later among member states and other stakeholders. In
contrast to the 2001 RES‐E directive drafting process in which the European Commission
could rely solely on theoretical advantages and shortcomings of various support
mechanisms, by 2007 several assessments of the experience with national support
schemes had already existed (e.g. European Commission 2005; Mitchell et al. 2006).
According to these evaluations, FIT appeared to be more cost‐efficient and effective
than market‐based certificate trading schemes (European Commission 2005).
Yet, in the Renewable Energy Road Map, the European Commission argued that
the support scheme for RES should be compatible with the internal energy market. Even
though the Commission pointed out that maintaining national support schemes until the
internal market becomes fully operation might be necessary, it underlined that the
harmonization of support schemes remained a long‐term goal (European Commission
2007: 7). Soon after the Spring Council 2007, the European Parliament tabled a
resolution on the RES Road Map in which it argued that national support schemes
should be maintained to ensure investor confidence (European Parliament 2007). The
renewable energy industry and member states with successful FIT systems (i.e. Germany
and Spain) were in line with the EP’s position.
The Commission started to view FIT as equally a market‐based instrument –
explicitly in the second evaluation report of 2008 ‐ with the designation of ‘price‐based
market instruments’ and TGCs as ‘quantity—based market instruments (European

189

Commission 2008: 5). This shift was perhaps partly caused by the sobering results of
electricity market liberalization, weakening the argument that any support scheme
should to be compatible with it (Lauber and Schenner 2011: 519) and partly due to the
pressure from Germany, the RES industry and the EP (Interview with the European
Commission official 2012). So, the Commission, in the Working Document presented
along with the draft RES directive in January 2008, reiterated that “harmonization of
support schemes remains a long‐term goal on economic efficiency, single market and
state aid grounds, but the harmonization in the short‐term is not appropriate”
(European Commission 2008: 7).
Despite unpopularity of market idea in many member states and among
stakeholders (RES industry), some high‐level Commission officials, supported by utilities,
tried to introduce a pan‐European green certificate scheme that would shift
competence from member states to the EU level, and lead to the eradication of existing
FIT schemes (European Commission 2007; Boasson and Wettestad 2013). In DG TREN of
the European Commission a small circle led by the Deputy Chief of the Cabinet,
Christopher Johns and the economist Peter Vis, who was previously in charge of ETS
scheme in DG Environment, persisted in pushing a full‐fledged EU certificate market
based on GOs. However, not everybody supported a market approach in DG TREN
(Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 91). Disagreements between the DG TREN and other DGs
also surfaced on the relative merits of GO trading and the national FIT systems, as well
as whether the promotion of the internal market should trump the safeguard of
national interests and industries. DG Competition with market efficiency in the internal
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market being its primary policy concern argued in favor of GO trading. DG Environment
and DG ECOFIN also supported the trading idea. They would have like to see the
harmonized certificate system that they believed would be less expensive. DG TREN
appeared to be the least market oriented (Nilsson et al. 2009: 4457).
In September 2007, TGC‐based harmonization supporters among top
Commission officials, persuaded Energy Commissioner Piebalgs to introduce RES trading
enabling member states to buy or sell TGC in other member states in the form of
Guarantees of Origin (GOs) without the attendant physical electricity and to count this
towards their own targets (Massy 2007: 51). This was supported by GO trading
proponents, including the UK and major utilities such as E.ON and Vattenfall (Toke 2008;
Nilsson et al. 2009). The UK was a key ally of the European Commission in favor of a
Community‐wide trading mechanism. Due to the meager results in meeting the RES‐E
indicative target of 10 percent, the UK saw the EU‐wide trading scheme as a means to
achieve its target in the most cost –efficient way (Interview with the British official, UK’s
Permanent Representation to the EU 2012). Commission officials skeptical of an EU‐
wide GO trading system made sure that the internal draft of the directive would leak in
December 2007, shortly before the Commission was to launch the climate package. The
German and Spanish governments together with the European Renewable Energy
Council (EREC) engaged in intense lobbying of the Commission (Boasson and Wettestad
2013). They wrote to Commissioner Pielbags arguing that the proposal would put a very
successful development of renewables at risk (Toke 2008).
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In light of upcoming parliamentary elections in 2009, the European Commission
wanted the RES directive to be adopted in early 2009. Because of the time pressure the
European Commission was more willing to accommodate the interests of FIT advocates
(Toke 2008; Interview with the European Commission official 2012). In the face of strong
resistance from the pro‐FIT coalition, the Commission in January 2008 presented a
milder, but somewhat ambiguous version of the draft directive, opening up for
certificate trade but not establishing a Pan‐European scheme (European Commission
2008). According to the proposal, companies in different member states would be able
to trade the guarantees of origin for RES‐E. That would enable producers of electricity
from renewable sources in one country to benefit from the support scheme in another
member state. The amount of energy represented by the GOs could be counted towards
the target achievement of that member state in which it benefitted from the support
scheme. This would lead to competition between support schemes in the EU member
states24.
Even though, the proposal included trading based on GOs, FIT defenders
succeeded in introducing a clause that provided for the possibility of national opt‐outs
from trading (Toke 2008: 3003). According to the Article 9 (2) “member states may
provide a system of prior authorization for the transfer of guarantees of origin… if such
system is likely to undermine the achievement of the environmental objectives
underlying the support scheme, or to ensure that national targets are met” (European

24

A producer of RES‐E in country A could sell its GOs for a certain amount of energy in country B to benefit from
country B’s support scheme. This would on the one hand lead to job creation in county A, but on the other, the costs
of its development would be paid by electricity consumers in country B, and the amount of electricity would be
counted towards the fulfillment of country B’s renewable energy targets.
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Commission 2008: 7). The Commission proposed to allow only those countries that have
achieved their indicative trajectory of interim targets to trade GO certificates. Even then
the member states may refuse authorization if they feel this will undermine their
support mechanisms (European Commission 2008: 27). Prior authorization would give
the states possibility to veto green certificate transaction. Renewable generators would
not be free to go “subsidy shopping around Europe” (Buchan 2009: 149).
The Commission’s draft directive did not explicitly aim at a harmonized Pan‐
European certificate trading scheme. However, the FIT supporters still saw a threat to
their national FIT schemes. They argued that because certificates were defined as
“tradable goods,” the national support schemes could have been regarded as a
distortion of the internal market rules (Neuhoff et al. 2008; Boasson and Wettestad
2013). If the European Court of Justice was to rescind the opt‐outs, even this proposal
would have permitted certificates trading to endanger national FIT schemes (Fouquet
and Johansson 2008: 4090). The FIT supporters also feared that if the European Court of
Justice, on the basis of the EU competition legislation, obliged member states to extend
their national support schemes to all applicants, including the ones from outside the
country, that would result in uncontrolled inflows and outflows of green power (in the
form of GOs) aimed at exploiting the differences in feed‐in tariff levels between various
EU states (Boasson and Wettestad 2012: 91). That might attract too many applicants to
the most generous feed‐in schemes and drain the RES production from member states
with less generous tariffs. Uncontrolled trade in the long run would make it hard for
governments to set their own tariff levels. This, in turn, would raise uncertainty on
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future income streams and hurt independent RES companies that depend on bank loans
for their sources of finance (Toke 2008; Buchan 2009: 146). This prospect of de‐facto
harmonization has been viciously resisted by heavyweight renewable states (Germany
and Spain), the European renewable industry and the European Parliament during the
negotiation phase (Buchan 2009; Interview with the European Commission official
2012).
One other less contentious, but still an important issue in the proposed draft
directive was grid access for RES. The European Commission, in the Renewable Energy
Road Map, pointed out the necessity to strengthen grid infrastructure and introduce
transparent rules for effective development of RES (European Commission 2006). The
European Parliament agreed with the European Commission when it emphasized that
the transparent, fair and priority access to the grids is essential (European Parliament
2007). The draft directive obliged member states to take “the necessary steps to
develop grid infrastructure to accommodate the further development of electricity
production from renewable energy sources” (European Commission 2008, Article 14(1).
To sum up, the European Commission’s policy entrepreneurship in the
formulation phase was quite successful with respect to binding national targets. Due to
the Commission’s stakeholder mobilization efforts, most of the member states were
ready to accept overall mandatory national targets without further discussion. As for the
European Commission’s ambitious objective to introduce harmonized Pan‐European
support scheme on the basis of GO trading, the Commission’s initial versions of the draft
proposal got watered down in the proposal formulation process. The time pressure to
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get the proposal adopted before the new EP elections in 2009, played into the decision
of the European Commission to accommodate the interests of the FIT supporters. The
resulting compromise diminished the Commission’s original ambitions with regard to
harmonization of RES support schemes. However, the compromise also helped reduce
the level of controversy in subsequent deliberations in the Council and the EP during the
negotiation phase (Nilsson et al. 2009).
6.3.3 Mediating Negotiations: Framing Battles
In January 2008, the European Commission presented the draft directive “on the
promotion of renewable energy sources of energy” replacing the two existing directives:
RES‐E directive of 2001 and 2003 directive on the promotion and use of biofuels and
other renewable fuels for transport. This proposal formed the part of a larger climate
and energy package that also included a regulation on an updated Emissions Trading
System (ETS II), provisions on energy efficiency, and support for developing carbon
capture and storage technologies. The Commission considered ETS and RES as
complimentary in reaching greenhouse gas reduction targets.
The proposed RES directive contained national targets for RES, targets for
renewable energy in transport, provisions on trade in GOs, grid access and
administrative measures, and sustainability criteria for biofuels (European Commission
2008). The issue of national targets and GO trading deserve particular attention as the
two most important elements of this complex directive. Unsurprisingly, negotiations
over the GO trading and the steering methods for RES proved to be one of the most
contentious issues in the negotiation phase.
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The reactions to the national overall targets that the Commission presented in
the draft proposal were mixed. The Council considered targets as very ambitious and
some member states, such as Poland, claimed them as “too ambitious” and wanted
further discussions on the target levels (Interviews with the Polish official, Ministry of
Economy 2012; Interview with the European Commission official 2013). However, the
French Presidency persuaded member states not to open up the issue for the
discussion. “We did not want to jeopardize the entire directive. If we opened up the
issue of national targets for political discussion, this would definitely endanger the fate
of the directive. I think everybody understood that” (Interview with the French official,
Permanent Representation of France to the EU 2012). In the end, the Council accepted
binding national targets presented by the Commission with only one revision: the target
for Latvia was reduced from 42 percent to 40 percent in the final directive (Annex 1,
Directive 2009/28/EC). So, instead of objecting to national targets, member states
decided to challenge the Commission on their autonomy in how to reach these targets.
Therefore, during the proposal negotiations, member states focused on the issue of
national support schemes, GO trading and flexibility mechanisms.
The European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, which
was responsible for the dossier, in its report on the Commissions’ proposal, suggested
introduction of mandatory interim targets for member states (European Parliament
2008). The EP also insisted on imposing “proportionate penalties” on member states if
they failed to meet their interim targets (European Parliament 2008: 58). The European
Commission ignored the EP’s request and instead of mandatory interim targets member
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states were asked to present indicative trajectory in their National Action Plans on how
they were planning to achieve their overall 2020 targets. With respect to penalties,
member states that would fail to achieve targets resulting from the trajectory, would be
obliged to present an updated action plan stating how they would catch up with the
indicative trajectory (Directive 2009/28/EC, Article 4(4)). Overall, the issue of national
targets was a smooth sailing compared to the debate on RES support scheme.
The European Commission’s ambition to introduce an EU‐wide harmonized
support system dated back as early as the first RES‐E Directive of 2001. In its proposal
for the new RES directive, the European Commission hoped to achieve this objective
through a massive expansion of the functions of guarantees of origin (GOs) (Schöpe
2010). Trading in GOs was the central mechanism in the proposal to ensure that the RES
targets would be reached in a cost‐efficient manner across the EU. The starting point
was that each producer of RES electricity or RES heating/cooling would be entitled to a
GO for the respective volume of renewable energy and these GOs would be freely
tradable across the EU. Under the Commission proposal, the GOs would have served as
an instrument of proof for national target achievement and could have been used to
claim benefits from the national support system (Schöpe 2010). The European
Commission, under the influence of FIT supporters, however, included a number of
prerequisites and qualifications. According to the Article 9(2) of the proposal, member
states, under certain conditions, were granted the opportunity to restrict the transfer of
GOs to and from their country, the so‐called “opt‐out” (European Commission 2008).
For example, only those countries that met their indicative trajectory of target
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achievement would be allowed to sell their GOs on the basis of ‘prior authorization’.
Legal experts however suggested that it was uncertain whether these limitations would
comply with internal market rules, in that the “limitation of trade must be proportionate
to the object aimed at, and justified in that he same objective cannot be achieved by
another means that is less hindering of trade” (Johnston et al. 2008; Schöpe 2010). The
proposal was still too ‘free trade’ for heavyweight renewable states fearing possible far‐
reaching legal consequences of GOs, RES industry and the European Parliament (Buchan
2009; Interview with the representative of the German Renewable Energy Association
2012).
In the European Parliament Claude Turmes, the vice‐president of EUROFORES
and the Green Party representative became the rapporteur for the directive. From the
first parliamentary reading in the ITRE committee it became apparent that the EP was of
a negative opinion with respect to the GO‐related provisions of the Commission’
proposal. Turme’s Memorandum, drafted in May 2008, argued that “EU‐wide
renewables certificate market is not the way forward. Such a scheme would not only
undermine the existing national support schemes, but also potentially generate h30
billion in windfall profits for traders and generators by moving from the technology‐
specific average price support schemes to a marginal market where the most expensive
marginal renewable certificate would set the price’’(Turmes 2008: 2; Buchan 2009: 150).
Turmes was successful to mobilize supporters and get Parliament’s backing (Boasson
and Wettestad 2013: 91‐92). Soon after his report, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution on the Commission’s proposal in which it suggested that GOs were to be used
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for “disclosure purposes only” and not confer on its owner the right to benefit from a
national support scheme in another country. Instead the EP proposed to introduce
“transfer accounting certificates (TACs)” that would permit RES energy producer to
benefit from the support scheme in another member state provided there was an
agreement between these respective member states. The European Parliament also
suggested the introduction of “joint support schemes” that would allow a number of
member states to cooperate in reaching their RES targets. In addition, the EP mentioned
“statistical transfers” that member states could make among themselves to help in
target achievement (European Parliament 2008). As we shall see, the EP’s objections
regarding the Commission’s proposal were largely shared among the member states.
The Energy Council in February 2008, the Environmental Council in March 2008
and the European Council of Spring 2008 underlined that the necessary flexibility in
target achievement must not compromise effective national support schemes (Schöpe
2010). It was quite obvious that the proposed GO trading did not enjoy support in the
majority of member states. Unsurprisingly, many member states were worried about
the situation in which the country offering the highest price for a unit of energy from
renewable sources would be flooded by the guarantees of origin and would have to pay
for energy produced somewhere else (Interview with the German official, Ministry of
Economy 2013).
To gain sufficient support for the draft directive, the European Commission, in
alliance with some member state (e.g. the UK, Sweden) supportive of its proposal,
conventional electricity industry represented by the Eurelectric, and energy traders
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organized under the umbrella of EFET, engaged in a framing battle with the opposing
coalition of FIT defenders (Lauber and Schenner 2011). The European Commission
shifted its framing strategy. It combined old economic arguments (cost‐efficiency,
competition, and compatibility with a liberalized electricity market) with a new line of
argumentation based on ‘flexibility’.

One of the top officials of the Energy

Commissioner’s Cabinet mentioned “We are not going to tell governments what
systems to put into place. We are just allowing a bit more flexibility” (Vis cited in Massy
2007: 53). In the beginning, the flexibility argument enjoyed the support of several
member states such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Malta, Luxembourg,
Austria, some Eastern European states and, of course, most importantly, the UK (Toke
2008: 2003).
The German and Spanish governments, supported by European and national RES
associations, members of the European Parliament and Green NGOs, responded with an
argument which did not question the need for more flexibility but objected to a system
based on GO trading. ‘Non‐trading flexibility’ became a key term. As Lauber and
Schenner (2011: 522) point out, “by only slightly changing the keyword… they
succeeded in addressing the official problem definition by proposing a different solution
serving the same purpose.” Similar to the framing strategy used during the negotiations
of 2001 RES‐E Directive, opponents of the Commission’s proposal re‐framed the issue as
one of subsidiarity. They insisted that the promotion of renewable energy was not only
about pursuing renewable investments anywhere in the EU at lowest costs, but that it
was also about local or national benefits renewable energy provided to employment
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and to stimulating technological progress. They argued that a trading system in which
any distributor could sell GOs for export would undercut quota fulfillment (EREC 2007).
They also insisted that an EU‐wide trading system would produce extra costs and large
windfall profits for incumbent utilities at the expense of small and medium‐sized
enterprises through greater insecurity of investment (Toke 2008; Lauber and Schenner
2011: 522). So, they framed the issue in a way that shifted the discussion away from the
question of which support scheme was the most appropriate towards the question of
which level of control was most appropriate.
‘Subsidiarity’ and ‘non‐trading flexibility’ soon appeared to win over the
European Commission’s arguments. Opponents of the Commission’s proposal mobilized
wide support in the Council, even among the member states with quota systems, such
as the UK and Poland, but skeptical of European integration (Lauber and Schenner 2011:
522). The radical shift in the UK’s position marked a final blow to the European
Commission’s GO trading. In the summer of 2008, Germany, the UK and Poland tabled a
joint proposal that clearly stated that the authority to choose and shape national
support systems should remain with the member states, while introducing instruments
for ‘non‐trading flexibility:’ a joint support scheme, statistical transfer, and joint
projects. These options would permit bilateral cooperation, but it would be up to
member states to decide whether to apply these mechanisms (Boasson and Wettestad
2013: 92). This alternative proposal by the trio of big member states was very similar to
the report of the European Parliament drafted by Turmes a month before and served as
a basis for the subsequent negotiations between the Council and the EP. In December
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2008 the Council and the European Parliament passed the directive under the first
reading. The final directive abandoned the proposed common policy instrument of GO
trading. The guarantees of origin were to play the role suggested by the Parliament,
namely that of a proof that a certain amount of energy was produced from renewable
sources of energy. GO trading was replaced by a voluntary system whereby a member
state that has reached its interim RES targets can sell or trade excess renewable credits
to another member state based on statistical values or so‐called ‘‘statistical transfers’’
(Nilsson et al. 2009: 4458). There was no reference whatsoever concerning the
possibility of harmonizing the support schemes in the future.
The European Commission’s efforts to mobilize support for the original
proposal’s GO trading had failed. The Commission lost in the framing battle and had to
accept the alternative proposal. Since the Commission’s key interest was a successful
outcome of the negotiations on the entire climate and energy package, the European
Commission’s decision not to insist on GO trading and flexibility mechanism might be
characterized as a smart strategic choice, especially in light of the time pressure created
by the upcoming EP elections.
Finally, a brief note is due on the issue of grid access. The draft directive obliged
member states to take “the necessary steps to develop grid infrastructure to
accommodate the further development of electricity production from renewable energy
sources” (European Commission 2008, Article 14(1). The European Parliament argued
that the operators of the transmission and distribution systems should also be obliged
“to bear the full costs for grid reinforcements related to the extension of large scale and
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small scale renewable energies.” The Council did not accept the requirement to make
the transmission and distribution grid operators pay for the enforcement of the
electricity grid. In the final version of the directive member states were merely given the
possibility of obliging grid operators to cover the full cost of the modernization of the
electricity grid, which significantly weakened this element of the directive (Directive
2009/28/EC). However, the directive article dealing with the access to the grid put
producers of electricity from renewable sources in a rather good position providing
them either with priority access or guaranteed access to the grid. Considering the
differences between the EU member states, the final version of that article was
probably as ambitious as it could get at that time.
Overall, the European Commission as a policy entrepreneur was definitely much
more successful in setting mandatory national targets and with regards to grid access
issues than in introducing a harmonized EU‐wide RES trading on the basis of GOs. The
European Commission’s supranational entrepreneurship effort aimed at harmonized
RES scheme proved to be in vain, for the second time.
6.4 Convergence of Preferences
In this section, I will examine the preferences/positions of key member states
(Germany, France, the UK and Poland) on the objectives and means of the Commission’s
proposal on RES 2009 directive focusing on direction and intensity of their
preferences/positions. At the end of the section, I will discuss the extent of convergence
between their positions.
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6.4.1 Domestic Context and Renewable Energy
Germany’s renewable portfolio has been built rapidly due to the FIT system. FIT
has led to the deployment of large quantities of wind, biomass, small hydro and
photovoltaic capacity. A feed‐in scheme regulated by the “Renewable Energy Sources
Act (EEG) from 2000 (later revised several times), offered operational support on the
basis of technological criteria. RES prices were adjusted to the costs of the different
renewable energy sources. RES enjoyed a guaranteed access to the grid (Jacobsson and
Lauber 2006). The operation of the feed‐in schemes led to the emergence of the
strongest renewable energy industries, primarily equipment producers for wind and
photovoltaic energy, in the entire EU. Total final energy from RES has increased by
almost 1 percent since 2002. According to Eurostat data, the share of RES‐E generation
went from 8.2 percent in 2003 to 15.4 percent by 2008 (Eurostat 2011). German
renewable energy output grew at an annual rate of 12 percent between 2000 and 2006
(IEA 2007: 65). So, Germany was able to meet its indicative target as mandated by the
RES‐E directive of 2001 well ahead of schedule. Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources
Act (EEG), which was modified in 2004 had already set ambitious targets to increase the
percentage of renewable energy sources in power supply to at least 12.5 percent by
2010 and to at least 20 percent by 2020 (EEG 2004). If this trend continued, 21 percent
of German energy would be sourced from RES by 2020, exceeding by 3 percent the
mandatory target of 18 percent proposed by the Commission’s RES proposal (Toke
2008).
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The “Black‐Red” Grand coalition of 2005‐2009 supported ambitious RES targets
for 2020: at least 20 percent of electricity generation and at least 10 percent of the total
energy supply (Duffield and Westphal 2011: 173). Because of their own ambitious
objectives and success in RES development, Germany became the European
Commission’s principal ally on an overall EU target, as well as binding national targets.
Germany’s strongly supportive position with respect to the endorsement of binding 20
percent overall EU target during the 2007 Spring Council, and later, with respect to
mandatory national targets was conditioned several factors. First, Germany had an
interest to expand the market for its growing RES industry. Introducing ambitious
energy/climate targets into EU legislation would create additional demand for RES
technology and provide excellent opportunity for Germany’s export‐oriented industry.
Second, German leadership wanted to ‘upload’ its national standards and solutions to
the EU level to reduce regulatory adjustment costs in subsequent ‘downloading’ of EU
rules. The more a European policy fits a member state’s domestic context, the lower
the adaptation costs in the implementation process (Börzel 2002). Third, Germany
sought a leadership role in global climate change negotiations (Jӓnicke 2011). Coupled
with its leadership in renewable technology exports, ambitious and unified EU targets
would give Germany a stronger position to become a “trend‐setter” in international
climate politics and exert more influence on other players (e.g. the US and China) in the
upcoming Copenhagen talks and in setting post‐Kyoto objectives (Cox and
Dekanozishvili forthcoming). Therefore, Chancellor Merkel aligned with the European
Commission to push forward the 20/20/20 initiative and put RES binding targets on the
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EU agenda. Holding the Council Presidency in the first half of 2007 provided an
important institutional platform for Germany to help the European Commission to
persuade member states during the 2007 Spring Council to adopt the 20 percent binding
target of RES share in the EU’s energy consumption by 2020” (Interview with the
German official, Ministry of Economy 2013).
However, Germany’s support for ambitious renewable energy targets has been
conditioned on being able to maintain its FIT scheme (Duffield and Westphal 2011: 177).
Thus, Germany strongly resisted the Commission’s proposal on the EU‐wide trading of
RES certificates. The German position was that TREC systems tended to favor incumbent
companies (large utilities) by generating windfall profits and market concentrations
rather than promoting technological diversification and independent power producers
(Jacobsson et al. 2009). German officials from the Ministry of Environment believed that
the new RES companies in Germany would suffer and target fulfillment would be
jeopardized if the Commission’s proposal was adopted: “The question was where the
RES plants would be built, where the jobs would be created. RES potential would not be
built in Germany, local ownership would be lost, FIT systems would collapse as
electricity companies in quota‐based countries would buy up GOs from low‐cost
generation to fulfill their corporate and national targets, while leaving FIT member
states with more expensive options” (Interview with the German official, Ministry of
Environment 2012). The German Ministry of Economy, on the other hand, was
concerned with the loss of cost control: “We shared criticism of the Ministry of
Environment regarding the European Commission’s proposal, however, for different
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reasons. It would not be possible to keep cheap wind power in Germany; wind industry
would be attracted out of Germany to member states with more generous tariffs. On
the other hand, we would experience excessive inflow of producers in PV sectors
because of generous German tariff. Overall, we would lose control over the costs”
(Interview with the German Official, Ministry of Economy 2013). Despite some
differences, the German government had a unified position during the negotiations in
Brussels, which was strongly in favor of binding targets, but strongly opposing the
Commission’s proposal on GO‐based certificate trading.
In the beginning of the 2000s, the British government announced its ambitious
climate change policy. The government set itself a target of 60 percent CO2 reductions
by the year 2050 (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom
2003). The Stern Review of 2006, initiated by the British government, drew the
attention to the challenge of climate change not only in the UK, but also at the European
level. Two years later, the Climate Change Act upgraded the previously adopted target
of 60 percent CO2 reductions to 80 percent by 2050, and aimed at 34 percent
reductions by 2020 (Department of Energy and Climate Change 2008).
Despite its ambitious climate targets, the UK was a laggard in the development
of renewable energies. The British government had failed to develop any meaningful
wind industry in spite of favorable weather conditions. Unlike Germany, the UK was
behind the schedule in meeting RES‐E directive indicative targets (European Commission
2007). The share of RES‐E generation over consumption grew from 2.8 percent to 5.6
percent in 2008 (Eurostat 2011). The gap between the UK’s ambitious climate change
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objectives and a slow development of RES was partly due to an inefficient support
scheme, and partly due to the UK’s focus on nuclear energy as the main non‐fossil
source of electricity.
Since 2002, the UK introduced a RES support mechanism based on renewable
obligation – a quota with tradable certificates (RO). The RO scheme is a ‘market‐based’
system involving trade in renewable obligation certificates (ROCs). Electricity suppliers
are obliged to fulfill the quota obligation. The UK quota obligation has often been
analyzed as a prime example for the high‐risk nature of quota systems, in terms of
volume, price and balancing risk (Mitchell et al. 2006). Until 2009 the scheme was
technology neutral ‐ only relatively low‐cost RES‐E technologies were supported,
whereas higher cost technologies such as photovoltaic were not competitive under the
quota scheme and were therefore also prevented from market integration (Wood
2011). Undifferentiated support for all kinds of RES has been a major disadvantage of
the quota scheme. Among the renewable energy sources, wind power has been the
dominant RES‐E technology and the main investors/producers have been the major
utilities, the ex‐monopoly companies (Stenzel and Frensel 2008). The RO system has
under‐achieved in relation to its quantitative target: in 2007 the RES‐E amounted to 4.9
percent (15.9 TWh), compared with the target of 7.9 percent (or 25.6 TWh). The RO
scheme has been criticized for being too costly. ROC system has been producing just a
0.3 per cent increase in the annual renewable energy as a contribution to total final
energy consumption (DBERR 2007). A key problem with the RO instrument is that the
future price of ROCs as well as future price of electricity is uncertain. This means that
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investors are facing greater risks than in FIT system. This increases the cost of RES
projects compared to FIT system where prices paid to renewable generators are fixed
beforehand for 15‐20 years (Toke 2005; Mitchell et al. 2006). In terms of RES‐E target
achievement, the UK was predicted to be generating around 6.5 percent of its final
energy from RES in 2020 in the best scenario case that would leave the UK 8.5 percent
short of its EU RES directive target ‐ 15 percent from RES by 2020 (Toke 2008).
So, due to its commitment to climate change, the UK was generally supportive
of the European Commission’s efforts to promote renewable energy that the UK
considered as an integral part of the its strategy to deliver on climate change and wider
energy policy goals (Parliament of the United Kingdom 2008). The UK’s strong concerns
about energy security after having become a net importer of gas, reinforced by the 2006
and later 2009 gas supply cut‐offs to Europe due to the dispute between Russia and
Ukraine, only contributed to the UK’s positive attitude towards the RES. Some of my
respondents from the European Commission recollected that the UK was favorably
disposed to the European Commission’s RES Roadmap. However, the UK initially was
very skeptical and not in favor of the Commission’s proposal on setting binding targets
for the development of 2020 (Interview with the European Commission official 2012;
2013). Leaked government papers revealed that British officials were opposed to the
setting of mandatory targets on the grounds that they would undermine the carbon
price and hinder the effectiveness of the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS). Also,
national binding targets proposed by the Commission would be very difficult for the UK
to meet (McGown 2011: 205). It was estimated that a 15 percent target would require

209

an approximately ten‐fold increase in the proportion of renewable energy in the UK
over little more than a decade (Parliament Committee Proceedings 2008). In addition,
for the UK the RES was about handling climate change and not about promoting certain
technologies. However, before the Spring Council of 2007 the UK changed its position
and supported the binding 20 percent RES target by 2020 as suggested by the European
Commission. As one of the high‐level Commission bureaucrats from the DG energy has
mentioned during an interview, the UK’s approval of the 20 percent target in final
energy consumption was thanks to Tony Blair’s confusion: “Blair, for some reason,
through that the 20 percent overall EU target was referring to electricity, not the total
energy consumption” (Interview with the European Commission official 2012).
With respect to the means on how to achieve RES targets, the UK’s position was
very much in line with the European Commission’s proposal. The UK was a key ally for
the Commission officials in favor of a Community‐wide trading mechanism in the
beginning. Initially, the UK was a strong supporter of GO‐based trading: “Minister
welcomes the principle of standardizing and enhancing the role of Guarantee of Origin
Certificates to allow them to be transferred between member states, and does not
believe that this should impact on national support systems for promoting renewables”
(Parliament of the UK 2008). The UK government actively lobbied the European
Commission to favor trade in RES and pointed to the need to influence key member
atates’ views, namely France, Germany, Italy and Poland (Internal briefing paper, not
dated). The UK feared a tripling of its electricity prices if it would need to increase RES
binding targets until 2020 with high amount of home‐grown RES (Toke 2008). An EU‐
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wide trading mechanism was seen by the UK as a means to achieve flexibility and thus
reduce costs. According to the internal briefing paper for UK ministers prepared by
officials from the UK Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, “from
a UK point of view, given the concern on not undermining the EU ETS, and the
difficulties of making large increases in renewable investment domestically, we would
tend to favour options with maximum flexibility over what and where investments can
be made to minimise costs” (Internal briefing paper, not dated).
Despite its initial vigorous support of the European Commission’s proposal, the
UK joined the alternative proposal drafted by Germany, Spain and Poland in the summer
of 2008 that stripped the GOs off trading quality. The UK’s radical shift was crucial
moment in the negotiation phase and it actually determined the fate of the proposal
(Interview with the European Commission official 2012). The UK’s objective was to have
a flexible mechanism at the EU level that would allow investment in RES outside the UK
and contribute towards the national target and not necessarily the harmonized EU
trading system. The UK was also convinced by the ‘cost‐related’ arguments of FIT
supporters. As Boasson and Wettestad (2013) argue, due to the absence of strong
British utilities, UK policymakers were not exposed to strong domestic pressure for
green certificates. “British renewable energy enthusiasts had repeatedly called for the
introduction of feed‐in systems, due to the disappointing achievement of the market
scheme” (Mitchell and Connor 2004 cited in Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 92). The
British energy regulator Ofgem also sided with them and argued against an EU‐wide
certificates scheme referring to high costs and technology‐neutral approach (Ofgem
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2008; Interview with the European Commission official 2012). All of these factors
contributed to the drastic shift in the UK’s position. So, unlike Germany, the UK was
initially against binding targets but supportive of EU‐wide certificates trading. However,
in the middle of negotiations, the UK’s position on support schemes converged with that
of Germany, Poland and other opponents of the European Commission’s proposal.
The French energy sector has traditionally been dominated by a high share of
nuclear power, while progress in developing renewable energy has been very slow, and
the proportion of energy derived from RES actually fell in 1997‐2004 (European
Commission 2007). Due to the large hydro resources, France started from a substantial
share of RES‐E, which was 14.8 percent in 1990 and slightly decreased to 14.4 percent in
2008 (ENTSO‐E 2011). France is one of few countries in the EU, where the share of RES‐E
in the electricity mix decreased from 17.8 percent to 13.5 percent over the period of
1995‐2009 (Eurostat 2011). France was lagging behind its RES‐E directive indicative
target of 21 percent, achieving only around 14 percent by 2010 (European Commission
2007). According to experts’ estimation, France’s share of energy from renewables
would only increase to 17 percent by 2020 in the best scenario case, well under 23
percent target allocated by the RES directive proposal (Toke 2008).
Since 2001, RES‐E has been supported under a feed‐in system paid for 15‐20
years depending on the technology and public tenders for larger projects above 12 MW.
The promotion of renewable energies is mainly realized by a system of obligation to buy
electricity from renewable sources at favorable rates (feed‐in tariff). This obligation
derives from Article 10 of law n°2000‐108 as well as from specific orders for the
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different RES technologies, especially the regulations on the feed –in tariff, which
contain specific rules for the various RES sources (DG Energy Report 2011). Ineffective
RES support mechanisms and number of bureaucratic barriers led to the sluggish
development of RES in France (DG Energy Report 2011). In addition, French energy
policy is heavily influenced by EdF, whose 84 percent of shares are government‐owned.
And EdF has never been a supporter of RES (Interview with an expert, Renewable
Energy Association of France 2013).
Despite ineffective renewable energy policy, the French government, and
especially French president Nicolas Sarkozy, appeared as a big supporter of EU’s climate
change related ambitions and accordingly the European Commission’s Energy and
Climate Package. This is not that surprising given France’s interest in nuclear energy.
French policy makers influenced by the powerful nuclear industry expected that the CO2
emissions reduction by 2020 could muster other countries to invest in nuclear energy
that would bring profitable contracts to the French nuclear industry, especially largely
state‐owned Areva (Interview with an expert, Renewable Energy Association of France
2013). Another important factor that determined the French position during the
negotiations was its upcoming EU presidency. Negotiations on the package started right
when France assumed the EU presidency (second half of 2008). France made the climate
and energy package a top priority during its Presidency and wanted to get the package
adopted until the end of its presidency. “Sarkozy himself was very active. He perhaps
wanted to play a leader’s role, and the lack of agreement over the most important piece
of legislation negotiated during the French presidency of the European Union could be
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damaging to Sarkozy’s image as an effective leader” (Interview with the European
Commission official 2012).
France also had a favorable situation domestically. The “Grenelle de
l’environnement” process was ongoing, which called for an ambitious increase in RES in
line with the EU RES targets.25 The French national assembly also supported ambitious
RES objectives: “These goals indeed correspond to the scale of the climate warming
challenge and strengthen Europe in its leadership role in the framework of the
international agreements before the deadline of the Copenhagen conference of
December 2009” (National Assembly, motion on a resolution on the energy‐climate
package, November 2008). So, Sarkozy supported the European Commission’s 20
percent overall RES target for the EU by 2020 during the 2007 Spring Council for reasons
different from Germany’s desire of having ambitious RES goals at the EU level.
When the European Commission presented mandatory national targets in its
proposal for the RES directive, the French government had some hesitation, but the
French Permanent Representation in Brussels convinced policymakers in Paris to agree
on binding targets. “As a result of internal debates it was concluded that without
binding targets there will be no boost for RES development” (Interview with the French
official, Permanent Representation of France to the EU 2012). The French Presidency
also decided not to open up the issue of mandatory national targets for the further
discussion. “We would never succeed to have an agreement if some member states
25

The Grenelle de l'environnement, instigated by Nicolas Sarkozy in the summer of 2007, was an open multi‐party
debate in France bringing together representatives of national and local government and organizations (industry,
professional associations, non‐governmental organizations) with the goal of unifying a position on public policy on
ecological and sustainable development issues over the following five‐year period., is to define the key points of
public policy on ecological and sustainable development issues over the following five‐year period.
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objected the level of their national binding targets. We, as a presidency, emphasized
two points: annex of the proposed directive with mandatory targets should not be
reopened, and all texts were to be held as a package. This would help to progress in
negotiations as some member states were willing to compromise on some parts of the
package in order to get concessions on the other parts” (Interview with the French
official, Permanent Representation of France to the EU 2011). So, French presidency by
not letting open up the issue of targets during negotiations used the power of agenda
exclusion (Tallberg 2003).
With respect to support schemes, France was in favor of maintaining autonomy
in deciding RES instruments, but its major objective was to get the package adopted: “If
the European Commission’s proposal on trading of green certificates was accepted, we
would lose control over the process of RES development. However, as a Presidency, we
focused on mediating the negotiations, organizing bilateral meetings with other
member states and holding trialogue meetings between the Council, the EP and the
Commission. We were sympathetic to the proposal put forward by Germany, Spain,
Poland and the UK, but we had to stay neutral. Our key aim was to reach the agreement
until the end of our Presidency” (Interview with the French official, Permanent
Representation of France to the EU 2012).
Overall, the French position on binding national targets, as well as on RES
support schemes was in line with the positions of other key member states. France’s
major concern was to get the entire package adopted, especially because of its high
stakes in the ETS component of the package.
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The Polish government has not been ambitious about the deployment of
renewable energy sources. By the time Poland joined the European Union in 2004, the
RES share was around 1.5 percent. The share of RES‐E generation in gross final energy
consumption reached 4.2 percent in 2008 (Eurostat 2011). Renewable energy has been
considered a goal set by the European Union rather than a viable source for electricity
production (DG Energy Report 2011). Power generation in Poland has been dominated
by coal (93.4 percent). However, because of international obligations to reduce CO2
emissions the use of coal has been expected to become more expensive. The second
most important energy source has been natural gas, mostly imported from Russia (Lang
2007 cited in Poblocka et al. 2011 ). The rising prices for coal and the dependency on
Russian supply constituted a serious issue for Poland in terms of energy security.
Therefore, nuclear power has gained in importance in the Polish energy mix.
In 2005, Poland introduced technology‐neutral quota‐based obligation and a
system of tradable green certificates, similar to the UK RO system, to support RES‐E
generation. The key idea behind the support scheme was to gradually stimulate the
demand of RES‐E and at the same time to facilitate competition between RES‐E
producers (EnerCEE, 2011). The quota obligation could also be fulfilled by paying a fee
calculated annually according to a statutorily set formula and published by the
Regulator (Art. 9a par. 2‐4 Energy Law Act). The Polish electricity market has for a long
time shown a permanent shortage of RES‐E. Hence, the “substitution fee” set by the
regulator has been the main driving factor determining RES‐E income from selling
certificates. As a consequence, the price for certificates in Poland has been mainly
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determined by regulation rather than by the market, similar to a feed‐in system
(Obersteiner 2008 cited in Poblocka et al. 2011).
The Development Strategy of Renewable Energy Sector elaborated in 2001 set
the goal of a14 percent share of renewable energy in the energy mix by 2020. However,
due to the expected increase in the consumption of electricity by 2020, Poland was
expected to reach 9 percent share of energy from RES (Kopaczewska 2007). During the
2007 Spring European Council president Kaczynski reluctantly agreed to the EU’s 20
percent target by 2020. But when the European Commission allocated 15 percent
mandatory national RES target by 2020, the Polish government and conventional
industry expressed their dissatisfaction, arguing that the target was too ambitious and
pushed for opening up the issue for discussion (Council 2008, Interview with the Polish
official, Ministry of Economy 2012). However, the Polish government did not succeed in
lowering the national mandatory target proposed by the European Commission. In the
climate and energy package negotiations, the major Polish priority was to improve its
chances of getting special treatment for its coal‐based utilities in the ETS (Boasson and
Wettestad 2013: 92). Poland focused on opposing some elements of the ETS directive
(i.e. introduction of the full auctioning of the CO2 emissions) and was ready to make
concessions during the negotiations of the RES directive to gain compromise on the ETS
directive (Interview with the French official, Permanent Representation of France to the
EU 2012). Eventually, Poland accepted the mandatory national target of 15 percent RES
share as suggested in the Commission’s proposal against its will.

217

Regarding the EU‐wide trade of GOs, the Polish government opposed the
European Commission’s proposal besides the fact that Poland had quota‐based RES
support scheme. Although the system of internationally tradable guarantees of origin
could help Poland develop renewable energy industry and create jobs in this sector at
the expense of electricity consumers in the countries with more generous tariffs, the
government appeared to be concerned not with the costs of RES development, but with
the growing possibility for RES industry to compete with conventional energy
companies. So, in response to the European Commission’s proposal, Poland allied with
Germany and Spain, later joined by the UK, to force the Commission abandon its
objective of introducing tradable GOs (Boasson and Wettestad 2013). Indeed, the
alliance succeeded in pushing through their solution that eventually made its way into
the directive. Overall, the Polish position was not in favor of the proposed directive,
neither in terms of the binding national targets, nor the support mechanism suggested
by the Commission. On the latter Polish position converged with that of other key
member states, whereas on the issue of target level Poland had to acquiesce to the
target it considered too ambitious.
6.4.2 Convergence of Preferences/Positions on Policy Objectives and Instruments
By the time the European Commission proposed the 20 percent binding target
for RES, climate change was an issue on the agenda in three key states, Germany, the
UK and France. Poland only relatively recently having joined the EU, was never a
prominent supporter of ambitious climate or renewable policies. Germany and France
both supported the European Commission’s 20 percent overall RES target for the EU by
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2020, albeit for different reasons as discussed earlier. The UK was initially skeptical and
not in favor of the Commission’s proposal on setting binding targets. However, before
the Spring Council of 2007, the UK changed its position and supported proposed targets.
Though reluctantly, Poland also agreed to accept the overall binding target. So,
Germany was strongly in favor of the binding target; France was supportive as well; the
UK became supportive only at the later point; the Polish position diverged from these
three member states but finally agreed on binding targets.
With respect to mandatory national targets that the European Commission
proposed in the draft directive after the 2007 Spring Council, Germany was again
strongly in favor of the proposal. The French government hesitated in the beginning, but
after the internal discussions was persuaded not to question mandatory national
targets. The UK was concerned that the national targets would be hard to meet, but still
supported binding national targets. The Polish position again was different and not in
favor of the binding national targets, but used the RES target as a bargaining chip to gain
concessions on other elements of the climate and energy package.
Preferences/positions of the key member states with respect to the means and
instruments for achieving objectives were far from aligned. In May–June 2008, member
state governments remained split on the issue of GOs. Germany strongly resisted the
Commission’s proposal on the EU‐wide trading of RES certificates. France was in favor of
maintaining autonomy in deciding RES instruments, and the French position was
generally in line with the German one, but France, as Council Presidency tried to remain
neutral since its major objective was to get the package adopted. The Polish
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government opposed the European Commission’s proposal besides the fact that Poland
had quota‐based RES support scheme. The Polish position was in line with the German
position and indeed they together tabled an alternative proposal. The UK’s position in
the beginning was opposite to the German and Polish anti‐GO trading position and
strongly in favor of the Commission’s proposal on Community‐wide support scheme.
However, things started to shift against GO trading. The national positions in the Council
meeting minutes reveal that even trading‐friendly countries, most importantly the UK,
were turning around and becoming uncertain about the merits of the system. The UK
changed its opinion, partly in response to domestic voices about looking into FIT, and
fears that certificate markets if harmonized across the EU might make certificates very
expensive (Nilsson et al. 2009). So, in the middle of negotiations, the UK’s position on
support schemes converged with that of Germany, Poland and other opponents of the
European Commission’s proposal. The UK joined the alternative proposal drafted by
Germany, Spain and Poland in the summer of 2008 that stripped the GOs off trading
quality.
Thus, the positions of the key member states were more aligned on the issue of
binding targets (vertical integration) than on harmonization of support schemes
(horizontal integration). With respect to policy instruments, the UK’s position was the
complete opposite of the German and Polish positions (also from the more neutral
French position). But in the middle of negotiations the UK’s position changed
dramatically and converged with the German and Polish positions. As a result, the
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European Commission was forced to give up the pan‐European framework for RES
trading.
6.5 Transnational Interest Consolidation
Similar to the 2001 RES‐E directive policymaking process, two major
transnational interest groups were active at the EU level trying to take part in shaping
the new RES directive by exerting influence on the EU policy makers. These two groups
again were utilities (conventional energy sector) represented by the umbrella
organization at the EU level – Eurelectric, and renewable energy industries represented
by EREC, EREF and European associations of national renewable industries, such as
EWEA (European Wind Energy Association). In this section, I will discuss the role of these
two transnational interest groups and the degree of their mobilization and consolidation
in the process of RES directive elaboration.
Since the adoption of the RES‐E directive in 2001, the European renewable
industry has been growing. Germany was the leading country with a significant RES
industry. In spite of the high annual growth rates, the renewable industry could not yet
compete with the conventional electricity industry in terms of economic strength
(Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 90). However, the renewable industry developed a very
strong presence in Brussels. EREC was an umbrella organization for all niche
organizations. EREC developed very close ties with technology‐oriented officials in the
European Commission’s DG TREN, as well as the European Parliament. RES industry
strengthened its lobbying capacity since the time the first RES‐E directive was
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elaborated (Interview with the representative from German Wind Energy Association
2013; Boasson and Wettestad 2013).
The renewable energy industry, under the EREC’s umbrella, mobilized itself on
the European scene to influence the renewable energy policy at the EU level as early as
2004, a date when the European Commission was supposed to table its report in
accordance with the 2001 RES‐E directive. EREC prepared a policy document which
suggested setting a 20 percent renewable target for Europe by 2020, and 34 percent
RES target for electricity sector (EREC 2004). After the European Commission presented
its RES Road Map, EREC in line with the European Parliament, more specifically
EOROFORES group, supported a binding target of 25 percent RES share by 2020, but
eventually welcomed the agreement of the 2007 Spring Council on 20 percent RES
target by 2020 (Interview with EREC representative 2012).
In addition to ambitious long‐term RES targets, the renewable industry was a
strong supporter of the sectoral approach. They had the EP’s backing on that issue. “At
first, we argued for a separate directive for heating/cooling sector to close the gap
between this sector and RES‐E and asked for at least 25 percent overall EU target by
2020 allocated among member states based on binding national targets” (Interview
with EREC representative 2012). However, the European Commission in its Road Map
presented the 20 percent overall target with no mention of sectoral targets. Dissatisfied
with the absence of sectoral targets, the RES industry, together with environmental
NGOs and the European Parliament, repeated their call for sector‐specific RES policy
objectives (Massy 2007). Eventually, the adopted directive only obliged member states
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to present an indicative trajectory in their National Action Plans outlining how they plan
to achieve mandatory national targets (Directive 2009/28/EC). So, sectoral targets that
RES industry and the European Parliament actively advocated for did not find way in the
final version of the 2009 RES directive.
The RES industry was strongly consolidated and became united with the MEPs,
the Commission officials and member state representatives against the Commission’s
proposal to harmonize the support schemes on the basis of the quota mechanism.
Shortly before the European Commission published the report, as required by the 2001
RES‐E directive, about the possibility to establish a community‐wide support scheme in
2005, EREC’s position paper underlined that there were serious distortions in the
conventional power market and considered it too early to harmonize different national
support schemes for renewable energy (EREC 2005). The RES industry shared the view
of the European Parliament and pro‐FIT member states that a pan‐European green
certificate scheme would raise investment uncertainty, and that the utilities would get
unjustified profit (Interview with the representative from the German Wind Energy
Association 2013). The RES industry aimed at a long‐term regulatory framework. EREC
representing equipment producers and manufacturers that would benefit from binding
targets, and small producers that would have difficulties dealing with liberalized market,
in alliance with other lobbyists including EREF (an organization for independent power
producers of renewable electricity), the European Photovoltaic Industry Association
(IPIA), the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) and the most important
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environmental NGOs in Brussels, (e.g. Greenpeace) vigorously opposed the creation of
pan‐EU market for GO certificates.
National wind energy associations united under the EWEA were the most active
supporter of FIT schemes and the strongest opponents of the harmonized support
scheme based on quota obligations. The EWEA believed that harmonization of the
renewable energy support scheme and liberalization of trade of electricity from
renewable sources of energy based on the mechanism of green certificates would lead
to a situation in which countries importing renewable energy would benefit from
support schemes introduced in another country without bearing the costs of the
scheme. Therefore, trade with electricity produced from renewable sources would only
make sense if all countries were given the same obligations and addressed a number of
differences such as various costs of grid connection, different electricity prices, fiscal
measures, etc. (Interview with the German official, Ministry of Environment 2012). The
RES industry argued that trading, or ‘flexibility’ as it was framed by the European
Commission, should have been restricted to those member states that had already met
their targets (Toke 2008: 3003). “They were very good at getting their point across the
European Commission against the use of GO‐based trading” (Nilsson et al. 2009: 34).
The disagreements within the Commission provided a strong incentive for lobbying, and
the final weeks of proposal preparation up until 23 January 2008, when the proposal
was formally published, saw an unprecedented lobby effort from interest groups and
member states (Nilsson et al. 2009). The consolidated effort of the RES industry bore
the fruit. As the representative of the German Wind Energy Association has mentioned,
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after the intensive discussions with the European Commission the draft has undergone
major changes as a result of the new understanding in the Commission: “The RES
industry was consolidated. Everybody agreed that mix of national and EU certificate
system could not work together and if the European Commission insisted on its
proposal, the whole RES industry would launch the campaign against it. Even voluntary
overarching certificate system would not fly; it would undermine target achievement.
And there was a convergence of positions between us and the German government. So,
the European Commission understood that legislation in the suggested form could
never be passed. In the end of 2008, after Germany, Spain, Poland and the UK tabled an
alternative proposal, there was an agreement among the most of the stakeholders that
voluntary cooperation mechanism was the way forward” (Interview with a
representative from the German Wind Energy Association 2012).
Thus, the RES industry was well‐mobilized and consolidated. They also acted
strategically when forming strong ties with the European Parliament, the Commission
officials who had more technology‐oriented outlook, the member state representatives
opposed to the pan‐European trading.
In the period preceding the adoption of the 2001 RES‐E directive electricity
producers had already taken up market thinking. To ensure growth they were
Europeanizing their activities and developing into big conglomerates through a series of
mergers and acquisitions. By 2008, there were few potential acquisition candidates in
Europe. Investment in RES began to be considered as one of the possibilities for further
growth (Boasson and Wettestad 2013: 89‐90). Therefore, when the European
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Commission began its work on the new RES directive, utilities got activated on the
European scene to influence the policy development in accordance with their interests.
These interests included the majority of transnational electricity corporations,
represented by Eurelectric, the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET) and
Renewable Energy Certificate System (RECS). All three groups generally supported, or at
least did not openly oppose renewable energy development as many member
companies were already investing in RES (Toke 2008). However, they considered the
target of 20 percent share for RES in overall EU energy consumption as very ambitious
and challenging. Although they did not overtly contest the targets, Eurelectric, EFET and
RECS underlined the importance of a market‐based mechanism and ‘flexibility’ for
achieving ambitious targets (Interview with Eurelectric representative 2011; Toke 2008).
Pro‐market oriented Eurelectric believed that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
should be the main instrument and the similar mechanism of green certificates for RES
could be a reasonable option to support renewable energy, while creating “level playing
field” for different sources of energy to compete on the market (Eurelectric 2007).
All three groups were strongly in favor of GO certificate trading. They mostly
mirrored the interests of giant companies (e.g. E.ON, RWE, Vattenfall) that could benefit
from windfall profits as the price of GOs would be determined by the marginal costs of
the most expensive RES technology (Johnson et al. 2008; Toke 2008). This system would
allow big incumbent electricity suppliers to buy certificates and be in control of income
stream for renewable energy developers that would depend on suppliers for contracts
(Toke 2008).
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Eurelectric and its allies presented a nuanced position: instead of explicitly
demanding a harmonized market for RES, they argued for giving a choice between FIT
and GO trading. Their nuanced position was the result of the consolidation problem. It
was difficult to form a unified strong position due to diverging interests that the
umbrella organizations have represented in terms of power technologies, or
nationalities (Nilsson et al. 2009; Toke 2008). There were members of Eurelectric (e.g.
Iberdola – a Spanish electricity company) that supported FIT and contributing to the lack
of a unified position in Eurelectric (Toke 2008). As for the EFET and RECS, they both
presented pro‐trading positions, but were dissatisfied with the “opt‐out” clause and
prior authorization provisions of the Commission’s proposal. Therefore, instead of
supporting the proposal, they criticized it (EFET 2007).
Thus, the traditional electricity industry organized under the umbrella of the
Eurlectric, EFET and RECS could not consolidate enough to present a unified position.
Nor did they behave strategically to establish the necessary alliances with outside
actors, as the better consolidated RES industry did with the MEPs and the member
states.
6.6 Rule Density
The choice of a legal basis for a particular directive can significantly affect the
decision‐making outcome, and therefore, can be a subject of discussion. This is
particularly true for policy areas for which the EU Treaty lacks explicit legal basis and for
which the legislation is usually adopted based on the provisions in related policy fields.
When there are pre‐existing EU rules (secondary legislation) regulating a given policy
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area, the subsequent rules in the same policy area can be affected by them, including
the choice of a legal basis for future legislation. According to Pierson’s (1996) path‐
dependency logic, later policy decisions will be conditioned by earlier ones. Pre‐existing
domain‐specific rules can affect competence distribution and steering method of
subsequent rules in that domain, as well as shape actor’s interest perception (Pierson
1996; Fligstein 2008). Previous rules may serve as model for subsequent ones and
determine their emergence and character of the outcome through policy feedback.
In this section I will discuss the choice of the legal basis and its implications for
the RES directive, as well as pre‐existing rules in the domain of renewable energy.
6.6.1 Legal Basis
The European Commission proposed the draft directive on the basis of Article
175 (1) of the Treaty that gives the Community power to act to preserve, protect and
improve quality of environment, protect human health and make prudent and rational
use of natural resource, in combination with Article 95, which deals with the internal
market. In general, a single legal base was preferred, but the Commission claimed the
use of a dual base to be appropriate as the directive contained provisions based on
different parts of the Treaty. Most of the parts of the proposed directive fell under the
Article 175 (1) (environment). Only those articles (15, 16, and 17) of the proposal that
imposed binding obligations on member states regarding the sustainability of biofuels
were proposed under Article 95 (internal market). One could easily argue that the
sustainability criteria themselves obviously pursue an aim of environmental protection
and should have been proposed under the environmental legal basis. However, the
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European Commission preferred to suggest using the internal market basis for the part
of the proposed directive that dealt with biofuels criteria. The Commission justified its
choice of legal basis by arguing that because the proposed provisions of the directive
aimed for a complete harmonization of biofuels criteria to prevent member states from
adopting measures which would obstruct trade in biofuels or raw materials, the internal
market was an appropriate legal basis. The Commission considered that the provisions
of harmonized standards for biofuels sustainability fell under Article 95 (European
Commission 2008). Both legal bases required the use of co‐decision procedures and the
support of a qualified majority of member states in the Council. It should be noted, that
the previous 2001 RES‐E directive was likewise adopted on the basis of Article 175(1) of
the Treaty.
However, Sarkozy, in his competency as the then President of the Council,
insisted that the whole energy‐climate package, including the RES directive, had to be
adopted based on the unanimity rule (Guéguen and Iosif 2008). Arguably, some aspects
of the Package, such as the establishment of binding renewable energy targets, had a
direct impact on the energy mix in the member states and could be based on article
175(2), which would require unanimous agreement in the Council and only consultation
with the European Parliament. The UK also supported the adoption of the directive
based on Article 175(2), which provided the EU with the option to adopt measures
significantly affecting a Member State's choice between different energy sources and
the general structure of its energy supply (Interview with the European Commission
official 2012). In response, the European Commission argued that the proposed
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directive would not significantly affect member states' choice between different energy
sources or the general structure of their energy supply, and therefore not fall under
Article 175 (2), because renewable energy is a close substitute for conventional energy
supplied through the same infrastructure and logistics system and all member states
had already used renewable energy and decided to increase RES share (European
Commission 2008).
Eventually, Sarkozy decided to adopt the directive based on unanimous political
agreement of member states, while formally the whole package would still be adopted
on the basis of Article 175(1) requiring QMV. From the legal point of view, this was
controversial, but from the political point of view, this was a strategic choice. This
deprived reluctant member states of the possibility to complain that they were forced
into implementing the directive adopted according to an improper legal basis. On the
other hand, unanimous agreement, though informal, would prevent inclusion of
unsolicited provisions in the directive.
In any event, formally basing the directive on article 175(1), which required
QMV, and co‐decision from the European Parliament had important implications for the
outcome. Using this article as a legal basis provided more of a role and discretion for
actors other than the Council (e.g. EP). Full involvement of the European Parliament,
which supported ambitious targets and defended national FIT schemes, put an
important stamp in making of the directive.
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6.6.2 Pre‐existing Domain Specific Rules
There is no doubt that without the previous RES‐E directive there would not
have been the RES 2009 directive. The earlier RES‐E directive determined the central
elements of the subsequent policy debate: targets beyond 2010, a Community
framework for the support of RES and additional legislative measures for RES‐H/C. In
that regard, the RES‐E directive can be seen as policy‐internal path dependency. The
RES‐E directive imposed an obligation on member states to introduce a support scheme
for electricity from renewable sources. This gave rise to the creation of a new RES
industry with high stakes and a strong presence in Brussels, whose consolidated activism
was crucial in the achievement of the compromise at the European level during the
negotiations over the RES directive of 2009. In addition, the initial steering method
adopted by frontrunner member states (Germany, Spain, Denmark) proved successful
and effective. This partly determined the success of pan‐European trading opponents to
block a shift towards harmonized market‐based instrument. In addition, RES‐E indicative
targets did not prove to be enough incentive for the RES development. This contributed
to the understanding that for RES growth legally binding targets were necessary. So,
ineffectiveness of indicative targets in 2001 directive helped the adoption of mandatory
targets in 2009 directive, and correspondingly had a positive effect in terms of creating
binding rules at the EU level (vertical integration). The 2001 RES‐E directive, particularly
Article 4, called for an assessment of national RES support schemes after a four year
period and provided the European Commission with the possibility of introducing a
proposal for a Community framework with regard to support schemes. In other words,
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the RES‐E directive set the path for future direction of Community’s action and
embedded the issue of RES support schemes. Thus, the EU’s renewable policy
development shows that even when there is no explicit legal basis for the given policy
area, the existence of domain‐specific rules can affect future decision outcomes through
policy feedback.
6.7 External Contingencies/Shocks
As discussed earlier, external contingencies can punctuate the equilibrium in the
EU system and have important implications on the policymaking outcomes. External
events can become critical junctures and exacerbate long‐term structural conditions,
such as EU’s energy dependence, or EU’s relative position in global competition.
External shocks can create convenient opportunities for supranational entrepreneurs to
use the international backdrop to promote their own ideas and interests. They can also
contribute to a change in the positions of national government, by shifting national
preferences on a given issue and provide window of opportunity for EU actors to exploit
them strategically for advancing collective interests. In this section, I will discuss
whether and how external contingencies have affected the RES directive policymaking
process and outcome.
Contextual factors played a crucial role in the initiation and adoption of the 2009
RES directive. Barroso’s priority on energy and climate was largely determined by
external contingencies. Upcoming international climate talks to be held in Copenhagen
in 2009 and the Russian‐Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 were two external contingencies
that created a political momentum to initiate the discussions on the new RES directive,
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put the issue on the agenda and prevented major opposition against the European
Commission’s proposal.
When the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the negotiations over the post‐
Kyoto agreement were due to start. The agreement on post‐Kyoto emissions reduction
targets was expected during the CoP meeting in Copenhagen in 2009 (Jӓnicke 2011). The
Stern review initiated by the British government in 2006 and the fourth assessment
report of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published in 2007 ‐ both of
which offered pessimistic assessments of the severity of the damage caused by climate
change, unveiled the urgency of taking action against global warming. While the Stern
report accentuated the economic argument to take measures against global climate
change, the fourth IPCC assessment report underlined the urgency to act by publishing
the most recent scientific evidence (Stern 2006; IPCC 2007: 5).
Once the failure of the Lisbon agenda became apparent, the European
Commission, and especially president Barroso, was looking for an issue of high salience
to regain the trust of the European institutions. Climate change provided the chance to
link a popular issue with a reframed Lisbon Agenda (Interview with the European
Commission official 2012; Interview with the expert, Brussels‐based NGO 2011). The
European Commission had argued that ambitious RES policy at the EU level would make
it possible for the EU to act as a global climate leader. The European Commission
exploited the external factor of upcoming international negotiations to initiate
discussion on the new RES directive and push the issue on the EU agenda. The European
Commission’s RES Road Map made a strong reference to climate change and EU’s
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leadership ambition on global level (European Commission 2006b). It is also noteworthy
that the RES directive was just one component of the energy and climate package.
Another important component was a new directive on the EU ETS, which was directly
linked to the Kyoto’s burden‐sharing mechanism. The salience of climate change in light
of the Stern review and upcoming Copenhagen talks provided a strategic opportunity
for the European Commission to ‘venue shop.’ As Princen (2007: 12) argues, “a key
feature of the focus on venues is that it enables one to look for moments of ‘issue
internationalization’, i.e. where national collective action problems can become
international [Community] ones.” The timing of the Commission’s proposal was apt due
to the concurrent rise of attention to the issue of climate change in key member states.
Leaders of all three key member states – Germany, the UK and France – were giving
signals that climate change was a priority (Eberlein 2012). The European Commission
had good reason to expect that framing the need for binding renewable energy targets
as a problem of climate change would ensure a favorable reception and would not be in
the interest of any European leader to go against any proposal to address climate
change. The European Commission rightly hoped that the German presidency would be
a reliable ally to facilitate the political agreement on the binding RES target at the EU
level. Indeed, the adoption of the 20‐20‐20 targets at the EU spring summit of 2007
proved that the European Commission’s strategy was right.
Russian‐Ukrainian gas dispute of 2006 was another external contingency, a
focusing event, which brought attention to the EU’s energy vulnerability owing to its
heavy reliance on Russian natural gas. Focusing events can change perception of a
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problem among policy‐makers. The EU’s energy dependency on outside suppliers is a
long‐standing external contingency. Growing dependency rate represents a change in
EU’s international standing in global energy market. However, it is often due to
proximate causes, focusing events that exacerbate this long‐standing structural
condition. Indeed, since 2000, the EU saw rising energy dependency with the inclusion
of new member states, higher import rates of natural gas and dwindling fossil fuel
resources in the North Sea. EU‐27 dependency on imported energy reached 53.9
percent in 2009. This marked an increase of 9 percent points from 1999 (see Figure 6.1).
Increasing demand from China and other developing economics on fossil fuels led to
price hikes that in turn increased costs of natural gas imports, whose price was linked to
the price of oil. But the major issue was not the price of natural gas but the reliability of
its main exporter to the EU. New worries over the security of gas supplies came with the
growing influence of Russia in European energy supplies after state‐controlled Gazprom
acquired several European wholesale companies (Wettestad 2011). The European
Commission’s 2006 Green Paper forecasted that the EU’s energy import dependency
would rise from 50percent in 2005 to 70 percent over the next two decades under the
business as usual scenario (European Commission 2006a). But it was the Russian cut‐off
of the gas supplies to Europe as a result of gas dispute with Ukraine that heightened the
security of supply and energy dependency concerns and revealed the need for
diversification of energy sources. It was a wake‐up call for the policy makers in the EU
(Interview with the European Commission official 2012). In Kingdon’s terms, the crisis
opened the problem stream (Kingdon 2002). The window of opportunity was there and
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it was up to the policy entrepreneurs to seize the opportunity. The European
Commission promoted energy security as an added value of RES in addition to its
contribution to hitting Europe’s over‐arching 20 percent emission reduction goal. In the
RES Road Map, which was the part of the Strategic European Energy Review, the
Commission underlined the role of RES in increasing the share of domestically produced
energy, diversifying the fuel mix, diversifying the sources of energy imports and
increasing the proportion of energy obtained from politically stable regions. The
Commission estimated that if the EU achieved 20 percent deployment of renewables,
the annual reduction in fossil fuel demand could reach 252 Mtoe from 2020 onwards
(European Commission 2006b: 3).
Referring to the security of supply concern in the aftermath of the Russian gas
cutoff in January 2006 seemed to be an appealing way to frame the issue (Natorski and
Surralles 2008). It reinforced the view that the more ambitious overall binding targets
for indigenous renewable energy at the EU level would reduce import dependencies as
well as the view that the most effective way of achieving short‐term results would be to
continue with the differentiated support systems as a model for policy learning across
member states (Wettestad 2012). As the security of supply concerns had been on the
rise and occupied the minds of EU policy‐makers, the preoccupation with the internal
market took a back seat. This shift weakened the position of those supporting the
European Commission’s original proposal for tradable certificates. As the overarching EU
agenda moved away from internal market efficiency to issues of security,
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competitiveness and innovation, it played further into the hands of those advocating
against harmonization (Toke 2008).
A few words are due on the impact of the global financial crisis. One could easily
expect that the financial crisis might have negatively affected the adoption of the
climate and energy package. The crisis definitely played out on the part of those
member states that would prefer to give up on a climate and energy package. However,
key member states had already given their political backing to the climate and energy
package and reiterated their commitment during the European Council in the fall of
2008 (European Council 2008). Strong advocates of the package in the European
Commission as well as member states argued that financial crisis revealed the need to
reach agreement on the climate and energy package as soon as possible (Interview with
the European Commission official 2012). Overall, the financial crisis cannot be
considered to have a significant impact, either positive or negative on the outcome of
the RES directive.
Thus, two external contingencies – upcoming international climate negotiations
in Copenhagen and the Russian‐Ukrainian gas crisis – opened up a policy window that
the supranational entrepreneur (the European Commission) exploited skillfully in the
RES directive policymaking. The Russian cut‐off of gas supply was a focusing event that
had an important impact on the perceptions of policymakers in member states with
regard to security of supply and the vulnerability of energy dependence on external
suppliers. This provided an opportunity for the European Commission to present the
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ambitious RES targets as a solution formula for addressing not only climate challenge
but also security of supply concerns.
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Figure 6.1 Energy Dependency EU‐27 (%)
Source: EUROSTAT: Energy, Transport and Environmental Indicators 2011
6.8 Integration Outcome
6.8.1 Degree of Institutionalization (Vertical Integration)
In December 2008, the European Commission and the Council and the European
Parliament reached political agreement on a new RES directive, which constituted a part
of the climate and energy package, within less than a year after the European
Commission tabled the draft proposal. The 2009 RES Directive was officially published in
April 2009. The Directive 2009/28/EC established a common framework for the
promotion of energy from renewable sources. Most importantly, it set mandatory
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national targets for the overall share of energy from renewable sources in gross final
consumption of energy and for the share of energy from renewable sources in
transport. The directive laid down rules for three flexible mechanisms aimed at
facilitating the achievement of national targets (statistical transfers, joint projects and
joint support schemes between member states), as well as for administrative
procedures and access to the electricity grid for energy from renewable sources. The
directive also established sustainability criteria for biofuels and bioliquids (Directive
2009/28/EC).
The first important point that needs to be mentioned when evaluating the
outcome is that the directive brought more issues under the EU’s legislative remit,
targeting different sectors, including electricity, heating/cooling, and bio‐fuels for
transport, and thus expanding the scope of the directive. For instance, the directive
obliged member states to ensure that by 31 December 2014 their building regulations
required the use of minimum levels of energy from renewable sources in new buildings
and in existing buildings that were subject to major renovation. This requirement could
also be fulfilled through district heating and cooling produced using a significant
proportion of renewable energy sources (Directive 2009/28/EC).
In terms of the extent of institutionalization (vertical integration), which in this
dissertation refers to the creation of binding rules and organizations at the EU level and
delegation of new institutional powers (competencies) to the Community, the directive
can be considered as a successful integration outcome.
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A key achievement of the new EU RES directive was the introduction of both
binding and more ambitious RES targets. It introduced mandatory overall 20 percent EU
RES target in gross final consumption, not just electricity, broken down into legally
binding national RES targets for 2020 (Article 3). In addition, the directive obliged each
member state to ensure that the share of energy from RES in all forms of transport in
2020 is at least 10 percent of the final consumption of energy in transport in that
member state (Article 3). The directive also strengthened the obligation of member
states to ensure that the operators of the electricity grid provide either guaranteed or
priority access to the electricity grid for RES. The directive also requested member states
“to take the appropriate steps to develop transmission and distribution grid
infrastructure, intelligent networks, storage facilities and electricity system, in order to
allow the secure operation of the electricity system as it accommodates the further
development of electricity production from renewable energy sources (Article 16). The
directive imposed binding obligations on member states regarding the sustainability of
biofuels and other bioliquids (Article 17, Article 18).
In addition to legally binding targets, the directive imposed extensive reporting
obligations on member states and provided supranational institutions (the European
Commission) with substantial mechanisms to monitor, control and redirect the national
policies. The directive required member states to develop National Renewable Energy
Action Plans in which they were asked to present an indicative trajectory tracing path
towards the achievement of their final mandatory targets (Preamble 18, Article 4). On
the other hand, it tasked the Commission to issue a highly detailed template for national
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action plans that member states are required to follow. Article 4 of the directive obliged
member states to adopt national renewable energy action plans by 30 June 2010. Apart
from extensively defining how they planned to implement each element of Directive
2009/28/EC, member states were also required to include estimated sectoral targets for
the share of renewable energy in the transport, electricity and heating and cooling
sectors in 2020. Furthermore, the directive required member states to send to the
Commission a forecast document indicating the estimated excess production or deficit
of energy from renewable sources in comparison to the targets set for each member
state. If a country did not expect to meet its target, the directive obliged member state
to inform the Commission about the expected level of the deficit. Article 22 obliged
member states to submit a report to the Commission every two years on the progress in
the promotion and use of energy from renewable sources.
Article 23 of the directive provided the European Commission with extensive
monitoring power. The Commission shall monitor the origin of biofuels and bioliquids
consumed in the Community and the impact of their production. The Commission was
tasked to evaluate the implementation of the directive by member states, in particular
with regard to cooperation mechanisms, in order to ensure that those mechanisms
enable member states to achieve the binding national targets. The Commission is also
tasked to present a Renewable Energy Roadmap for the post‐2020 period, and if
appropriate present a proposal to the EP and the Council for the period after 2020. This
provision is particularly important in terms of policy continuity as it creates grounds for
the subsequent round of policymaking on renewable sources of energy.
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6.8.2 Harmonization level (horizontal integration)
With regard to the second dimension of integration outcome – harmonization –
the directive achieved little progress (see also Wettestad et al. 2012). The mandatory
introduction of a trading system based on GO certificates, as initially proposed by the
European Commission, was dropped. Instead, the directive established three types of
voluntary “flexibility mechanisms” designed for facilitating cross‐border support of RES
without affecting national support schemes (Preamble). First, statistical transfer
mechanisms allow member states to arrange for statistical transfer to other member
states, so that renewable energy produced in one country can be counted towards the
target of another (Article 6). Second, the member states can collaborate in the planning
process of the joint projects and count a certain portion of RES from other member
states towards their target – the so‐called joint project mechanism (Article 7). Finally,
under the joint support scheme member states can voluntarily decide to join or partly
coordinate their national support schemes and count a certain amount of energy
produced from RES produced in the territory of one member state towards the national
overall target of another member state (Article 11). These three mechanisms may
facilitate various kinds of cross‐border collaboration. However, it is up to the member
states to decide how they employ these mechanisms and whether this will underpin the
development of a pan‐European green certificate scheme or more technology‐oriented
steering methods (Boasson and Wettestad 2013). So, in terms of the means or
instruments for achieving RES binding targets, the directive again failed to create
harmonized RES support scheme.
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Finally, with respect to the harmonization level introduced by the directive it
should be noted that the directive prevents member states from adopting certain
measures which would obstruct trade in biofuels or raw materials. In this regard, the
directive aims for a harmonization of biofuels sustainability criteria in order to ensure
that no criteria adopted individually by member states may constitute an obstacle to
trade between member states.
Overall, the integration outcome of the 2009 RES directive can be classified as a
success in terms of institutionalization, since it introduced legally binding targets,
imposed extensive reporting obligations on member states and provided supranational
institutions (the European Commission) with extensive possibilities to control national
RES policies. In terms of harmonization, however, the directive did not succeed, leaving
member states free to decide which financing scheme to develop for renewable energy.
One of the Commission officials succinctly summarized the success achieved by the
directive: “The 2009 RES directive is a big step forward. Legally binding targets decided
at the EU level now have a direct impact on national energy mixes of member states. So,
in terms of promoting renewables the directive was a real success; in terms of
harmonized RES policy and fully functioning internal market it was not. Nevertheless, it
is a seed in soil on how cooperation and flexibility could function in the future”
(Interview with the Commission official 2012).
6.9 Chapter Summary
Insufficient progress in RES development several years after the 2001 RES‐E
directive was adopted helped the European Commission to push for more ambitious
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and binding targets. The RES‐E directive and its reporting requirements had already put
post‐2010 targets on the agenda. This policy feedback of the existing domain‐specific
rules (RES‐E directive) set the stage for the discussions on the new RES directive that
was supposed to deal with the flaws of the previous policy outcome. The ineffectiveness
of indicative targets in the 2001 directive helped the adoption of mandatory targets in
2009 directive, and correspondingly had a positive effect in terms of creating binding
rules at the EU level (vertical integration). A policy window was opening up due to two
external contingencies – upcoming international climate negotiations in Copenhagen
and Russian‐Ukrainian gas crisis. Upcoming international climate talks was an important
variable since the leaders of key member states (Germany, the UK and France), striving
for the EU’s leadership role in upcoming international climate negotiations to be held in
2009, gave their backing to an ambitious climate policy objective at the EU level. Russian
cut‐off of the gas supply in January 2006 was another external contingency, a focusing
event that influenced the perceptions of policymakers in member states on their
vulnerability due to rising energy dependence on external suppliers. This provided an
opportunity for the European Commission to present the ambitious RES targets as a
solution formula for addressing not only climate challenge but also security of supply
concerns. Both climate change and security of supply frames employed by the
Commission to advance ambitious and binding RES targets were politically appealing
and contributed to the Commission’s successful supranational entrepreneurship in the
policy initiation phase during which target‐setting dominated the agenda. The binding
overall 20percent RES target, instead of separate sectoral targets, was the European
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Commission’s strategic choice to give member states sufficient flexibility to allocate
their national resources.
In addition to skillfully exploiting the policy window opened up by external
contingencies and framing the RES issue in politically appealing manner, the European
Commission used its strategic alliance with the incoming German Presidency to facilitate
the unanimous adoption of the binding targets at the European Council. The political
agreement on the binding 20 percent target achieved during the European Council
summit in the spring of 2007 provided a very strong mandate for the European
Commission to go ahead with the formulation of the draft directive with two central
issues: mandatory national targets for each member state and the RES support schemes
based on green certificate trading.
The European Commission’s policy entrepreneurship proved successful with
respect to binding national targets. Due to the Commission’s stakeholder mobilization
efforts, the member states were familiar with the national targets before their
publication, and most of them were ready to accept overall mandatory national targets
without further discussion. The decision of the French presidency not to open up the
issue of national targets for further discussion prevented major debates on national
targets in the Council. Positions of three key member states, Germany, the UK and
France eventually converged in favor of the Commission’s proposal on mandatory
national targets. The reluctant Polish government was also bought into the agreement
at the expense of concessions on other elements of the climate and energy package.
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While the European Commission policy entrepreneurship proved successful on
the issue of national targets, its ambitious objective to introduce harmonized pan‐
European support scheme on the basis of GO trading largely failed. The European
Commission had to dilute its original proposal due to the strong opposition from
member states seeking to defend their national support schemes (Germany and Spain).
Lack of a unified position within the European Commission itself also hindered the
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship on the issue of support schemes. The time
pressure to get the proposal adopted before the new EP elections in 2009, also played
into the decision of the European Commission to accommodate the interests of FIT
supporters. The European Commission acknowledged that the trading instrument would
have difficulties to be accepted not only in the Council but also in the European
Parliament, which was aligned with well‐consolidated interest groups in renewable
energy in defending existing national support schemes. Arguments of the pro‐FIT
coalition based on ‘Subsidiarity’ and ‘non‐trading flexibility’ soon appeared to win over
the arguments of the European Commission supported by the conventional electricity
industry and the UK. However, the conventional electricity industry mobilized under the
umbrella of Eurelectric, and energy traders organized in EFET could not consolidate
enough to present unified position. Nor did they behave strategically to establish
necessary alliances with the outside actors, as the better consolidated RES industry did
with the MEPs and the pro‐FIT member states. So, the European Commission’s policy
entrepreneurship on the GO trading and flexibility mechanism did not succeed. The
radical shift in the UK’s position marked a final blow to the European Commission’s
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proposal. Once the position of the British government converged with the German and
Polish positions against the pan‐European trading, the Commission lost its main ally in
the Council. For France, as for the Council Presidency, the major goal was to reach
agreement on the directive before the end of its Presidency term. It stayed neutral, but
facilitated the agreement on the alternative proposal. As a result, the European
Commission was forced to give up the pan‐European framework for RES trading. The
European Commission’s key interest was a successful outcome of the negotiations on
the entire climate and energy package. Therefore, the Commission made a strategic
choice not to insist on GO trading and focus on the major objective: binding national RES
targets. Although a binding overall RES target had already been politically agreed at the
Spring Council 2007, it would have been very unlikely that the RES directive proposal,
which was to translate 20percent overall target into mandatory national overall targets,
would have been accepted by a majority of member states if the GO trading mechanism
had been maintained.
In its endeavors the European Commission has been supported by one group of
transnational interests: the conventional electricity industry (utilities) under the
umbrella of Eurelectric and energy traders organized under EFET. However, they could
not win over the better consolidated renewable industry and green groups. First, the
RES industry had stronger incentives against the proposed pan‐European trading.
Second, they built stronger outside alliances with the MEPs and the key member states.
Third, unlike the traditional electricity industry, they had a much clearer and unified
position. While the consolidated RES industry under the umbrella organizations, such as
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EREC and EWEA, created momentum for a European policy framework and served as
important allies for the European Commission in pushing binding targets, the same
transnational interests played out against harmonized instruments.
Overall, the European Commission’s supranational entrepreneurship facilitated
by external contingencies and existing domain‐specific rules (2001 RES‐E directive)
proved successful when the positions of key member states converged in favor of the
Commission’s proposal and when the European Commission was supported by the well‐
consolidated transnational interests (RES industry). As a result, the 2009 RES directive
with the binding RES targets was a successful outcome in terms of institutionalization.
On the other hand, the European Commission’s supranational entrepreneurship did not
prove successful when the positions of key member states converged against its
proposal on GO‐ based trading and when the well‐consolidated transnational interests
(RES industry) played out not in favor of the Commission’s preferred instrument. As a
result, the directive did not succeed in terms of harmonization, leaving it up to the
member states to decide on the support scheme for RES development.
6.10 Comparative Analysis
Whilst the empirical knowledge generated in the two case studies is an
important contribution to the literature on European energy policy in general, and the
European renewable energy policy, in particular, this section goes one step further to
bring together the main results from these two case studies and draw comparative
conclusions by assessing the five causal conditions identified in my theoretical
framework. The comparative analysis is structured along the causal conditions:
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supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of key member state preferences,
transnational interest consolidation, rule density and external contingencies. This
section aims to find the conjunction of causal conditions that leads to successful
integration outcome by comparing two contrasting cases: the RES‐E 2001 directive,
which did not result in successful integration outcome, and RES 2009 directive, which
did result in successful integration outcome, at least in terms of institutionalization
(vertical integration).
Supranational Entrepreneurship
In the 2001 RES‐E case, policy entrepreneurship by the European Commission
was successful in raising the issue of RES on the EU agenda and paving the way for the
important piece of legislation aimed at development of RES. However, facing resistance
from member states, the Commission’s entrepreneurship efforts to make the target of
12 percent share of energy from RES in the gross EU consumption, later translated into
22.1 percent share of renewable energy in total Community electricity consumption by
2010 binding failed. The European Commission’s half‐hearted attempt to introduce
binding minimum national targets did not succeed either. Furthermore, the European
Commission backed off on its initial idea to introduce harmonized EU‐wide support
scheme based on market instruments. The European Commission’s framing strategy
relying on the ‘internal market’ frame to justify the introduction of a harmonized
scheme based on tradable green certificates was been surpassed by the ‘subsidiarity’
argument of feed‐in tariff advocates arguing for member states’ right to choose freely
their national support instruments. As a result, the draft directive was a watered down
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version, compromised to fit the preferences of key member states in order not to
endanger the fate of the whole directive. In addition, the European Commission did not
succeed in its attempt to base the directive on the far‐reaching internal market article
(Article 95) that would give more discretion and leeway to the European Commission to
introduce prospective harmonized Community‐wide RES support scheme. The
Commission did not succeed in mobilizing the support of the Council either for binding
targets or a harmonized support scheme. Despite successfully raising the issue of
renewable energy on the EU agenda, the European Commission’s supranational
entrepreneurship in policy formulation and negotiation phases largely failed.
In the case of 2009 RES directive, the European Commission skillfully exploited
the policy window opened up by external contingencies and framed the RES issue in a
politically appealing manner to mobilize stakeholders’ support.

The European

Commission used its strategic alliance with the incoming German Presidency to facilitate
the anonymous adoption of the binding targets at the European Council in the policy
initiation phase. The European Commission also showed strong supranational
entrepreneurship in the formulation phase with respect to binding national targets. Due
to the Commission’s stakeholder mobilization efforts, most of the member states were
persuaded to accept overall mandatory national targets without further discussion. In
contrast to the 2001 RES‐E case, the European Commission’s policy entrepreneurship
this time proved successful in introducing ambitious and binding overall 20percent RES
target in the EU’s gross energy consumption, as well as in setting mandatory national
targets for individual member states.
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However, similar to the 2001 RES‐E case, the European Commission’s policy
entrepreneurship effort aimed at introducing a harmonized pan‐European support
scheme on the basis of GO trading did not succeed. First, in the formulation phase, the
European Commission was forced to dilute its original proposal due to the strong
opposition from member states seeking to defend their national support schemes
(Germany and Spain). And later, in the middle of negotiations, after losing the support
of the major ally in the Council – the British government – the European Commission
had to accept the alternative proposal put forward by the group of member states that
opposed the Commission’s preferred instrument. To sum up, the supranational
entrepreneurship by the European Commission was much stronger in the policymaking
process of the 2009 RES directive than in the case 2001 RES‐E directive.
Convergence of Preferences
On the Commission’s proposal for the 2001 RES‐E directive the positions of the
three key member states – Germany, France and later the UK ‐ were closely aligned by
the time the draft directive was to be adopted by the Council. Germany’s argument that
national solutions would better serve national industrial interests won over
liberalization and internal market based arguments initially supported by the UK. As a
result, the Council reached the common position that no harmonization was necessary
at that stage given the limited experience with national support schemes. The positions
of three key member states converged at a point where they would not favor binding
targets (vertical integration) or a common harmonized support scheme for RES
(horizontal integration).
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By the time the European Commission proposed binding targets in its proposal
for the 2009 RES directive, preferences of the key member states underwent a major
change: Germany was strongly in favor of the overall binding 20 percent RES target as
well as mandatory national targets; France was supportive of binding targets largely due
to its objective to adopt the directive before the end of its Council Presidency term; the
UK became supportive, albeit at the later point; the position of the recently joined
Poland diverged from these three member states. The Polish government was against
the binding targets but finally gave its reluctant support with the hope to gain
concessions on the other parts of the climate and energy package. So, at the end, the
positions of key member states converged in favor of the Commission’s proposal on the
issue of RES binding targets. This was a very different case from the 2001 RES‐E
directive, in which the convergence of key member states’ positions against the binding
targets hindered the success in vertical integration.
With respect to policy instruments, the UK was initially strongly in favor of the
Commission’s proposal, while Germany and Poland strongly opposed the introduction of
pan‐European trading based on GO certificate trading. However, in the middle of
negotiations, the UK’s position changed dramatically. It converged with the German and
Polish positions. So, at the end of negotiation phase, all key member states (including
France, which tried to remain neutral because of its term as a Council Presidency)
aligned against the Commission proposal on harmonized support scheme. Thus, in both
cases – 2001 RES‐E and 2009 RES directives – preferences of the key member states
converged, yet not in favor of policy harmonization.
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Transnational Interest Consolidation
Two transnational interest groups became activated on the European level to
influence the content of the 2001 RES‐E directive. The traditional electricity industry
mobilized under the umbrella of Eurelectric. The RES industry was represented by the
EREC. National niche organizations relating to wind power, biomass, etc. that were
already organized in Brussels‐based associations, such as EWEA, also joined the group.
The RES industry was better consolidated than the traditional electricity industry
supporting the European Commission’s proposal on harmonized RES support scheme,
yet not enough to have a strong stamp on the directive. Overall, both groups have been
active, but none of them could develop well‐articulated interests and positions.
Similar to the 2001 RES‐E directive policymaking process, the same transnational
interest groups were mobilized at the EU level trying to take part in shaping the new
2009 RES directive by exerting influence on the EU policy makers. These two groups
again were utilities (conventional energy sector) represented by the umbrella
organization at the EU level – EURELECTRIC, and renewable energy industries
represented by EREC, EREF and European associations of national renewable industries
(e.g. EWEA). However, in contrast to the previous time, the RES industry developed a
strongly consolidated position in favor of RES binding targets and against the pan‐
European trading suggested by the European Commission. The traditional electricity
industry organized under the umbrella of the Eurelectric, EFET and RECS could not
consolidate enough to present unified position: instead of explicitly demanding a
harmonized market for RES, they argued for giving a choice between FIT and GO trading.
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Thus, in the 2009 RES case, the RES industry managed to present itself as an active and
consolidated transnational interest group.
Rule Density
Since the EU lacked a formal legal basis for energy policy before the adoption of
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, both directives had to be based on Treaty provisions dealing
either with the environment or the internal market domain. The European
Commission’s decision to adopt the 2001 RES‐E directive on the basis of far‐reaching
Article 95 (internal market) was rejected by the Council. Eventually, the directive was
adopted under the environmental legal basis (Article 175(1)), which required qualified
majority voting in the Council and co‐decision with the EP. The European Commission
avoided the other option of adopting the directive on the basis of Article 175(2) that
would require unanimity in the Council and only consultation with the EP. Thus,
choosing article 175(1) as the legal basis for the adoption of the directive (as opposed to
175(2c) significantly strengthened the role of the supranational actors in the process of
negotiations over the directive. Under the QMV, the directive could have been adopted
even if some member states did not give their consent. Therefore, the choice of legal
basis certainly had an impact on the decision outcome.
The 2009 RES directive was adopted under the double legal basis. The same
environmental legal basis (Article 175 (1) was used for the RES targets and support
scheme. However, provisions of the 2009 RES directive that imposed binding obligations
on member states regarding the sustainability of biofuels were based on Article 95 of
the Treaty (internal market). Using Article 175(1) as the legal basis provided for the full

254

involvement of the European Parliament and enabled the EP to put its stamp on the
decision outcome.
In terms of the pre‐existing domain‐specific rules in the area of renewable
energy sources, there was no existing legislation at the EU level in the renewable energy
domain when the RES 2001 Directive was adopted. Therefore, the impact of pre‐existing
domain specific rules was none. The 2001 RES‐E directive, however, had a significant
impact on the subsequent policymaking process through the policy feedback
mechanism. The 2001 RES‐E directive provided the European Commission with the
prerogative of developing a new legislation in several years based on the assessment of
the RES‐E directive achievements. Thus, the RES‐E directive set the path for future
direction of Community’s action and had a direct effect on the RES 2009 directive
outcome.
External Contingencies/Shocks
Although the EU’s energy dependence on outside sources of energy supply and
environmental issues, such as climate change, were becoming more important in 1990s,
no external shocks or a focusing events that could affect vulnerability of member states,
exacerbate the perceptions of the EU’s energy dependence and necessitate the
adoption of binding RES targets (vertical integration), or harmonized RES support
schemes (horizontal integration) were present to have a significant impact on the 2001
RES‐E directive outcome.
On the other hand, external contingencies played a crucial role in the initiation
and adoption of the 2009 RES directive. Upcoming international climate talks to be held
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in Copenhagen in 2009 and Russian‐Ukrainian gas crisis in 2006 were the two external
contingencies that created a political momentum for the new RES directive. They
opened up a policy window that the supranational entrepreneur (the European
Commission) exploited to present the ambitious RES targets as a solution formula for
addressing not only climate challenge but also security of supply concerns. Thus,
external contingencies had a significant impact on the RES 2009 directive.

Integration outcome
In terms of the degree of institutionalization (vertical integration), which in this
dissertation refers to the creation of binding rules at the EU level and delegation of new
institutional powers (competencies) to the Community, the 2001 RES‐E directive cannot
be considered as a successful integration outcome. The directive set an overall EU‐level
target of 22 percent electricity from renewables in the energy mix by 2010, but only
made this target indicative, not binding. The national targets for member states were
also made not mandatory. In addition, priority access for RES‐E to the grid was optional,
not mandatory requirement for member states.
Whereas the 2001 RES‐E directive only dealt with electricity sector, the RES 2009
directive brought more issues under the EU’s legislative realm. It expanded the sectoral
scope targeting by including electricity, heating/cooling, and bio‐fuels for transport. The
directive introduced both binding and more ambitious RES targets. It introduced
mandatory overall 20 percent EU RES target in gross final consumption, not just
electricity, broken down into legally binding national RES targets for 2020, and
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mandatory RES target of 10 percent in transport sector. The directive also strengthened
the obligation of member states to ensure that the operators of the electricity grid
provide either guaranteed or priority access to the electricity grid for RES. The directive
imposed binding obligations on member states regarding the sustainability of biofuels
and other bioliquids. In addition to legally binding targets, the directive imposed
extensive reporting obligations on member states and provided the European
Commission with extensive monitoring power. Thus, the integration outcome of the
2009 RES directive can be classified as a success in terms of institutionalization (vertical
integration).
With regard to the second dimension of integration outcome – harmonization
level (horizontal integration) – both directives failed to create a harmonized RES support
scheme. However, the 2009 RES directive achieved some progress in harmonization of
biofuels sustainability criteria.
Table 6.1 Mapping of Causal Conditions and Causal Outcome
Supranational
Entrepreneurship

Convergence of
preferences on proposal
Objectives

Means

(binding
targets)

(harmonized
support
scheme)

Transnational
interest
consolidation

Rule
Density

Outcome

External
Shocks

vertical

horizontal

2001
RES‐E

medium

Not in
favor

Not in favor

low

low

low

low

low

RES
2009

high

In favor

Not in favor

high

medium

high

high

low

257

Looking at Table 6.1, we see how the results of the comparative analysis of these
two cases, in parallel to the fuzzy set analysis presented in Chapter 4 can shed some
light on the conjunction of causal conditions that leads to successful integration
outcome. In other words, the results help us to capture causal “recipes” – a specific
combination of causally relevant ingredients linked to an outcome (Ragin 2008: 9).
First of all, the examination of the causal conditions and the causal outcome
through process‐tracing technique based on multiple data sources reveals a very close
match with respect to the classification of the causal outcome in the fuzzy set analysis of
survey‐based data. The last two columns of Table 6.1 show how successful the outcome
was in terms of vertical and horizontal integration in each case. The results correspond
to the fuzzy scores of set membership for integration outcome along both dimensions in
both cases: the 2009 renewable directive resulted in enhanced vertical integration,
while achieving little progress on harmonization. The RES‐E 2001 case did not succeed in
attaining either vertical or horizontal integration. The same is true for the classification
of all five causal conditions. The results obtained from case studies, with respect to the
degree of presence or absence of the causal conditions, are congruent with the fuzzy
scores for the set membership of the causal conditions in both cases. The next step is to
evaluate the causal recipes obtained from the case studies and see if our findings from
the two modes of analysis validate each other.
The results of comparative analysis show that supranational entrepreneurship
alone is not a sufficient condition for successful integration outcome, as demonstrated
by the 2001 RES‐E case. When the preferences of the key member states converged
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against binding target (vertical integration) and harmonized RES support scheme
(horizontal integration) the Commission’s supranational entrepreneurship did not prove
sufficient for successful integration outcome. However, it should be noted that the
absence of domain‐specific EU rules (rule density), well‐consolidated transnational
interests and/or external shocks might have as well contributed to unsuccessful
integration outcome. The 2001 RES‐E case study can validate the findings from the fuzzy
set analysis only inasmuch as it does not invalidate them. The combinations of the
causal conditions identified by the fuzzy set analysis as jointly sufficient for the
integration were absent in the RES‐E case, which did not result in successful integration.
The RES 2009 case has shown that the European Commission’s supranational
entrepreneurship facilitated by external contingencies and rule density (existing
domain‐specific rules) led to a higher degree of institutionalization (vertical integration)
when the positions of key member states converged in favor of the Commission’s
proposal and when the European Commission was supported by the well‐consolidated
transnational interests (RES industry). On the other hand, when the positions of the key
member states converged not in favor of the harmonized trading scheme for the RES,
supported by the well‐consolidated transnational interests (RES industry) against the
Commission’s proposal, the outcome achieved little progress in terms of harmonization
level (horizontal integration). Thus, the convergence of preferences among the key
member states played a crucial role in “defeating” the Commission’s harmonization
attempt in both cases. So, we can draw two key points from the study of the RES2009
directive. First, we can identify a distinct causal path with all five causal conditions being
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present and jointly sufficient to successful vertical integration. Second, we could argue
that convergence of preferences against the Commission’s proposal on harmonization
of policy instruments and/or pressure from the consolidated transnational interest
groups hindered horizontal integration.
These findings offer two important implications for the fuzzy set analysis
presented in Chapter 4. The findings validate one of the causal paths to integration
derived from the fuzzy set analysis ‐ EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF*SUPRENT – in which
convergence of key member state preferences together with the supranational
entrepreneurship, rule density and external shocks are jointly sufficient for integration
to occur. With respect to an alternative recipe 4 from the fuzzy set solution formulas ‐
EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*~CONVPREF*SUPRENT – for horizontal integration, while the
results of the case studies attest to the importance of supranational entrepreneurship,
rule density and external shocks, they also reveal the crucial role that convergence of
preferences can have for integration outcome. Fuzzy‐set causal path, on the other hand,
offers a causal recipe, which posits convergence of preferences being present or absent.
This discrepancy can lead us to ponder upon the convergence of preferences as a
permissive condition for successful harmonization.
However, as fuzzy set analysis demonstrated, there is equifinality in European
integration. Different configurations of causal conditions – causal recipes –can lead to
the same effect. Inclusion of more case studies in the future research endeavors will
definitely yield stronger conclusions. Yet, the findings obtained from both fuzzy set
analysis and comparative in‐depth case studies support the major argument of this
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dissertation that integration in the EU’s energy policy domain proceeds under the
interplay of agency, structure and external contingency.
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this study is to understand under what conditions and how
European integration succeeds through examining twelve cases of EU legislative pieces
in energy policy domain. While the existing European integration theories explore what
is European integration, or why European integration takes place, this study takes a
configurational approach to examine how various causal factors come together to
generate integration. The configurational approach allows different combinations of
conditions to elicit causal recipes for European integration and enables this study to lay
the foundations for a typological theory of European integration. Instead of studying
European integration by looking at the progression of the integration project as a whole,
this dissertation examines integration outcomes of particular policy‐making instances
along two dimensions of vertical (institutionalization) and horizontal (harmonization)
integration.
The study draws on the two dominant and contending European integration
theories to derive liberal intergovernmental and supranational paths to European
integration and assess/test them through two different methodological approaches: a
novel fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis of twelve EU energy directives in various
sectors of EU energy policy followed by a comparative in‐depth case‐study of two
contrasting cases of 2001 and 2009 EU renewable energy directives.
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Most importantly, I suggest an alternative “punctuated equilibrium” path to
European integration that synthesizes two contending approaches and also brings in the
external contingency as a necessary component in the causal recipe. The “punctuated
equilibrium model” speaks to the underlying argument of the dissertation that
integration unfolds under the conjunction of structure (dense EU rules in a given
domain), agency (by supranational policy entrepreneurs or by states acting according to
their preferences) and external contingency (external shocks).
Overall, by synthesizing the existing theories in European integration literature
and drawing insights from the EU policy‐making and public policy research, my broad
theoretical framework based on structure, agency and external contingency and
corresponding “punctuated equilibrium” model to European integration is expected to
serve as a building block for a typological theory of European integration and persuade
the reader that integration outcomes may be achieved via different trajectories. The key
findings of the dissertation can contribute to that purpose.
Indeed, the findings largely support my broad theoretical framework and cast
doubt on studies that emphasize the preeminence of either structure or agency to
explain European integration. By analyzing different configurations of five causal
conditions – supranational entrepreneurship, convergence of preferences, transnational
interest consolidation, rule density and external contingency – fuzzy set analysis
produced four intermediate solutions that show the existence of two different causal
paths to integration.
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The findings demonstrate that external shocks, rule density and supranational
entrepreneurship jointly lead to the integration outcome. Alternatively, the analysis
reveals another causal path to integration, in which convergence of key member state
preferences combined with external shocks, rule density and supranational
entrepreneurship leads to successful integration. Interestingly, the two most successful
cases in terms of vertical integration (the renewable energy directive of 2009 and the
third energy package aimed at the liberalization of electricity markets) are covered by
this path. This may signal that particularly successful integration outcomes requires the
convergence of member state preferences in favor of the Commission’s proposal that
aims at creating binding rules at the EU level, or transferring competencies to the
Community. The case study of the RES 2009 directive reinforces the importance of
convergence of member state preferences by showing that the European Commission’s
supranational entrepreneurship facilitated by external contingencies and rule density
(existing domain‐specific rules) led to a higher degree of institutionalization (vertical
integration) when the positions of key member states converged in favor of the
Commission’s proposal. On the other hand, when the positions of the key member
states converged not in favor of the harmonized trading scheme for the RES the
outcome achieved little progress in terms of harmonization level (horizontal
integration). Comparative analysis of the two cases also shows that the lack of
convergence of preferences among the key member states in favor of the Commission’s
proposal played a crucial role in “defeating” the Commission’s harmonization attempt in
both cases.
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Overall, the findings from fuzzy set analysis and comparative case studies
validate EXTSH*RULE*CONVPREF*SUPRENT path to integration, in which convergence
of key member state preferences together with the supranational entrepreneurship,
rule density and external shocks are jointly sufficient for integration to occur. With
respect to an alternative

EXTSH*RULE*~TRANS*~CONVPREF*SUPRENT path for

horizontal integration, while the results of the case studies attest to the importance of
supranational entrepreneurship, rule density and external shocks, they also reveal the
crucial role that convergence of preferences for integration outcome. So, the fuzzy‐set
causal path, which posits convergence of preferences being present or absent, is only
partially validated. Based, on this inconsistency between the findings from two different
modes of analysis, we can speculate that convergence of preferences is a permissive
condition for successful harmonization.
What do the findings tell us about the causal paths derived from contending
European integration theories and an alternative “punctuated equilibrium” path?
Firstly, the findings do not support the liberal intergovernmental path which
posits integration outcomes as the results of the convergence of preferences among the
key member states. As the findings show, external shocks, supranational
entrepreneurship and existence of dense EU rules in the given domain are all crucial
parts of the causal recipe as well.
The findings do not support the supranational path to integration either. The
fuzzy set analysis shows that external contingencies are a required element of the causal
recipe together with the European Commission’s supranational entrepreneurship in
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exploiting existing EU rules in the energy domain. Furthermore, the presence of
consolidated transnational interests is not decisive, contrary to the supranational
arguments, to achieve integration. The comparative case studies also attest that when
the positions of the key member states converged against binding target (vertical
integration) in the 2001 RES‐E case and harmonizing the RES support scheme (horizontal
integration) in both RES‐E and 2009 RES cases, the Commission’s supranational
entrepreneurship did not prove sufficient for successful integration outcome. However,
it should be noted that the absence of domain‐specific EU rules (rule density), and/or
external shocks might have as well contributed to unsuccessful integration outcome in
the 2001 RES‐E case.
With respect to the “punctuated equilibrium” path that speaks to the broader
theoretical framework of the dissertation, the findings provide supporting evidence.
Both causal paths to integration in the EU’s energy domain resulting from fuzzy set
analysis support my argument that integration in the EU’s energy policy domain
proceeds under the conjunction of structural conditions, such as dense EU rules in a
given policy domain and external contingencies pressing for the common solutions at
the EU level that are successfully employed by supranational entrepreneurs (the
European Commission) and permitted by the convergence of preferences among major
EU member states (see Table 4.10).
Overall, the findings support the major claim of this dissertation that there are
different paths to integration and that integration in the EU energy policy domain
proceeds under the conjunction of structural conditions, such as pre‐existing domain‐
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specific EU rules, external contingencies, such as focusing events outside the EU, and
skillful supranational policy entrepreneurs, such as the European Commission, and
permitted when the positions of the key member states converge in favor of the
proposed policy objective or policy instruments.
What are the implications of the findings of this study to the European
integration theories? Most importantly, the intergovernmentalist claim that member
state preferences determine the speed and character of European integration versus
the supranational claim that European integration is a self‐reinforcing rule creation
process in which supranational entrepreneurs take the lead is not useful. The findings of
the dissertation buttress both claims. While the key EU member states with strong
bargaining positions acting together can block the adoption of undesired proposals, the
findings show that there have been policymaking instances when the European
Commission skillfully exploited opportunities opened up by external crisis, and managed
to expand existing rules in a given domain towards more integrative outcomes. The
RES2009 case offers important evidence in this respect. Governments that would
happily avoid any binding targets concerning the share of RES as demonstrated by
several preparatory Energy Council meetings, still agreed to take far‐reaching steps and
took on binding obligations. This has two major implications for liberal
intergovernmentalism. Firstly, preferences are not pre‐determined and fixed; they
change in the process of negotiations. Shifts in member state positions can happen as a
result of external crisis, as demonstrated by the punctuating impact of Russian‐
Ukrainian gas crisis in two cases: 2009 renewable energy directive and 2010 security of
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gas supply regulation. Second, factors other than just member state preferences need to
be taken into consideration when analyzing policymaking outcomes. It should be
acknowledged that negotiations constitute only one of many phases through which the
European Commission can exert its influence. Agenda‐setting and policy initiation
phases are important stages as well, in which the European Commission enjoys
considerable leverage. For instance, when preparing a draft of a directive, the
Commission already knows what member states would be ready to approve and what
could be offered by the Commission to make them ready to accept more than they
otherwise would. This knowledge is later used to mobilize the support for the
acceptance of a directive during the negotiations in the Council. The Commission can
also present a proposal as part of a larger package that significantly increases the
number of possible trade‐offs to some reluctant member states, as demonstrated by
the 2009 RES case. This leads to the creation of policy‐linkages and formulation of a
policy in a way that makes it difficult for member states to veto it. Finally, the European
Commission can strategically set an agenda for a particular policy. One of such
strategies is to present a proposal when a country with interests similar to those of the
Commission holds the EU presidency. This can contribute to shifting the negotiations in
the direction preferred by the Commission. This is what happened in the case of the
obligatory 20% target for the share of energy from renewable sources until 2020, which
was proposed by the Commission shortly after Germany took over the presidency of the
European Union.
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On the other hand, supranationalists should be careful not to overlook a central
position of member states and the fact that those instances when power is transferred
to the EU level generally tend to be those backed by member states. The findings from
the RES case illustrate that convergence of positions among the key member states on
the binding RES targets was crucial. So, convergence of preferences among key member
states, although not the single most important factor as claimed by liberal
intergovernmentalist, can still be a permissive condition. An interesting question for the
future research is to investigate what happens when the preferences of the key
governments are diffuse due to weak or fragmented domestic constituencies, or failure
to aggregate numerous bureaucratically disparate proposals into an integrated national
preference. Under what conditions would supranational entrepreneurs be more likely to
seize this opportunity and push forward more integrative outcomes?
Thus, the major implication of the dissertation findings is that they lend support
to the configurational approach synthesizing different theoretical approaches for
analyzing increasingly complex EU policymaking and its integration outcomes. ‘Either or’
approaches to European integration should be replaced by more holistic theory of
European integration that can accommodate multiple paths to integration. This
dissertation is expected to have an added value in that respect.
The theory and analysis developed in this research informs the understanding of
how integration succeeds in the EU’s energy domain. Although the study is limited to
the energy field, I believe that the proposed theoretical framework and a novel method
of fuzzy set analysis in European integration scholarship can successfully be applied to
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other EU policy fields, such as environmental or transport domains, and prove useful for
future cross‐sectional comparative studies of integration outcomes in different policy
fields.
Another research endeavor, which would validate and at the same time further
develop the findings, is to examine more cases in the EU energy domain. This is
particularly relevant since the EU has put forward subsequent proposals in some of the
sectors covered in this dissertation (e.g. renewable energy). Including more in‐depth
case studies would also enhance the validity of the findings and provide valuable
empirical knowledge in some sector of the EU energy domain, similar to the two
renewable energy case studies in the present research.
Despite the novel methodological effort contributing to the European
integration literature, there are some important constraints in the analysis which may
require further development. First, it is important to note that the credibility of fuzzy set
analysis critically relies on its calibration process. Ragin (2008) stresses that calibration
process should never be a mechanical process; it should always be based on the
researcher’s substantive and theoretical knowledge. Yet, at the same time Ragin (2008)
strongly recommends utilizing external criteria for the calibration process in order to
achieve transparent and systematic analysis. Due to the lack of literature in European
integration studies using fuzzy set methods, my fuzzy set calibration process largely
imitates the recommended processes and examples used by Ragin (2008; Rihoux and
Ragin 2008). Therefore, the qualitative anchors which did not have explicit external
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criteria in the literature had to be calibrated on my interpretation of the data obtained
from elite surveys and semi‐structured interviews.
Another methodological challenge lies in the number of causal conditions and
the limited number of cases. If too many causal conditions are introduced into a recipe,
the results can become overly complex. With five causal conditions and twelve cases,
some of the paths which lead to the outcome capture only one case and that creates
problems for coverage and consistency analysis (Schneider and Wegemann 2004). This
challenge can be overcome in the future research by including more cases – more policy
proposals within the energy domain.
In addition, there is always an element of interpretation and bias when we seek
to explain directly unobservable phenomenon. Among the most problematic tasks are
identifying member state preferences and impacts of external shocks. This requires the
interpretation of a complex and contradictory documentary record. Therefore, quality
and representativeness of sources is a key. Data triangulation strategy has been pursued
to cross‐check the reliability of data. Internal governmental reports and minutes),
corroborated memoirs provided during interviews by the participants archived and
published oral histories have been consulted. However, caveats still remain. It was not
always possible to assemble a comprehensive primary‐source record (archives remain
closed, minutes remain classified, politicians remain in office and issues remain
sensitive).
Besides these limitations, this study is expected to bring integrative cumulation
as it synthesizes existing theoretical approaches in order to understand the dynamics of
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European integration. On the methodological front, employment of fsQCA on twelve EU
energy proposals is a pioneering attempt in European integration field and brings
valuable addition to the existing qualitative studies of European integration. In addition,
the dissertation contributes to better understanding of under‐researched EU energy
policy‐making. Finally, the dissertation can be insightful for the EU and national
policymakers in their efforts towards developing a common European energy policy.
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APPENDIX A – ELITE SURVEY ON EU ENERGY POLICY
(Approved by Institutional Review Board of the University of South Carolina in
accordance with the provisions on the Protection of Human Subject in the Code of
Federal Regulations (45 CFR 46))
THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS CONFIDENTIAL AND FOR RESEARCH PURPOSES ONLY
From the list below, please select the EU directives/regulation you are well‐familiar
with. If you have been closely involved with more than one legislative piece listed
below, please fill out the questionnaire separately for each selection.
Energy Package I (Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity)
Energy Package I (Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and the Council
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas)
Energy Package II (Directive 2003/54/ EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity)
Energy Package II (Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning common rule for the internal market in natural gas)
Energy Package III (Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and
accompanying Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and 715/2009 on
conditions for access to the network for cross‐border exchanges in electricity)
Energy Package III (Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and
accompanying Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators, Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 and 715/2009 on
conditions for access to the network for cross‐border exchanges in gas)
Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal
electricity market
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Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources
Council Directive 2004/67/EC concerning measures to safeguard security of natural
gas supply
Regulation (EC) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply
Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy end‐
use efficiency and energy services
Directive 2012/27/EU of the Council and the European Parliament on energy
efficiency establishing a common framework of measures for the promotion of
energy efficiency

Please answer the following questions IN REFERENCE to the directive/regulation you
selected from the above list

Q1: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of the European
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship throughout the process of proposal development
in terms of its effort and success in raising the issue on the EU agenda, and mobilizing
stakeholders’ support on the objectives of the proposal, such as creation of binding
rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of competencies from member
states to the EU?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q2: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of the European
Commission’s policy entrepreneurship throughout the process of proposal development
in terms of its effort and success in raising the issue on the EU agenda, and mobilizing
stakeholders’ support on the harmonization of policy instruments, measures, standards
across member states suggested in the proposal?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q3: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of convergence among the
positions of the key Member States (France, Germany, the UK, and Poland) in favor of
the objectives of the Commission’s proposal, such as creation of binding rules and
obligations for member states, and/or transfer of competencies from member states to
the EU.
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(NOTE: if you consider that the positions of the key member states converged NOT in
favor of the objectives of the proposal, please rank ”0”)
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Q4: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of convergence among the
positions of the key Member States (France, Germany, the UK, and Poland) in favor of
the harmonization of policy instruments, measures, standards across member states
suggested in the Commission’s proposal?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(NOTE: if you consider that the positions of the key member states converged NOT in
favor of the harmonization of policy instruments, measures, standards across member
states, please rank ”0”)
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Q5: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of consolidation of
transnational interest groups organized at the EU level (European
federations/associations) that were in favor of the objectives of the Commission’s
proposal, such as creation of binding rules and obligations for member states, and/or
transfer of competencies from member states to the EU.
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q6: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of consolidation of
transnational interest groups organized at the EU level (European
federations/associations) that were in favor of the harmonization of policy
instruments, measures, standards across member states suggested in the Commission’s
proposal.
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0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q7: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the impact of the Treaty Legal Basis of
the adopted proposal in terms of increasing the discretion of the Community (EU)?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q8: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the impact of the Treaty Legal Basis of
the adopted proposal in terms of promoting harmonization of policy instruments,
measures, or standards across member states?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q9: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the impact of the already existing EU
rules within the same policy domain on the objectives of the proposal, such as creation
of binding rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of competencies
from member states to the EU (for example, the impact of the pre‐existing RES‐E 2001
directive on the objectives of the RES 2009 directive)?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(Note: if you consider that no previous EU rules existed within the same policy domain,
please rank “0”)
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Q10: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the impact of the already existing EU
rules within the same policy domain on the means of the proposal, such as
harmonization of policy instruments, measures or standards across member states (for
example, the impact of the pre‐existing RES‐E 2001 directive on the harmonization level
introduced by the RES 2009 directive)?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(Note: if you consider that no previous EU rules existed within the same policy domain,
please rank “0”)
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Q11: Please rank the impact of an external shock, such as a focusing event or crisis
outside the EU (if any) on the objectives of the proposal, such as creation of binding
rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of competencies from member
states to the EU? (Please specify the focusing event/crisis:___________________)
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(Note: if you consider that no focusing event/crisis outside the EU had any effect of the
objectives of the proposal, or if you consider that the focusing event/crisis you specified
had a negative effect, please rank “0”)
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Q12: Please rank the impact of an external shock, such as a focusing event or crisis
outside the EU (if any) on the means of the proposal, such as harmonization of policy
instruments, measures or standards across member states (Please specify the focusing
event/crisis:___________________)
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
(Note: if you consider that no focusing event/crisis outside the EU had any effect of the
means of the proposal, or if you consider that the focusing event/crisis you specified
had a negative effect, please rank “0”)
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Q 13: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the degree of institutionalization, such
as creation of binding rules and obligations for member states, and/or transfer of
competencies from member states to the EU, introduced by the directive/regulation?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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Q14: Please rank on the following 10‐point scale the level of harmonization, such as
harmonization of policy instruments, measures or standards across member states,
introduced by the directive/regulation?
0‐1(none); 2‐4 (low); 5 (difficult to rank); 6‐8 (medium), 9‐10 (high)
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